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The Bichard Inquiry – Contents  iii Introduction and summary 
by Sir Michael Bichard 
1 	 On 17 December 2003, Ian Huntley was convicted of the murders of Jessica 
Chapman and Holly Wells. It is difficult to exaggerate the horror which these 
murders caused or to begin to imagine the grief of the girls’ families. 
2 	 In the days following Huntley’s conviction, there was widespread public 
disquiet when it became clear that he had been known to the authorities 
over a period of years. In fact, he had come to the attention of Humberside 
Police in relation to allegations of eight separate sexual offences from 1995 
to 1999 (and had been investigated in yet another). This information had 
not emerged during the vetting check, carried out by Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary at the time of Huntley’s appointment to Soham Village 
College late in 2001. 
3  This Inquiry was set up by the Home Secretary to: 
‘Urgently enquire into child protection procedures in Humberside 
Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary in the light of the recent 
trial and conviction of Ian Huntley for the murder of Jessica 
Chapman and Holly Wells. In particular to assess the effectiveness 
of the relevant intelligence-based record keeping, the vetting 
practices in those forces since 1995 and information sharing with 
other agencies, and to report to the Home Secretary on matters 
of local and national relevance and make recommendations as 
appropriate.’ 
4 	 As I made clear in my opening statement in January 2004, my aim has been 
to discover what happened, why it happened and what lessons could be 
learned and conclusions drawn. That has inevitably involved asking some 
tough questions and criticising individuals and organisations. 
5 	 Huntley alone was responsible for, and stands convicted of, these most 
awful murders. None of the actions or failures of any of the witnesses who 
gave evidence to the Inquiry, or the institutions they represented, led to the 
deaths of the girls. 
6 	 However, the Inquiry did find errors, omissions, failures and shortcomings 
which are deeply shocking. Taken together, these were so extensive that 
one cannot be confident that it was Huntley alone who ‘slipped through 
the net’. 
The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary  1 7 	 The detailed facts and findings are set out in the body of the report. In this 
summary, I highlight the main conclusions. 
In Humberside and North East Lincolnshire 
Humberside Police 
8 	 One of the key failings was the inability of Humberside Police and Social 
Services to identify Huntley’s behaviour pattern remotely soon enough. 
That was because both viewed each case in isolation and because 
Social Services failed to share information effectively with the police. 
It was also because, as the Humberside Chief Constable admitted in his 
evidence, there were ‘systemic and corporate’ failures in the way in which 
Humberside Police managed their intelligence systems. 
9 	 These failures were all the more surprising given the emphasis all the 
witnesses placed on the importance of intelligence and the need to 
identify patterns of criminal behaviour as early as possible. 
10 	 The reality in Humberside was very different. The process of creating 
records on their main local intelligence system – called CIS Nominals 
– was fundamentally flawed throughout the relevant period. Police officers 
at various levels were alarmingly ignorant of how records were created 
and how the system worked. The guidance and training available were 
inadequate and this fed the confusion which surrounded the review and 
deletion of records once they had been created. 
11 	 This confusion was so serious that there was not even a common 
understanding of what was meant by ‘weeding’, ‘reviewing’ and 
‘deletion’. It cannot now be ascertained how many records were lost 
without proper review. The only sensible inference is that a significant 
number were lost. It cannot be known whether the confusion contributed 
to the deletion of the information in the only intelligence report on Huntley, 
filed by Police Constable Harding, in July 1999, or whether the deletion was 
an error of judgement or simply a mistake. However, the ‘haemorrhaging’ 
of intelligence casts serious doubts on the usefulness of other Humberside 
Police records. 
12 	 The failures in the use of CIS Nominals were compounded by the fact that 
other systems were also not being operated properly. Information was not 
recorded correctly onto the separate CIS Crime system. It took four years 
(from 1999 to 2003) for those carrying out vetting checks to be told that the 
CIS 2 system, introduced in late 1999, also allowed them to check a name 
through the CIS Crime system. 
13 	 Equally, the Child Protection Database (CPD), as operated, was largely 
worthless because the information put onto it was regarded as unreliable. 
CPD records were not reviewed or deleted for ten years, and even when 
it was finally realised that this database could be an important vetting tool 
(1998), it took a further four years to use it for that purpose. 
14 	 As a result of these failures, there was not one single occasion in all of the 
contacts with Huntley when the record creation system worked as it should 
have done. The various investigations of Huntley from 1995 onwards within 
2  The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary Humberside might well have been different if the police officers involved 
had known about past incidents. It cannot be known whether the disposal 
of any of those incidents would or should have been different as a result. 
The most that can be said is that such opportunity as there was, was missed. 
15 	 I have to conclude that these problems arose, at least in part, from 
a widespread failure to appreciate the value of intelligence within 
Humberside Police. As late as October 2002, the force’s then Director 
of Intelligence reported that there was ‘an alarming ignorance of what 
constitutes intelligence, how it should be recorded then how it should be 
graded, stored, disseminated and weeded’. As I state in my report, there is 
every reason to suppose that the level of ignorance was even greater in the 
late 1990s. 
Social Services 
16 	 It is not for me to reach conclusions about Social Services’ handling of the 
early contacts with Huntley. This is a matter for Sir Christopher Kelly’s Serious 
Case Review. I have, however, referred to him my misgivings about several 
aspects of these contacts. 
17 	 Why, in Contact 1, was it concluded by social workers that there were ‘no 
significant concerns found in welfare’, even though it was accepted that a 
15-year-old girl (AB) was staying with a 21-year-old boyfriend (Huntley) with 
whom she admitted having sex? Why in Contact 2A (CD), was the case not 
referred to Humberside Police when it became clear that an allegation had 
been made that CD, also 15 years old, had had sex with Huntley? Why was 
no action taken to prevent CD from living alone with Huntley after his father 
had left on business? 
18 	 Why was Contact 3 (EF), again a 15-year-old, dealt with by Social Services 
alone, rather than jointly with the police? 
19 	 Taken together, these issues raise serious questions about the extent to 
which Social Services played their part in dealing effectively with someone 
who was, over a short period of time, known to have been involved sexually 
with several girls under the age of consent. 
20 	 In addition to the contacts which the Inquiry examined, it is apparent from 
information obtained by Social Services, and provided as supplementary 
evidence, that Huntley was probably involved sexually with one other 
girl under the age of 16, but none of the Social Services’ computerised 
records that remain in respect of this girl mention the name ‘Huntley’. Such 
actions as are recorded by Social Services do not show any reference 
to Humberside Police. It is also possible that Huntley had other sexual 
relationships with girls under the age of 16 that were not referred to Social 
Services or the police, and so have not been considered by the Inquiry. 
Data protection 
21 	 In the media coverage following the trial, and during the course of the 
Inquiry, a great deal of attention has been given to the role of the data 
protection legislation. This is not least because the Humberside Police press 
release of 17 December 2003 suggested that the legislation was a principal 
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available to them in December 2001. I reject that suggestion. 
22 	 By the time Chief Constable Westwood came to give written and oral 
evidence, he acknowledged that the data protection legislation was not 
the reason for the lack of searchable records. He was right to do so. 
23 	 It is evident that police officers were nervous about breaching the 
legislation, partly at least because too little was done to educate and 
reassure them about its impact. But I do not believe that the current Data 
Protection Act needs to be revised as a result of these events. It is, as a 
member of the judiciary said recently, an ‘inelegant and cumbersome’ 
piece of legislation, but the legislation was not the problem. I suggest, 
however, that better guidance is needed on the collection, retention, 
deletion, use and sharing of information, so that police officers, social 
workers and other professionals can feel more confident in using information 
properly. 
In Cambridgeshire 
24 	 Cambridgeshire Constabulary was the other police force directly involved 
in the Inquiry because of its handling of Huntley’s vetting check. There, too, 
errors were made. These included: 
•  entering Huntley’s date of birth incorrectly onto the database; and 
• 	 checking the Police National Computer (PNC) only against the name 
‘Ian Nixon’, and not against ‘Ian Huntley’. 
25 	 I have also concluded that it is extremely unlikely that any fax was ever sent 
to Humberside Police requesting a check of their (Humberside’s) records. 
26 	 These errors, caused by problems in Cambridgeshire Constabulary’s local 
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB), were not systemic or corporate, but they 
were serious. The evidence to the Inquiry showed a unit with resource and 
work pressures, confused processes not explicitly defined, a lack of audit/ 
performance-monitoring arrangements, and poor training and guidance. 
Staff were struggling to deliver an adequate service in the run-up to the 
introduction of the national CRB, and they were trying to balance a 
number of competing calls on their time. In the circumstances, it is not at all 
surprising that the errors were made. 
27 	 Even if a fax had been sent, a check of Humberside Police records would 
not have revealed anything because their CIS Nominals had no information 
on Huntley in December 2001, and at that time no other systems were 
checked by Humberside Police for vetting purposes. I am very clear that 
the fax should have been sent by Cambridgeshire Constabulary, the 
intelligence should have been kept by Humberside Police, and Huntley’s 
history should have been revealed. 
28 	 Not surprisingly, Cambridgeshire Constabulary have since taken steps 
to address these failings. It also appears from a review subsequently 
4  The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary conducted by them that it is unlikely that the kinds of errors made in this 
case were widespread. 
29 	 It has not been part of my remit to consider the way in which 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary managed the investigation into the murders 
of Jessica and Holly. Sir Keith Povey, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary (HMCIC), is leading that work. 
Huntley’s recruitment 
30 	 In late 2001, Huntley applied for the post of caretaker at Soham Village 
College, a school that before and after these events has shown itself 
to be excellent and well led. Nonetheless, on this occasion there were 
errors in the school’s recruitment process. The five open references that 
Huntley provided were, by their nature, unreliable and should not have 
been accepted. It was not the practice of the school normally to do so. 
In addition, Huntley’s employment history was not adequately checked 
and it contained gaps including, the Inquiry discovered, one undisclosed 
employer from whom no reference was sought. 
31 	 I consider that Huntley should not have been allowed to start work before 
the necessary checks were completed, given that he would be working 
and living on site; he had not previously held any post involving significant 
contact with children; and alternative arrangements had previously been 
put in place to cover the work. 
32 	 However, even if the proper practices had been followed at Soham Village 
College, the likelihood is that the outcome would have been no different. 
The references were later checked by Cambridgeshire Constabulary and 
were authentic. 
33 	 Soham Village College retains Education Personnel Management Limited 
(EPM), as a personnel service provider. One of EPM’s directors would have 
signed the Police Check Form, to confirm that the particulars Huntley 
provided had been verified. They did not, in practice, however, check 
all those particulars, including details such as previous addresses. EPM 
explained that, in their opinion, this was not practical, nor was it required 
by the guidance provided at the time, nor was it common practice with 
other Registered Bodies. I do not have to determine this point, but it is never 
good practice to suggest that facts have been verified when they have 
not. It would have been sensible for EPM, and other Registered Bodies, to 
point out the deficiencies in the wording of the guidance to the relevant 
government departments. Equally, the wording should have spelt out more 
clearly the responsibilities of the Registered Bodies. 
The national context 
34 	 I have been able to look closely at the national context within which 
the events in Humberside and Cambridgeshire unfolded. Once again, 
the Inquiry discovered a series of shortcomings which suggest that the 
importance everyone concerned professes to give intelligence was not 
borne out in reality. 
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recording intelligence were part of the original National Strategy for Police 
Information Systems (NSPIS) as long ago as 1994, no such system exists 
even now. It was, in fact, formally abandoned in 2000 at the same time 
as the launch of the National Intelligence Model (NIM), which sought to 
place intelligence at the heart of policing. There are still no firm plans for 
a national IT system in England and Wales, although, in contrast, such a 
system will be fully operational in Scotland by the end of this year. 
36 	 Furthermore, it is only very recently that priority was given to a system that 
will enable forces (and the CRB) to identify that intelligence is held on an 
individual by another police force. This is the so-called PLX system, and 
it should be available to all forces by the end of 2005, although a similar 
system has been available in Scotland since 1992. Without the PLX, even 
today, anyone could move from one police force area to another, and 
that force would have no way of knowing that there was intelligence held 
on that person, unless there was a recordable conviction, in which case it 
would be on the PNC, or they happened to contact the first force directly. 
37 	 The PNC is the most important current national system. It holds information, 
not just on individuals’ recordable convictions but also on, for example, 
aliases and distinguishing features. For nearly a decade now, successive 
reports from the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO), the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Home Office Police 
Research Group and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) 
have drawn attention to serious delays across police forces in entering 
data onto the PNC. The failure to remedy these problems over such a long 
period of time is yet further evidence of the failure in practice to recognise 
intelligence gathering as a prerequisite of modern, effective policing. 
38 	 Some improvements in the PNC’s performance have begun to be made 
very recently. To ensure that further progress is achieved, the Home Office 
now intends to introduce a Code of Practice, under the Police Reform Act 
2002, which gives greater powers and sanctions. 
39	 The quality and timeliness of PNC data entry will also now be included in the 
Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF), and the Performance 
Baseline Assessments, to ensure that performance is regularly monitored. It 
must, however, be a source of acute embarrassment to the police service that 
this poor performance has been allowed to continue for so long, even allowing 
for other pressures and priorities. 
40 	 It is also very important that the responsibility for entering court results onto 
the PNC transfers from the police to the Court Service – by the current 
proposed date of 2006 at the latest. Most important of all is that the 
medium- and long-term future of the PNC, which is already an ageing 
system, needs to be secured, with additional resources if necessary. 
41 	 A national IT intelligence system and a secure, efficient PNC are 
priorities for the future, but it is questionable whether the lack of either 
played a significant part in the contacts with Huntley. The lack of clear, 
understandable national standards and guidance on the subject of record 
creation, retention, review, deletion and information sharing most likely did 
6  The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary contribute to the failure of record keeping in Humberside Police. The lack 
of clarity, and the differing practices in the 43 police forces, also makes the 
loss of valuable information through inappropriate deletion more likely, as 
happened in Humberside. 
42 	 I am, therefore, clear that we need a national Code of Practice to cover 
record creation, retention, deletion and information sharing, which is easily 
understood and uniformly applied across the country. 
43 	 Without doubt, given their nature and scale, one might have expected 
the failures I have described – especially in Humberside Police – to have 
been identified and resolved earlier by local management and by external 
assessors. Those external assessors included HMIC, part of whose task is to 
identify any functions and activities that are at risk, by making use of the 
data and intelligence it gathers from its many contacts with police forces. 
Had the problems I have described been identified earlier, either by HMIC 
or by the Humberside Police Authority (whose resources, it must be said, 
were seriously limited), then action must surely have followed. 
The failings 
44 	 In the 35 years I have worked in the public sector, I have rarely encountered 
staff who did not strive, to the best of their ability, to provide a good service 
to the public within the resources available. However, when failures occur, 
they can have devastating consequences, and in those circumstances, it 
is important to identify where responsibility lies before making proposals for 
future improvements. 
Humberside Police 
45 	 It should be said that in the past two years, Humberside Police have 
devoted considerable time, resources and effort to addressing the 
problems with their intelligence systems and practices. 
46 	 However, the problems I have identified in Humberside were not isolated or 
the result of simple human errors. In the words of the Chief Constable, the 
failings were ‘systemic and corporate’. These were problems of the most 
serious kind. There was a failure, over several years, to identify them, caused 
in large part by the fact that there were few effective management 
audits or inspections to check that the systems were operating properly. 
There was inadequate training for police officers and the guidance on 
record creation, review and deletion was either non-existent or, at best, 
confused. There is little evidence of sufficient strategic review of information 
management systems and no real awareness among senior managers of 
the scale and nature of the problems. In some instances, that seems only to 
have been grasped during the Inquiry hearings themselves. 
47 	 I do not expect senior management in any organisation to know about 
every failure. However, in such key areas, senior management could and 
should have done more to identify and deal with the failures – especially 
when others, including HMIC, had drawn attention to the importance of 
information management. 
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management at Humberside Police. 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary 
49 	 As I have said, the errors made by Cambridgeshire Constabulary were 
serious and one might have expected the Chief Constable to identify the 
extent of these earlier than he did. As far as the local CRB was concerned, 
the nature of the failings resembled those in Humberside. There was a lack 
of clear guidance about the process, no adequate audit, and a failure 
on the part of senior management to identify the problems. The extent of 
these failings, however, was not as great as in Humberside Police. They were 
neither systemic nor corporate. 
Others 
50 	 With regard to Social Services, I share the concerns expressed fairly by the 
new Deputy Director, Mr Martin Eaden. However, it is for Sir Christopher Kelly 
to reach final conclusions on this. 
51 	 I believe that PITO, ACPO and the Home Office must share responsibility 
for the fact that there is still no national intelligence IT system, nor even a 
system which flags up to police forces that there is intelligence held on an 
individual by another police force. The failure here contrasts sharply with the 
progress made in Scotland. 
52 	 The Home Office should take the lead more effectively than it has during 
the past decade, to deliver these priorities. Ultimately, they should be 
priorities for the government as a whole and not just one department. 
53 	 ACPO will be disappointed that for so long it was unable to persuade its 
members to improve their performance with respect to the quality and 
timeliness of data entered onto the PNC. ACPO has also been unable to 
foster a culture that properly values the importance of intelligence, and to 
provide guidance to minimise the scope for confusion, on the retention and 
deletion of criminal intelligence. In fairness, I acknowledge the work that 
has been taken forward in recent years on the National Intelligence Model. 
54 	 I have also found cause to criticise the way in which ACPO handled recent 
disagreements with the Information Commissioner, who was, in my view, 
fulfilling his responsibilities in challenging some decisions by police forces. 
However, the Commissioner, too, needs to be mindful of the tone of such 
challenges. There is a danger that inappropriate language can feed a 
climate of fear, which too easily surrounds the data protection legislation. 
55 	 ACPO is, of course, the national body which exists, in large part, to seek 
to develop national approaches to national problems. All the heads of 
the police forces are represented on it. My comments, therefore, are not 
directed primarily at the current leadership of the Association but will, I 
hope, be taken to heart by the police service as a whole. 
56 	 I have no doubt that Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary 
(HMCIC), Sir Keith Povey, appreciates the critical part that HMIC can play 
in raising the performance of police forces across the country. I also believe 
that he understands how HMIC can perform that task most effectively. 
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more to identify earlier, and help address more effectively, the problems 
that existed in Humberside Police. 
57 	 HMIC might also have focused earlier, nationally, on the issues of record 
retention, deletion and vetting. Humberside Police were inspected on 
several occasions during the period in question, and although comments 
were made about IT information systems and intelligence, at no time was 
the scale of their problems exposed. The fact that HMIC were able to 
reach clear views so quickly in their inspection in late 2003 underscores my 
conclusions. I believe that there was sufficient in the HMIC reports to have 
caused Humberside Police Authority to ask more difficult questions. 
58 	 The interview and recruitment process which led to Huntley’s appointment 
at Soham Village College was flawed, as the school principal admitted. 
This only goes to reinforce the findings of successive reports about the 
importance of the selection process and I am making recommendations 
about selection and recruitment in schools. 
59 	 The CRB needs urgently to offer further advice on the responsibilities of 
Registered Bodies for the checking of information provided by applicants 
for disclosure. 
What improvements can be made? 
60 	 I have set out elsewhere all of the recommendations contained in this report 
(see pages 13–17). I have also tried to ensure that the responsibility for each 
is made clear so that I can review progress when the Inquiry re-convenes. 
In this summary I want to highlight the five key areas where I think progress is 
essential. These are: 
A new system for registering those working with children and vulnerable 
adults 
61 	 The current arrangements could be improved within the existing vetting 
framework to address concerns about checking identity, checking an 
applicant’s addresses, dealing with incomplete and withdrawn applications 
and providing access to additional databases (for example, HM Customs 
and Excise). However, the resulting improved regime would still have 
overlaps, duplications and inconsistencies and could only offer a snapshot 
taken when a vetting search was undertaken. 
62 	 I am, therefore, recommending a very different system. I am proposing 
the introduction of a register of those who wish to work with children or 
vulnerable adults – perhaps evidenced by a licence or card. The inclusion 
of an individual on this register would reassure employers that nothing was 
known by any of the relevant agencies about that individual that would 
disqualify them from working with children or vulnerable adults. 
63 	 The register would be constantly updated, following the introduction next 
year of a new system (the PLX) that will indicate when police forces hold 
intelligence on an individual. The register could be easily accessed – subject 
to security protection – by any employer, large or small, including parents 
employing tutors or sports coaches. Such a system would relieve the police 
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employers and would simplify arrangements for employers. It could – and 
I think should – incorporate an appeal process for applicants who were 
refused registration. It would also avoid information about past convictions 
being released to prospective employers without reference first to the 
individual concerned. 
64 	 These new arrangements would need to be put in place over a period of 
time and a decision will need to be made about which central body should 
be responsible for administering the system. The government will also need 
to be satisfied about costs matched against benefits, although preliminary 
indications suggest that the new arrangements could offer savings in a 
relatively short time. 
65 	 The arguments for and against a card or licence are finely balanced and 
again, these are matters for the government to consider. I merely say that 
if it is decided to introduce a card, then a card with a photograph and 
biometric details would provide real advantages in checking identity. 
A national IT intelligence system 
66 	 If it is possible to introduce a national IT intelligence system in Scotland 
(and that will be done by the end of the year), then it should be possible 
to do the same in England and Wales, even allowing for the additional 
complexities. 
67 	 It is regrettable that so little progress has been made since 1994 and 
that, as a result, police forces do not easily or routinely have access to 
intelligence held about an individual by other forces. The development 
and early implementation of a national intelligence IT system in England 
and Wales should be an urgent priority for the government, with the Home 
Office taking the lead. At the least, an interim system for flagging the 
existence of information should be in place by 2005. 
Clear guidance on record creation, retention, review, deletion and the 
sharing of information 
68 	 Although there is much advice and guidance already in existence, it is 
subject to local interpretation and leaves scope for confusion between the 
concept of ‘review’ on the one hand and ‘deletion’ on the other. In some 
circumstances, the guidance is unclear about the retention of conviction-
related information and leads to inconsistent decisions about the retention 
of criminal intelligence (that is, non-conviction related information). 
69 	 As a result, the possibility of valuable intelligence being lost prematurely 
is significant. I believe, therefore, that a new national Code of Practice is 
needed, and that it should be made under the Police Reform Act, to ensure 
that it is applied across the country. It needs to be clear and designed to 
help police officers in the front line. It should supersede all existing guidance 
and cover the capture, review, retention or deletion of all information 
(whether or not it is conviction related). The Code should also cover the 
sharing of information by the police with partner agencies. 
10  The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary Referral of sexual offences against children and subsequent action 
70 	 I have noted the level of public disquiet that Huntley was able to have 
sexual relationships with so many girls under the age of 16 and, in one 
instance, even to live with a girl under 16. There is also concern that the 
issue of underage sex may not be taken sufficiently seriously by the police or 
social services generally. 
71 	 Of course, I am aware that some teenagers under the age of 16 have sex, 
but what causes most concern is when one of the parties is noticeably 
older, or has been ‘grooming’ the other, younger, party in some way. I note 
that this concern is reflected in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, now in force. 
72 	 There is already guidance in Working Together to Safeguard Children 1999, 
requiring Social Services departments, save in exceptional circumstances, 
to inform the police about sexual offences committed, or suspected of 
having been committed, against children. But this case has demonstrated 
the need to ensure that this guidance is conscientiously applied and I 
believe that some further action is needed to ensure this happens. 
73  I am therefore proposing that: 
73.1 	 The government should reaffirm the expectation that social services 
should, other than in exceptional circumstances, notify the police 
about sexual offences committed or suspected against children. 
73.2 	 National guidance should be provided to assist social services 
departments in making the decision about when to notify the police 
– or not. 
73.3 	 Social services records, in particular the Integrated Children’s System 
(ICS), should record those cases where a decision is taken not to 
notify the police. 
73.4 	 The decision making in these cases should be inspected by the 
Commission for Social Care Inspection. 
Training for all involved in appointing people to work with children 
74 	 Previous Inquiries have also highlighted the importance of robust selection 
and recruitment. Guidance was issued to local social services departments 
following the Warner Report, and the National Minimum Standards, 
issued under the Care Standards Act, also refer to this. However, I am not 
convinced that this issue has been taken on board sufficiently in education. 
75 	 The danger is that too much reliance will be placed on CRB checks and 
the registration scheme which I am now recommending. However, there 
is a concern that many abusers are not known to the police, therefore 
if properly conducted, the selection and recruitment process is a further 
essential safeguard. 
76 	 I therefore want to see more training being made available to school 
governors and head teachers to ensure that interviews to appoint staff 
reflect the importance of safeguarding children. From a date to be agreed, 
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at least one panel member being properly trained. 
77 	 I also want to see the inspection bodies, such as Ofsted, reviewing 
recruitment arrangements in schools. I understand that the Commission for 
Social Care Improvement already includes an evaluation of evidence of 
effective recruitment and vetting procedures in its inspections of regulated 
care settings. 
Conclusion 
78 	 I have already announced that I shall reconvene the Inquiry in six months’ 
time to review publicly the progress that has been made against these 
various recommendations. I am aware that because of the speed with 
which we have worked, some of the recommendations need further 
detailed work, but I am confident that all those who have a part to play 
will respond urgently. 
79 	 For those agencies whose job it is to protect children and vulnerable 
people, the harsh reality is that if a sufficiently devious person is determined 
to seek out opportunities to work their evil, no one can guarantee that 
they will be stopped. Our task is to make it as difficult as possible for them 
to succeed, and if the various recommendations in this report had already 
been in place, then it would have been significantly more difficult for 
Huntley. 
80 	 Even then, however, it will always be possible for someone like Huntley to slip 
through the net unless intelligence records are maintained and accessed 
effectively. It is quite clear that in this case that did not happen because of 
serious failings over a period of several years. 
12  The Bichard Inquiry – Introduction and summary Recommendations for action

A national information technology (IT) system for police 
intelligence in England and Wales 
1 	 A national IT system for England and Wales to support police intelligence 
should be introduced as a matter of urgency. The Home Office should 
take the lead and report by December 2004 with clear targets for 
implementation (page 132). 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
2 	 The PLX system, which flags that intelligence is held about someone by 
particular police forces, should be introduced in England and Wales by 2005 
(page 132). 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
Police IT procurement 
3 	 The procurement of IT systems by the police should be reviewed to ensure 
that, wherever possible, national solutions are delivered to national 
problems (page 133). 
Responsibility: The Home Office, advised by the Police Information 
Technology Organisation (PITO) 
The Police National Computer (PNC) 
4 	 Investment should be made available by Government to secure the PNC’s 
medium and long-term future, given its importance to intelligence-led 
policing and to the criminal justice system as a whole. I note that PITO has 
begun this work (page 134). 
Responsibility: The Home Office, advised by PITO 
5 	 The new Code of Practice, made under the Police Reform Act 2002, 
dealing with the quality and timeliness of PNC data input, should be 
implemented as soon as possible (page 134). 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
The Bichard Inquiry – Recommendations for action  13 6 	 The quality and timeliness of PNC data input should be routinely inspected 
as part of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) and 
the Baseline Assessments, which are being developed by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (page 134). 
Responsibility: HMIC 
7 	 The transfer of responsibility for inputting court results onto the PNC should 
be reaffirmed by the Court Service and the Home Office and, if possible, 
accelerated ahead of the 2006 target. At the least, that deadline must be 
met (page 134). 
Responsibility: The Court Service and the Home Office 
A new Code of Practice on information management 
8 	 A Code of Practice should be produced covering record creation, review, 
retention, deletion and information sharing. This should be made under 
the Police Reform Act 2002 and needs to be clear, concise and practical. 
It should supersede existing guidance (page 138). 
9 	 The Code of Practice must clearly set out the key principles of good 
information management (capture, review, retention, deletion and 
sharing), having regard to policing purposes, the rights of the individual 
and the law (page 138). 
10 	 The Code of Practice must set out the standards to be met in terms of 
systems (including IT), accountability, training, resources and audit. These 
standards should be capable of being monitored both within police forces 
and by HMIC and should fit within the PPAF (page 138). 
11 	 The Code of Practice should have particular regard to the factors to be 
considered when reviewing the retention or deletion of intelligence in cases 
of sexual offences (page 138). 
Responsibility: The Home Office, taking advice from the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Information Commissioner and the other 
relevant agencies 
Handling allegations of sexual offences against children 
12 	 The Government should reaffirm the guidance in Working Together to 
Safeguard Children so that the police are notified as soon as possible when 
a criminal offence has been committed, or is suspected of having been 
committed, against a child – unless there are exceptional reasons not to 
do so (page 139). 
13 	 National guidance should be produced to inform the decision as to 
whether or not to notify the police. This guidance could usefully draw upon 
the criteria included in a local protocol being developed by Sheffield Social 
Services and brought to the attention of the Inquiry. The decision would 
therefore take account of: 
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• overt  aggression; 
• coercion  or  bribery; 
•  the misuse of substances as a disinhibitor; 
• 	 whether the child’s own behaviour, because of the misuse of 
substances, places him/her at risk so that he/she is unable to make 
an informed choice about any activity; 
• 	 whether any attempts to secure secrecy have been made by 
the sexual partner, beyond what would be considered usual in a 
teenage relationship; 
• 	 whether the sexual partner is known by one of the agencies (which 
presupposes that checks will be made with the police); 
•  whether the child denies, minimises or accepts concerns; and 
•  whether the methods used are consistent with grooming. 
14 	 The Integrated Children’s System should record those cases where 
a decision is taken not to refer to the police. 
15 	 The Commission for Social Care Inspection should, as part of any social 
services inspection, review whether decisions not to inform the police have 
been properly taken (page 139). 
Responsibility: The Department for Education and Skills (DfES) 
Training for those conducting interviews 
16 	 Head teachers and school governors should receive training on how 
to ensure that interviews to appoint staff reflect the importance of 
safeguarding children (page 141). 
17 	 From a date to be agreed, no interview panel to appoint staff working in 
schools should be convened without at least one member being properly 
trained (page 141). 
18 	 The relevant inspection bodies should, as part of their inspection, review 
the existence and effectiveness of a school’s selection and recruitment 
arrangements (page 141). 
Responsibility: The DfES 
A registration scheme 
19 	 New arrangements should be introduced requiring those who wish to work 
with children, or vulnerable adults, to be registered. This register – perhaps 
supported by a card or licence – would confirm that there is no known 
reason why an individual should not work with these client groups. 
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take the decision, subject to published criteria, to approve or refuse 
registration on the basis of all the information made available to them by 
the police and other agencies. The responsibility for judging the relevance 
of police intelligence in deciding a person’s suitability would lie with the 
central body. The police, as now, would be able to identify intelligence 
which on no account should be disclosed to the applicant. 
Employers should still decide, based on good selection procedures, whether 
or not the job required the postholder to be registered and should retain the 
ultimate decision as to whether or not to employ. 
The central body would have the discretion to ignore any conviction 
information judged not to be relevant to the position in question. 
Individuals should have a right to appeal against any refusal to place them 
on the register and that right should be exercised before any information is 
made available to a third party. 
The register should be continuously updated and available to prospective 
employers for checking online or by telephone. 
The register should be introduced in a phased way, over a period of years, 
to avoid the problems associated with the introduction of the Criminal 
Records Bureau (CRB). 
The DfES, in consultation with other government departments, should 
decide whether the registration scheme should be evidenced by a licence 
or card (page 154). 
Responsibility: The DfES, the Department of Health and the Home Office 
Vetting 
Recommendations 20–30 are relevant for as long as the existing vetting 
regime remains in place. 
Standards for police vetting checks 
20 	 HMIC should develop, with ACPO and the CRB, the standards to be 
observed by police forces in carrying out vetting checks. These should 
cover the intelligence databases to be searched, the robustness of 
procedures, guidance, training, supervision and audit (page 142). 
Responsibility: HMIC 
Enhanced Disclosure regime for all those employed 
in schools 
21 	 All posts, including those in schools, that involve working with children, and 
vulnerable adults, should be subject to the Enhanced Disclosure regime 
(page 144). 
Responsibility: The Home Office and the DfES 
16  The Bichard Inquiry – Recommendations for action Checking processes 
22 	 The Registered Bodies’ precise responsibilities for checking identities need 
to be clarified urgently (page 145). 
23 	 Registered Bodies, or the CRB, should be able to check passports and 
driving licences presented as proof of identity against the Passport Service 
and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) databases (page 147). 
24 	 There should be an expectation that documents produced to confirm 
identity should, wherever possible, include a photograph (page 147). 
25  Fingerprints should be used as a means of verifying identity (page 147). 
26 	 Guidance should be issued to Registered Bodies on how to verify that 
applicants have given a full and accurate account of their current and 
past addresses (page 147). 
27 	 Registered Bodies should be required to confirm that they have checked 
the information on the ‘Police Check Form’ in accordance with CRB 
guidance (page 147). 
28 	 The consents that applicants currently give on the ‘Police Check 
Form’ should be sufficiently broad to enable the requisite checks to be 
undertaken (page 147). 
29 	 Incomplete or withdrawn applications should in future be returned to the 
Registered Body, and not to the applicant (page 147). 
30 	 Proposals should be brought forward as soon as possible to improve the 
checking of people from overseas who want to work with children and 
vulnerable adults (page 147). 
31 	 As a priority, legislation should be brought forward to enable the CRB to 
access the following additional databases for the purpose of vetting: 
•  Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise; 
•  National Criminal Intelligence Service; 
•  National Crime Squad; 
•  British Transport Police; and 
• 	 the Scottish and Northern Ireland equivalents of the Protection 
of Children Act List and the Protection of Vulnerable Adults List 
(page 147). 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
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1 	 On 17 December 2003, Ian Huntley was convicted of the murders of 
Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells. 
2 	 Huntley had come to the attention of Humberside Police in relation to 
allegations of eight separate sexual offences from 1995 to 1999 (and had 
been investigated in yet another). This information had not emerged in the 
vetting check, requested by his employer at the time of his appointment 
to Soham Village College late in 2001, carried out by Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary. 
3 	 Against this background, I was appointed by the Home Secretary to head 
an Inquiry with the following terms of reference: 
‘Urgently to enquire into child protection procedures in Humberside 
Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary in the light of the recent 
trial and conviction of Ian Huntley for the murder of Jessica 
Chapman and Holly Wells. In particular to assess the effectiveness 
of the relevant intelligence-based record keeping, the vetting 
practices in those forces since 1995 and information sharing with 
other agencies, and to report to the Home Secretary on matters of 
local and national relevance and make recommendations 
as appropriate.’ 
4 	 In addition to my Inquiry, there are two other related investigations: Sir Keith 
Povey, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, has been asked 
to consider the findings of the contemporary review by the Metropolitan 
Police into how Cambridgeshire Constabulary carried out the early 
part of the criminal investigation; and North East Lincolnshire Area Child 
Protection Committee has commissioned a Serious Case Review, chaired 
by Sir Christopher Kelly, to look at the way in which agencies in that area 
fulfilled their duties to protect children. 
The Inquiry’s procedures 
5 	 Letters were sent to a variety of organisations and individuals on 7 January 
2004 requesting information and documentation relevant to the terms of 
reference. Attached to these letters was a series of questions which formed 
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participants. The questions are in Appendix 1. 
6 	 Notices were published in the national and regional press inviting anyone 
who wished to submit information relevant to the Inquiry to do so. 
7 	 On 13 January, at a pre-Inquiry hearing, I explained how I intended to 
conduct the Inquiry; gave likely participants the opportunity to raise 
questions; and made myself available to speak to members of the media. 
8 	 The majority of written submissions and evidence was received by the end 
of January 2004, although throughout the Inquiry further written material has 
been received. 
9 	 There were 16 days of public hearings between 26 February 2004 and 
30 March. 
Appreciation to those who submitted evidence 
10 	 I place on record my appreciation to all those who submitted information 
and evidence to the Inquiry. Humberside Police and Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary in particular submitted detailed written evidence that 
clearly required considerable effort on their part, and in a tight timescale. 
I would also like to thank all those who were invited by the Inquiry to give 
oral evidence, sometimes at very short notice. No one declined. In some 
cases, witnesses had to address events that had happened several years 
previously or describe processes that had changed. Without such hard 
work and co-operation, the task of the Inquiry would have been much 
more difficult. 
Counsel’s opening statement 
11 	 Counsel to the Inquiry made an opening statement on 26 February, which 
lasted a day. This set out: 
• 	 the detailed chronology of Huntley’s contacts with Humberside Police 
and Social Services, and the process of his recruitment to Soham Village 
College, which involved Cambridgeshire Constabulary; 
• 	 the relevant national and local systems of record creation and 
retention; and 
• 	 the past and present systems of conducting police checks on applicants 
for jobs involving contact with children and other vulnerable persons, 
known as vetting. 
20  The Bichard Inquiry – The Inquiry process The focus of the Inquiry 
12  Counsel’s opening statement also made clear that: 
12.1 	 the main focus, as far as the past was concerned, would be on the 
contacts that the police and Social Services had with Huntley; 
12.2 	 I did not intend to conduct a detailed examination of general 
information-recording systems in Cambridgeshire Constabulary; and 
12.3  I would focus as much on the future as on the past. 
The witnesses 
13	 Oral evidence was received from 64 witnesses, who are listed in Appendix 2. 
They included: Humberside Police and Humberside Police Authority; North 
East Lincolnshire Social Services; Cambridgeshire Constabulary; Soham 
Village College; Education Personnel Management Ltd (EPM); government 
departments and relevant agencies; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary; the 
Association of Chief Police Officers; the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(Scotland); other professional bodies, including teaching and social services 
associations; and the voluntary sector. 
14 	 Draft extracts of my report were sent to relevant individuals and 
organisations for comment at the end of April 2004. Responses were 
received and considered in mid to late May 2004. 
15 	 The Inquiry made use of a website to publish written and oral evidence and 
to provide information about the Inquiry’s procedures. During the hearings 
the media were provided with extensive facilities. 
The Report 
16 	 This report was delivered to the Secretary of State six months after the 
Inquiry was launched. 
17 	 In the report, I focus first on all the contacts which the various agencies had 
with Huntley, and how the systems that were used to record these contacts 
were managed. I also look at how he was recruited for the caretaker’s job 
at Soham Village College and how he was vetted for that position. 
18  Second, I explain my findings with regard to those contacts. 
19 	 I then go on to describe and comment upon the national picture with 
regard to the collection, reviewing and retention of records; and the 
different information technology and vetting systems. 
20  As a result, this report is broadly divided into four sections: 
1  Contacts, recruitment and vetting – the facts (pages 23–75); 
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3  National systems and structure – the facts (pages 109–125); and 
4 	 National systems and structure – the findings (pages 127–155). 
My recommendations are listed throughout this section – and 
together on pages 13–17. 
Please note that the Glossary on pages 157–162 explains acronyms and 
various terms mentioned in the report. 
Thanks to the Inquiry team 
21 	 I would like to express my gratitude to the Inquiry team, each of whom 
has played their part to the full. They have been unfailing in the help and 
support they have given me. It has been a real team effort and everyone 
has worked incredibly hard. Thanks therefore to James Eadie and Kate 
Gallafent, Counsel to the Inquiry; Jim Nicholson, Secretary; Kim Brudenell, 
Solicitor; Joyti Manjdadria, Deputy Solicitor; Bill Taylor, Police Adviser to 
Counsel; Nadine Smith, Press Officer; and to Adele Hopkins, Shifra Marikar 
and Wendy Clarke – all key members of the team. 
22  The Bichard Inquiry – The Inquiry process 1 	 Contacts, recruitment and 
vetting – the facts 
The first section of the report examines the contacts between Humberside 
Police, Social Services and Huntley from August 1995 to October 1999. 
An overview 
1.1 	 Huntley had lived for most of his life in the Humberside Police area but there 
is no record of any contact between him and Humberside Police before 
August 1995, when he was 20 years old. 
1.2 	 Between  August 1995 and July 1999, Huntley came into contact with 
Humberside Police and/or local social services (Humberside County Council 
Social Services before 1 April 1996, and North East Lincolnshire Social 
Services thereafter) in relation to 11 separate incidents involving allegations 
of criminal offences. One involved burglary and one the non-payment of 
a fine for not having a television licence. The remaining nine contacts (of 
which Social Services were aware of five) all involved allegations of sexual 
offences. Of these: 
1.2.1 	 Four involved allegations of unlawful sexual intercourse with girls 
under the age of 16. In three of these, the girls concerned were 
aged 15; in the other, the girl was aged 13. 
1.2.2  Four involved allegations of rape. 
1.2.3 	 In between the rape allegations there was an allegation that 
Huntley had indecently assaulted an 11-year-old girl. 
1.3 	 He was neither convicted nor cautioned in relation to any of these 
incidents. 
1.4 	 He was summonsed in relation to the burglary offence, and the case 
went to court after a lengthy delay. However, a decision was taken not to 
proceed because the prosecuting counsel had concerns about whether 
the interview of Huntley had complied with the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. The police officer involved did not, and does not, agree 
with those concerns. Unusually, for a single count indictment, the charge 
was left to ‘lie on file’, which meant that the case could not be pursued 
without the court’s permission. 
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reached court but did not proceed to trial. It was discontinued on the 
advice of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), following concerns about 
the complainant’s version of events, which had changed during 
the investigation. 
1.6 	 On 26 May 1999, the day after he was interviewed about one of the rape 
allegations, Ian Huntley changed his name by deed poll to ‘Ian Nixon’. 
On 2 May 2002, he changed it back again to Huntley. 
1.7 	 In October 2001, he applied for a job as a caretaker at Soham Village 
College, which he was offered, and accepted, in mid-November 2001. 
This led to the police check, or vetting process, described later in this report, 
in which Education Personnel Management Ltd (EPM) were involved. 
1.8 	 On 26 November 2001, Huntley started working at the school before the 
vetting was completed and the result known. In the first week of January 
2002, the check produced a negative result – that is, it did not reveal any 
of the incidents in which he had come to the notice of Humberside Police. 
In all probability, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, who managed the police 
checks, never asked Humberside for any information on Huntley, but even 
if they had, a search still would not have revealed anything about the 
allegations of sexual offences. 
1.9 	 Huntley had been in a relationship with Maxine Carr since at least July 1999. 
By November 2001, she was living with him. 
1.10 	 By Easter 2002, Maxine Carr was working at St Andrew’s Church of England 
Primary School in Soham. 
1.11 	 From the summer term of 2002, she was the temporary classroom assistant 
to Year 5, which covered the class that Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells 
attended. They therefore came into contact with Huntley through knowing 
Maxine Carr, rather than as a result of his employment at Soham Village 
College. 
1.12  On 4 August 2002, Huntley murdered Jessica and Holly. 
Dealing with the contacts as they happened 
How Humberside Police and/or Social Services handled 
the 11 contacts with Huntley 
1.13 	 Before dealing with the contacts, I need to outline, in brief, what 
record-keeping and intelligence systems were available to the police 
and social services. There is more detail about the record-keeping systems 
in Appendix 3 and the Glossary has a brief explanation of the various 
acronyms. 
1.14 	 Humberside Police had four separate information technology (IT) systems for 
maintaining relevant records: 
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• 	 the local Criminal Information System (CIS), which has two applications: 
CIS Nominals and CIS Crime; 
•  the Child Protection Database (CPD); and 
•  the Integrated Criminal Justice System (ICJS). 
1.15 	 The  PNC is accessible to all police forces and gives details about an 
offender’s criminal record, including information about his modus operandi, 
(that is, his way of operating), associates and aliases. It also has other 
functions which are not directly relevant to this Inquiry. 
1.16 	 CIS Nominals was the core intelligence system of Humberside Police. It was 
structured around and could be searched against the names of individuals. 
It held information about people who came to the attention of the police in 
connection with criminal activity or alleged criminal activity. 
1.17 	 CIS Crime contained details of reported, recorded, detected and ‘disposed 
of’ crimes. Until December 1999, the only way to search for an individual on 
CIS Crime was to use a Unique Reference Number, or URN, ascribed by the 
police to the individual concerned when the first record was made on the 
CIS Nominals system. However, from December 1999, it became possible 
to search both CIS Crime and CIS Nominals against an individual’s name in 
one search. 
1.18 	 The  CPD recorded the decisions that were taken in cases referred to or 
from Social Services and information received from other agencies and 
individuals. It could be searched by the name of an alleged offender, 
though it was not the practice of Humberside Police to use it in this way 
until 2002. 
1.19 	 The  ICJS was installed in police custody suites. It creates custody records 
and generates documents on a range of matters such as cautions, charges 
and bail. Anyone arrested would be recorded on the ICJS. 
1.20 	 Social Services had the Social Services Information Database (SSID), a 
nationally-recognised system used by many social services authorities. 
The SSID was searchable only by the names of the service user – that is, 
by the name of the child. The SSID could record information in ‘free text’ 
(rather than under the subject name of the file) about those against whom 
allegations were made, but these records were not then searchable by the 
alleged abuser’s name. 
1.21 	 Two Social Services offices were involved in dealing with the contacts: 
Grimsby West (located in Grimsby itself) and Grimsby East (located in 
Cleethorpes). Each had an Investigation and Assessment Team which 
handled, and made decisions about, incoming referrals. 
1.22 	 Each of the contacts is referred to by a number, with the exceptions of 
Contact A and Contact 2A, which were dealt with by Social Services 
only and not referred to the police. It is possible Huntley had other sexual 
relationships with girls under the age of 16 that were not the subject of 
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by the Inquiry. 
Contact A 
involving: Huntley’s then wife

first contact with Social Services: 13 April 1995

1.23 	 On 13 April 1995, a referral was made to Social Services about Huntley, and 
his then wife, by a medical sister at the hospital Huntley’s wife attended in 
connection with her pregnancy. She was 13 weeks pregnant at the time 
and had recently separated from Huntley. 
1.24 	 A standard paper form used by Social Services, a ‘Referral and Initial 
Information Record’, was filled in by social worker John Stephen Dennison 
from Grimsby West and recorded that Mrs Huntley wanted advice about 
adoption; and that she was afraid of Huntley. The information from the 
paper form was later entered onto the SSID. 
1.25 	 She claimed to the hospital sister that Huntley had been violent towards her 
and pushed her down the stairs in March 1995, after which she had had a 
scan. The sister is recorded as being ‘not confident that allegations against 
[Huntley] are justified, given her manner’. The ‘Referral and Initial Information 
Record’ also records that Huntley had no convictions for violence (the basis 
for this is not known, but it was probably as a result of what Mrs Huntley told 
the sister and the sister then relayed the information to Social Services). 
Record keeping: Contact A 
1.26 	 There is no indication that the report received by Social Services from the 
local hospital about alleged domestic violence was referred to the police. 
Contact 1 
allegation: unlawful sexual intercourse, involving 15-year-old AB

first contact with Social Services: 23 June 1995

first contact with police: 9 August 1995

1.27 	 On  23 June 1995, the case of AB, a 15-year-old girl, was referred to 
Social Services. A ‘Client Enquiry Form’ (subsequently transposed onto 
an electronic ‘Referral and Initial Information Record’ held on the Social 
Services database) was created by an advice officer, Margaret Woods, at 
Grimsby East. This stated that AB’s parents had asked for help because AB 
kept running away with her boyfriend, Ian Huntley, who was approximately 
21 years old. However, no record was made of Huntley’s name. 
1.28 	 It is not clear what, if any, action was taken by Social Services as a result of 
this referral. It appears from the records that remain that the matter was not 
referred to the police at this stage, despite the possibility of underage sexual 
intercourse. The witness evidence from Martin Eaden, Deputy Director (Child 
Care) in the Directorate of Learning and Child Care at Social Services, was 
that a referral should have happened, given the age difference between 
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Services and was not there during the relevant period. 
1.29 	 Under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (the formulation of the offence has 
been changed under the Sexual Offences Act 2003), it was an offence ‘for 
a man to have ... sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of sixteen’. 
An offence was not committed if the man was under the age of 24, and: 
•  had not previously been charged with a similar offence; 
•  believed the girl to be 16 or over; and 
•  had reasonable cause for that belief. 
Another referral 
1.30 	 On 8 August 1995, there was another referral about AB, only eight weeks 
after the first. It was made to advice officer Catherine Jones. A second 
‘Referral and Initial Information Record’ was created, this time by advice 
officer Valerie Betmead (Grimsby East). It recorded AB stating that her 
parents had thrown her and her younger brother, YZ, out of their home 
‘for behaviour problems’; and that AB might have been pregnant. 
1.31 	 It also recorded that AB was staying with Huntley, aged 21, at Florence 
Street, Grimsby. When this record was created, Social Services would have 
known about the June referral because it would have been on AB’s file. 
There is no indication that Social Services either rang the police to ask them 
to check their records against Huntley, or referred the case to them. 
1.32 	 Mr Eaden’s evidence was that he would have expected them to have 
done both at this time. 
1.33 	 It appears, from a police note made on 9 August 1995, that social worker 
Colin Pettigrew had spoken to Huntley on 8 August 1995 and ‘arranged for 
the kids to stay there’. There was no referral of the case to the police, even 
though by this stage it appeared that AB and YZ were living with Huntley. 
On the contrary, it was Social Services themselves who appear to have 
arranged for the 15-year-old AB and YZ to stay with a 21-year-old they knew 
to be AB’s boyfriend. 
1.34 	 Mr Eaden stated that there were no circumstances in which it would be 
appropriate for social services to arrange for a 15-year-old girl to stay with 
a 21-year-old boyfriend. 
1.35 	 Also  on  9 August 1995, a third ‘Referral and Initial Information Record’ was 
created by advice officer Ann Turner. It records the source of the referral as 
being Huntley himself. This time the police were involved. AB’s father had 
evidently found out where his daughter and son were living. He went round 
to Florence Street and there was a row. 
1.36 	 The precise course of events appears on the third ‘Referral and Initial 
Information Record’ and another standard form, the ‘Suspected Child 
Abuse, Record of Initial Decision’, Form 547. 
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another version was filled out by Detective Inspector Billam, the head of 
one of the four divisional Child Protection Units operated by Humberside 
Police at that time. 
1.38  Form 547 sets out the three options for investigation: 
•  social services alone; 
•  a joint police and social services investigation; or 
•  the police alone. 
The decision recorded on Form 547 was that the investigation should be 
a joint police and social services investigation. 
Events on 9 August 
1.39  The sequence of events on that day was: 
1.39.1 	 Huntley rang Social Services to report a disturbance at his home 
where, he told Social Services, AB and YZ had stayed overnight 
and that day. His concern appears to have been that AB’s and 
YZ’s parents had come to take them away and that YZ had been 
‘cuffed by his father causing bruising’. 
1.39.2  The police were called to the scene by a third party. 
1.39.3 	 At the scene, AB’s father told police that AB was having full 
underage sexual intercourse with Huntley. 
1.39.4 	 All parties went to Grimsby police station, where the Humberside 
Police Child Protection Unit became involved. 
1.39.5 	 Mr Pettigrew and DI Billam decided that there should be a joint 
police and social services investigation into the allegation made 
by AB’s father. A strategy meeting was held later that afternoon 
involving Police Constable Teasdale and Catherine Irwin-Banks, 
a social worker. 
1.40 	 AB was interviewed on 9 August 1995 by PC Teasdale, with Ms Irwin-Banks in 
attendance. AB said she had been having sexual intercourse with Huntley; 
and that he knew how old she was. She signed the record of the interview 
in PC Teasdale’s notebook to that effect. 
1.41 	 The police note of the interview records that Ms Irwin-Banks had considered 
the circumstances of the two children, AB and YZ, and that there were ‘no 
significant concerns found in welfare’. Mr Eaden’s evidence was that there 
appeared to be ‘significant inconsistency’ between that statement and the 
facts of the case. 
1.42 	 AB is recorded in the Crime Report as being unwilling to make a complaint 
against Huntley. 
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1.43 	 The  next  day,  10 August 1995, Huntley was interviewed under police caution 
at his home by PC Teasdale. He admitted both that he had been having 
sexual intercourse with AB and that he knew she was 15 years of age. In 
short, he admitted the offence. He claimed that he thought that ‘if her 
parents were okay about it, it was not an offence’. PC Teasdale made it 
clear to Huntley that it was an offence to have sexual intercourse with a girl 
under 16, no matter who gives their consent. Huntley signed the record of 
the interview as a true record. 
1.44 	 In a statement taken by the police from AB in November 2002, AB said 
she remembers her mother not warming to Huntley. He had mentioned 
that her mother had specifically asked him not to engage in full sex with 
AB as she was not old enough. She said this did not stop them having 
unprotected sex. 
No action taken 
1.45 	 DI Billam of Humberside Police decided not to take any action in relation to 
the incident after PC Teasdale made a recommendation to that effect. The 
record states: ‘detected – complainant declines [to prosecute]’. 
Formal cautions 
1.46 	 There was an option for the police to consider issuing a formal caution to 
Huntley. (This caution should not be confused with the ‘police caution’ 
given to a person who is being questioned.) 
1.47 	 The relevant Guidance relating to formal cautions at the time was in Home 
Office Circular 18/1994, and appended revised national standards for 
cautioning. The purposes of the Guidance were to: 
•  discourage the use of cautions in inappropriate cases; 
•  seek greater consistency of approach between police force areas; and 
•  promote better recording of cautions. 
1.48  The Guidance highlighted the need to consider the: 
•  seriousness of the offence; 
• offender’s  record; 
•  views of the victim; and 
•  potential effectiveness of using a caution. 
1.49 	 It noted that a caution was to be recorded and could be relied upon by 
the police in making future decisions about whether or not to prosecute, 
and in court, should the person being cautioned re-offend. 
1.50 	 The national standards also set out conditions which had to be met before 
a caution could be given: 
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give a realistic prospect of conviction [Note 2A reinforced this by 
providing that where the evidence does not meet the required 
standard, a caution cannot be administered]; 
2  the offender must admit the offence; 
3 	 the offender ... must understand the significance of a caution and 
give informed consent to being cautioned.’ 
Record keeping: Contact 1 
There is more detail about the different record-keeping systems in Appendix 
3 and the Glossary. 
1.51 	 PNC: No record was made because Huntley was not charged. Even if 
he had been cautioned this would not have been entered as it was not 
possible to enter cautions onto the PNC until November 1995. 
1.52 	 CIS Nominals: No record was made. There was no power of arrest for 
unlawful sexual intercourse (USI) so there were no source documents such 
as custody records, Form 310 (‘Phoenix Descriptive’) or Bail Form – which 
were routinely sent to the Divisional Intelligence Bureau (DIB) and from 
which CIS Nominals records were created. 
1.53 	 No  Form 839 (the dedicated Intelligence Report form) was prepared 
or submitted. 
1.54 	 CIS Crime: A record was made. It would have been telephoned through 
to the Central Crime Inputting Bureau, responsible for creating CIS Crime 
records. The record identified Huntley as the victim’s boyfriend in the 
‘General Information’ box (called ‘dataset 4’), but this could not be 
searched later on. 
1.55 	 It is important to understand that dataset 4 was one of a number of 
datasets within the CIS Crime system, including ‘dataset 1’ (summary) and 
‘dataset 3’ (offenders/wanted persons). It was possible to search dataset 3 
by a person’s URN but not possible to search dataset 4. 
1.56 	 The  record  was  not  apparently updated to record the fact that Huntley had 
been interviewed. It should have been. Nor was the searchable ‘offenders/ 
wanted persons’ screen (dataset 3) completed at any stage. Again, it 
should have been. 
1.57 	 When the case was disposed of, DI Billam printed off the then current 
version of the CIS Crime report, signed and dated it. He then sent it to the 
local DIB whose crime administration staff, in accordance with practice, 
updated the CIS Crime database to record the disposal. The DIB stamped 
DI Billam’s print-off to record receipt on 15 August 1995. It is assumed that 
CIS Crime was updated to record the disposal as: ‘Detected – Complainant 
declines to prosecute’. 
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•  either no record was made of Contact 1 on the CPD; or 
• 	 a record was made, but was deleted in January 2002 when records 
were reviewed and deleted from the CPD for the first time since its 
introduction in 1991. 
1.59 	 The initial view of Humberside Police, set out in the statement of Detective 
Chief Superintendent Hunter, was that of the four Form 547s (‘Suspected 
Child Abuse Record of Initial Decision’) that were completed manually (for 
Contacts 1, 3, 4 and 8) ‘only two were entered on the [CPD]’. These related 
to Contacts 4 and 8. According to DCS Hunter’s statement, the forms were 
either not submitted to the co-ordinator, were lost in transit, or were not 
processed. 
1.60 	 However, on examination of the policy for reviewing and deleting records 
as applied in January 2002, it became apparent that, if properly applied, 
the policy would have resulted in the records made on Contacts 1 and 
3 being deleted. In his evidence, DI Billam was clear that every Form 
547 would have been sent to those inputting information onto the CPD. 
Accordingly, it seems more likely, as DCS Hunter accepted, that records 
were made on the Child CPD in relation to Contacts 1 and 3, but were 
deleted in January 2002. 
1.61  ICJS: No record was made because there was no arrest. 
Contact 2 
allegation: burglary

when: 6 November 1995

first contact with police: 18 March 1996 

1.62 	 On  6 November 1995, there was a burglary at a house in Florence Street, 
Grimsby. The allegation was that Huntley, along with someone else, 
knocked through the loft space in one house (to which they had legitimate 
access) into the next-door house; and then stole electrical items and 
jewellery. 
1.63 	 Huntley was not traced by Humberside Police until 18 March 1996. In the 
meantime, he had moved to an address at Pelham Road, Immingham, 
South Humberside, and was living with his father, Kevin Huntley. 
1.64 	 That day, Police Constable Macdougal interviewed Ian Huntley, under 
caution and at his father’s home, in connection with the burglary. 
He admitted involvement in the offence and blamed another individual 
as having had the major role. 
Arrested for burglary and non-payment of a TV licence fine 
1.65 	 Huntley was reported for summons but he failed to appear at Grimsby 
Magistrates’ Court on 19 July 1996. A warrant was issued for his arrest. He 
was eventually arrested on 5 February 1997 for the burglary offence and for 
non-payment of a TV licence fine. 
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1.66 	 When the case came to trial at Grimsby Crown Court on 5 January 1998, 
the prosecution indicated that they did not wish to proceed. It appears that 
there was a disagreement between PC Macdougal and the prosecuting 
barrister. The barrister considered that there may have been a breach of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Codes because Huntley 
had been interviewed at his father’s home and not taken to a police station 
and given a recorded interview. 
1.67 	 PC Macdougal considered that he had acted appropriately, given that 
there had been a delay from the incident date; the only evidence was 
from a co-accused and there were no arrangements that could be made 
for taking care of the children in Huntley’s sole charge at that time. (These 
were the children of his then partner, who was not present.) PC Macdougal 
believed that the interview had been conducted appropriately under 
PACE rules. The barrister, however, informed the judge that it had been 
agreed between the prosecution and the defence that the case would 
not go ahead. 
1.68 	 The case was not dismissed; but, rather unusually, the count was allowed 
to ‘lie on file’. This meant that the case could not be pursued without the 
court’s permission. 
Record keeping: Contact 2 
1.69 	 PNC: A record was created on 12 May 1998, over four months after the 
case had finally been disposed of as a ‘lie on file’. The 1995 Association 
of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO’s) Code provided for the same retention 
periods for ‘lie on file’ cases as for convictions. In cases of burglary, the 
relevant retention period was 20 years. The record is still on the PNC. 
1.70 	 CIS Nominals: Humberside Police state that a Form 310 (‘Phoenix 
Descriptive’) was created, leading to a CIS Nominals record. 
1.71 	 After further research by Detective Chief Superintendent Baggs (the 
Director of Intelligence since December 2003), it has now been ascertained 
that the first record on CIS Nominals about Contact 2 (which gave Huntley 
a URN) was created on 6 June 1996. 
1.72  A further record was made on the ‘General Information’ screen (dataset 
11) of CIS Nominals, about the warrant issued for Huntley’s arrest, following 
his non-attendance at court in July 1996. If Humberside Police practice at 
the time was followed, the record about his warrant would have probably 
been deleted on his arrest on 5 February 1997. 
1.73 	 Also, if Humberside Police practice at the time was followed, the burglary 
charge record would have stayed on CIS Nominals for 20 years – the 
same length of time as it would have stayed on the PNC. It was still on CIS 
Nominals on 7 July 1999 when the system was interrogated and Huntley’s 
entry was printed off with regard to Contact 10. However, when CIS was 
re-written at the end of 1999 (in order to ensure Y2K compliance) datasets 
8 and 9, containing details of convictions and the general conviction 
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available on the PNC. 
1.74 	 CIS Crime: DCS Baggs concluded that a CIS Crime record was also 
created; and it is likely that Huntley’s URN would have been inserted in the 
‘Offenders’ screen (dataset 3) making the record searchable against his 
URN in future. 
1.75  CPD: Not applicable. 
1.76  ICJS: Not applicable, as Huntley was not arrested. 
Contact 2A 
allegation: unlawful sexual intercourse involving 15-year-old CD

first contact with Social Services: early 1995

no contact with Humberside Police

1.77 	 From  early 1995, until the file was closed in May 1996, Social Services had 
a series of referrals about a 15-year-old girl, CD. 
1.78 	 In December 1995, CD ran away from her father’s home and went to live 
with a girlfriend and the girlfriend’s mother in Immingham. The girlfriend’s 
mother referred the case to Social Services. It is not clear whether, or for 
how long, CD may have returned to her father’s home. 
1.79 	 However,  by  28 February 1996, CD was living at Pelham Road, Immingham 
with Kevin Huntley, Ian Huntley’s father. Referral details were recorded on 
that date by Social Services advice officer Ms Jones, who had previously 
referred the 8 August 1995 incident when the 15-year-old AB (see Contact 1) 
was thrown out of her home and went to live with her ‘boyfriend’ Ian Huntley. 
1.80 	 The education welfare officer had visited the house at Pelham Road on 
28 February 1996. The referral details record that, until that visit, Kevin 
Huntley had been unaware that CD was still at school. They also record that 
Kevin Huntley was prepared to accommodate CD, but informed Social 
Services that he was to be away from home from the following weekend, 
leaving Ian Huntley (aged 21) and CD (aged 15) alone together. 
No action taken by Social Services 
1.81 	 No action appears to have been taken by Social Services to ensure that this 
did not happen. On 7 March 1996, the day before Kevin Huntley was due 
to leave for a period of work in Bury St Edmunds, Ian Huntley telephoned 
Social Services himself and spoke to Ms Jones, who created another ‘Client 
Enquiry Form’. Huntley requested that accommodation be arranged for CD 
because he ‘[did] not want the responsibility’. CD’s father is recorded as 
being out of contact until 12 March 1996 due to shift work. 
1.82 	 Again Social Services appear to have taken no action. The next record is of 
another call from Ian Huntley to Social Services on 11 March 1996, taken by 
social worker Vicki Robertson. Huntley told her that his father had now gone 
away; he was finding it extremely difficult to cope; CD was not attending 
school; and he had told her she must leave that night. 
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that they made attempts through March and April 1996 to trace CD’s 
father; and that Social Services did not know where CD was living at 
this time. 
Two further notable contacts 
1.84 	 There were two further notable contacts with Social Services concerning 
Huntley in this period: 
1.84.1 	 First, a diary sheet dated 18 April 1996 records that social worker Ms 
Robertson had been told by pupils at CD’s school that it was believed 
that CD was ‘living with and possibly in a relationship with Ian Huntley 
– Pelham Rd’. So there was by this date, even looking at CD in 
isolation from AB, a suggestion of an improper sexual relationship. 
No reference was made to the police and no police checks were 
requested on Huntley. 
1.84.2 	 Second, the diary sheet records that the Pelham Road address had 
been visited by the Education Welfare Officer, Steve Mumby. During 
the visit, Huntley had denied that CD was there and said that he 
was shocked to see the education welfare officer as he believed 
CD was 17 years old. 
1.84.3 	 On  25 April 1996, Roger Davies, the Deputy Head at Immingham 
School, rang Ms Betmead (the same advice officer who received 
the report about AB having to leave her parents’ home and going 
to live with Huntley seven months earlier, on 8 August 1995, in 
Contact 1). 
1.84.4 	 The call record, made on a ‘Client Enquiry Form’, does not read as if 
CD had gone away and come back again. Questions are therefore 
raised about the contrast between this information and what 
Huntley had told the education welfare officer a week earlier. 
1.84.5 	 However, the form does record that Huntley said that his father was 
still away and that he did not want the responsibility of caring for CD 
because he could not be responsible for her school attendance; 
finance was a problem; and because of ‘the moral issues of CD 
being in the house alone with him’. Someone had written on this 
form ‘Risk 0; Need 1’; and consistent with that, Ms Betmead wrote 
‘No evidence of significant child protection issues. Visit, locate [CD], 
close’. 
A third 15-year-old involved 
1.85 	 Also  on  25 April 1996, on the same day that Mr Davies was passing his 
concerns on to Social Services by phone, and Huntley was expressing 
‘moral concerns’ about having a 15-year-old girl in the house with him, 
Huntley visited the mother of another 15-year-old girl (EF) and admitted 
having unprotected sexual intercourse with her. This is dealt with separately 
in Contact 3 below. So at this point there were two 15-year-old girls involved 
for some of the same period: CD and EF. 
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investigate the allegations, or to check their records, despite the fact that 
Social Services stated in evidence that they were relying on the police to 
maintain records of past contacts with alleged abusers. 
1.87 	 Nor is there any indication that Social Services took any further action 
to investigate these concerns beyond senior social worker Sue Kotenko 
sending a letter to CD at Huntley’s address in Pelham Road, inviting her 
to attend a meeting with a social worker and her father scheduled for 
7 May 1996. It appears from Social Services records that this meeting did 
not take place. 
File closed by Social Services 
1.88 	 The file on CD was closed by Social Services on 21 May 1996, apparently 
on the basis that following a referral on 25 April 1996, CD did not attend 
the meeting to which she was invited. No reference was made to the letter 
faxed to Social Services from Immingham School on 1 May (see Contact 3). 
1.89  In his evidence, Mr Eaden, who had reviewed this incident, accepted that: 
•  no checks had been made with the police and should have been; and 
•  no referral had been made to the police and should have been. 
1.90 	 Overall, he described the handling by Social Services of this incident as 
‘totally inadequate in every sense’. 
Record keeping: Contact 2A 
1.91 	 There are no police records relating to this incident in either manual or 
computerised form. It was never the subject of a specific referral to the 
police. It is less clear what, if any, details of the CD incident were passed 
orally to Humberside Police. As appears below, the indications from the 
evidence are that no such details were passed to them. 
Contact 3 
allegation: unlawful sexual intercourse involving 15-year-old EF

first contact with Social Services: 24 April 1996

first contact with Humberside Police: 22 May 1996

1.92 	 In  April 1996, at the same time as the events relating to CD were unfolding, 
further concerns surfaced about Huntley and his relationships with 
underage girls. These related to EF, another 15-year-old girl who should have 
been attending, but had a record of truancy from, Immingham School. 
She was a friend of CD (see Contact 2A). 
1.93 	 On  24 April 1996, Social Services’ first record of concern about EF was at 
a meeting involving Nikki Alcock, of the Community Support Team; Bev 
McLoughlin, a social worker; and the Education Welfare Officer, Mr Mumby. 
EF’s mother told the meeting that her daughter was living with Huntley 
at Pelham Road. Mr Mumby is recorded as noting that he had ‘some 
knowledge of the occupants having visited yesterday in respect of another 
child’. This other child was CD (Contact 2A). 
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EF’s mother’s statement, given to Humberside Police in August 2002 and 
summarised at paragraph 1.106, that after the 24 April meeting, EF’s mother 
went round to Huntley’s house and threatened him with a knife. 
Letter faxed from girls’ school 
1.95 	 On  1 May 1996, Mr Davies faxed a letter to social worker, Ms McLoughlin, 
recording a meeting he had had with EF’s mother the day before. 
It is evident from a ‘Client Enquiry Form’ filled out by Ms McLoughlin on 
30 April 1996 that the fax was preceded by a phone call from Mr Davies 
to convey the substance of the information, and request a referral. 
1.96 	 EF’s mother had requested the 30 April meeting to report her concerns 
about EF and CD (Contact 2A). EF was not attending school or 
communicating. EF’s difficulties stemmed, in her mother’s view, from the 
relationship with Huntley. The concerns identified at this meeting, and 
recorded in a letter sent to Ms Betmead, included the following: 
• 	 EF and Huntley had admitted sleeping together (even though EF was 
only 15); 
• 	 EF had been given alcohol and drugs at an acquaintance’s house, 
which was used as a place to meet Huntley; and 
• 	 Huntley had also had sex with CD (Contact 2A) – CD having boasted 
about this relationship to EF’s mother. 
1.97 	 The Social Services diary sheet dated 2 May 1996, completed by Ms 
McLoughlin, also records EF’s mother’s statement that CD (that is, her 
daughter’s friend) had told her that she [CD] had had sexual intercourse 
with Huntley. The note then contradicts itself: it says that ‘... Huntley refused 
to confirm this with [EF’s mother]’; but it then goes on to record EF’s mother 
saying that Huntley had admitted to her about having sexual intercourse 
with CD. 
Social Services telephoned Humberside Police 
1.98 	 In  early  May 1996, Social Services telephoned Humberside Police. They 
spoke to Detective Constable Ramskill at one of the Child Protection Units 
and asked for a check on Huntley: a clear example of an agency wishing, 
for understandable reasons, to have a person’s history in front of them 
before deciding how to deal with a case. 
1.99 	 DC Ramskill has no recollection of the call. He believes he would have rung 
the DIB and asked for checks on CIS (the local intelligence system) and the 
PNC, which holds criminal history information nationally. The results would 
not have revealed anything. 
1.100 	 Ms McLoughlin’s diary sheet entry for 7 May 1996 records that EF was not 
willing to discuss the Huntley situation, and that neither EF nor her mother 
wished to make a complaint against him. 
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Phil Watters, a senior social worker, was going to discuss the situation with 
DI Billam, head of one of Humberside Police’s Child Protection Units. 
1.102 	 On  9 May 1996, Dawn Hutchinson, a senior social worker, created a 
‘Supervision Case Record Form’, which stated that neither EF nor her mother 
wished to take the matter further; but that the case was to be discussed 
with DI Billam. The form continues: 
‘Ian Huntly [sic] – not known on SSID [the Social Services Information 
Database] or Police Records.’ 
1.103 	 Ms Hutchinson created a further ‘Supervision Case Record Form’ on 
20 May 1996. It recorded a referral to an assessment team about Huntley’s 
sexual relationship with EF. It again recorded that Mr Watters was to discuss 
the matter with DI Billam. 
The first Humberside Police record 
1.104 	 The first Humberside Police record of these events was made by DI Billam on 
22 May 1996. There is nothing in Social Services’ files to indicate that there 
was any referral of this case before then. This surprised Mr Eaden because, 
in his view, a referral should have been made at an earlier date. 
1.105 	 The details of the referral were recorded in Form 547, ‘Suspected Child 
Abuse, Initial Decision Record’. The order of the words appears to be 
incorrect but it indicates: 
‘Referrer [EF’s mother] informed [Social Services] that [EF] had 
admitted to her that she has had sexual intercourse with a Mr Ian 
Huntley. Huntley has allegedly confirmed this fact to [EF’s mother]. 
[EF] seen by [Social Services] – does not want to make complaint 
to police.’ 
EF’s mother’s statement 
1.106 	 The details of the referral, recorded in outline in Form 547, but appearing 
more fully in Social Services records, are confirmed in the statement taken 
by Humberside Police from EF’s mother in August 2002, in which she states: 
1.106.1 EF’s best friend was CD (see Contact 2A). 
1.106.2 CD was lodging with Huntley at Pelham Road because she had 
problems with her parents. CD was 15 at the time. EF was a frequent 
visitor. 
1.106.3 EF began playing truant from school. Then she started spending 
nights away from home. She too was staying at Pelham Road. 
1.106.4 EF’s mother was then told (after about two months), by a friend 
across the road, that there was something funny going on at 
Pelham Road. 
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car. CD answered the door. EF’s mother went in with a short-bladed 
potato knife. She discovered EF in the living room in a bra and 
a skirt. 
1.106.6 EF’s mother went upstairs, where Huntley was lying on the bed, 
apparently asleep. She put the knife inside his nose and asked him 
if he was having sex with EF. He responded: ‘So what if I am?’ 
1.106.7 EF’s mother cut his nose and told him to get out of Immingham in 
a week or he would be dead. 
1.106.8 She took EF home; and then went to see Social Services. 
1.106.9 Ms Alcock of Social Services visited EF the next day. Following this 
visit, EF told her mother that she had been having sex with Huntley 
and that he was her boyfriend. 
1.107 	 The oral evidence before the Inquiry explored whether the facts about CD 
and/or the letter dated 1 May 1996 from Mr Davies of Immingham School 
were passed by Social Services to the police. DI Billam was clear in his 
recollection that neither had been passed on. 
1.108  Mr Watters would have regarded it as surprising if this had not happened. 
1.109 	 Mr Eaden’s view was that neither the information about CD, nor the faxed 
letter, were passed to the police. 
1.110 	 It also seems clear from the documentary evidence, confirmed by the 
Social Services witnesses and by DI Billam, that neither Social Services nor 
Humberside Police made the link between this Contact and Contact 1, 
the AB incident, in which both Social Services and Humberside Police had 
been involved. 
Investigation by Social Services alone 
1.111 	 On the same date as the referral to Humberside Police (22 May 1996), 
Mr Watters, a senior social worker, and DI Billam, decided that the matter 
would be dealt with solely by Social Services. The basis for the decision, 
recorded on Form 547, ‘Suspected Child Abuse Initial Decision Form’, was 
that Social Services were in regular contact with the family on a voluntary 
basis, and EF did not wish to make a complaint or discuss the matter. 
1.112 	 In his evidence, Mr Eaden accepted that this would not have been an 
appropriate decision if the CD case (Contact 2A) had also been taken 
into account – doubly so, if the AB case (Contact 1) had been taken into 
account. It would and should have been a joint police and social services 
investigation. 
1.113 	 The last records of any contact with Social Services are two letters: one to 
EF and one to her mother, from Ms McLoughlin, dated 23 May 1996. These 
advise both of them about the desirability of EF living with her mother; 
and refer to a meeting set up for 28 May 1996. It is not known whether the 
meeting took place. 
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1.114  PNC: Not applicable, because Huntley was not charged. 
1.115 	 CIS Crime and Nominals: No record was created on the CIS systems. The 
incident was not investigated as a crime, so no record was made on CIS 
Crime. No source documents were submitted to the DIB – an Intelligence 
Report on Form 839, for example, which could have led to a record on 
CIS Nominals. 
1.116 	 CPD: As with Contact 1, it is likely that a record was either not created or 
was created and then deleted in January 2002. 
1.117  ICJS: Not applicable, as Huntley was not arrested. 
Contact 4 
allegation: unlawful sexual intercourse involving 13-year-old GH

first contact with Social Services: 24 May 1996

first contact with Humberside Police: 24 May 1996

1.118 	 On  24 May 1996, two days after DI Billam made the decision in relation to EF 
(Contact 3, above), a further allegation was made against Huntley: that he 
had had underage sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old girl, GH, while GH 
was babysitting two other younger children. 
1.119 	 The allegation was first made to Social Services and is recorded in a ‘Client 
Enquiry Form’ completed on 24 May 1996 at 13:55, which stated: ‘Concern 
that [GH] may have been forced or coerced into having sex with 21-yr-
old man while babysitting ... [GH] now refuses to discuss it.’ Someone has 
written ‘R4’, that is, ‘Risk Level 4’ on the form (which means ‘high risk’). The 
case was allocated to social worker Eileen Hemingway. The fact that GH 
was babysitting and turned up with two 21-year-old men was also recorded 
on the SSID on 24 May 1996. 
1.120 	 About an hour-and-a-half later (that is, still on 24 May 1996), another 
‘Client Enquiry Form’ was filled out by the same social worker. It records 
a conversation with GH’s mother: ‘Concern that [GH] has been seeing 
Huntley, 22 yrs of Pelham Rd Immingham. [GH] will not discuss it and is 
not eating or sleeping and is crying all the time. [GH] says: “nothing has 
happened” but Ian won’t have anything to do with her now ...’ Someone 
has written ‘R1’ on this form (which means ‘low risk’). The form also records 
(in his writing) that it had been seen by Mr Watters, who had been involved 
in the EF events just a few days earlier (Contact 3). 
1.121 	 Social Services then referred the matter to DI Billam on 24 May 1996. 
There was a telephone discussion with him in which he made it clear that, 
because of other work, the case would need to be deferred. Five days 
later, on 29 May, he and Mr Watters of Social Services created ‘Suspected 
Child Abuse, Record of Initial Decision Forms’ in identical terms. Under the 
‘details of referral’ section, they state: ‘Concern that [GH] may have been 
forced or coerced into having sex with a 21 year old man after babysitting 
... [GH] now refusing to discuss it’. 
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1.122 	 The recorded decision on the forms was that there would be a joint police 
and social services investigation, with Police Constable Clark as lead 
investigator. A strategy meeting was set for 30 May 1996. 
1.123 	 This meeting was attended by DI Billam, PC Clark and Mrs Hemingway from 
Social Services. The concerns were recorded in the Humberside Police note 
of the meeting as: ‘13 year old girl ... USI [unlawful sexual intercourse] with 
Ian Huntley ... Suggestion that it was non-consensual’. The decision was that 
PC Clark and a representative of Social Services should visit GH’s mother to 
discuss the case. 
1.124 	 On  31 May 1996, PC Clark completed a Crime Report. The person who had 
first reported the matter to Social Services told PC Clark that her information 
was based on what GH’s mother had told a mutual acquaintance. 
1.125 	 GH’s mother told PC Clark that she had forbidden GH from seeing Huntley; 
and that this had caused problems between them, but that she had ‘no 
real grounds to suspect her daughter had had a sexual relationship with 
[Huntley]’. 
1.126 	 GH denied having had any sexual relationship with Huntley and assured PC 
Clark that she was no longer seeing him. Mrs Hemingway’s notes 
of this meeting are consistent with this account: both PC Clark and 
Mrs Hemingway regarded GH as being very mature for her age and 
that she ‘would not disclose the fact she may have been involved with 
Huntley on a sexual basis if she had’. 
1.127 	 It was concluded that there was no evidence to support an offence of 
‘unlawful sexual intercourse’ and that the matter be ‘no crimed’. The Crime 
Report shows this recommendation being accepted by DI Billam. 
1.128  Huntley was not interviewed by the police. 
1.129 	 On the same day, 31 May 1996, a Humberside Police form ‘Suspected 
Child Abuse, Record of Subsequent Action’ was completed by PC Clark, 
recording that no further action was to be taken. Mrs Hemingway of Social 
Services completed a similar form. Social Services wrote to GH’s mother to 
inform her that no further action would be taken. 
1.130 	 Mr Watters accepted in his evidence that there was no indication of any 
link being made back to other incidents, despite the fact that this contact 
was reported only days after the disposal of Contact 3 and while Contact 
2A was also still continuing. 
1.131 	 DI Billam likewise accepted that he did not make the link either to 
Contact 3 or to Contact 1. 
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1.132  PNC: Not applicable, because Huntley was not charged. 
1.133 	 CIS Nominals: No record was made. No source documentation, which 
would have led to the creation of a record, was submitted to the DIB. 
In particular, an Intelligence Report on Form 839 was not filed. 
1.134 	 CIS Crime: There was a report on CIS Crime. However, it did not name 
Huntley. 
1.135 	 CPD: A record was made. It noted Huntley’s name and recorded the 
allegation (‘USI’). It also recorded (wrongly) that the result had been 
a ‘caution’. 
1.136  ICJS: Not applicable, as Huntley was not arrested. 
Contact 5 
allegation: non-appearance for the burglary summons/non-payment of fine 
first contact with Humberside Police: 5 February 1997 
1.137 	 Huntley was arrested at 12:15 on 5 February 1997, following two warrants: 
one for failing to appear in relation to the burglary charge on 19 July 1996 
(Contact 2), and one relating to a fine imposed by Grimsby and 
Cleethorpes Magistrates’ Court on 5 March 1996 for not having a TV 
licence. Bail was refused by the custody sergeant and Huntley was taken 
before the next available court that afternoon. 
1.138 	 At 14:15 he appeared before Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates’ Court. 
It appears from the court record that he was ordered to pay £2 per week 
from that date in respect of the fine imposed on 5 March 1996. He was 
remanded on conditional bail until 6 March 1997 on the burglary charge. 
Record keeping: Contact 5 
1.139  PNC: No record was created. 
1.140 	 CIS Nominals: It appears that the database contained at least one entry 
about Huntley’s outstanding ‘Failure to Appear’ warrant (on the ‘General 
Information’ screen ‘dataset 11’). This is dealt with under ‘Record keeping: 
Contact 2’ (the burglary charge). 
1.141  CIS Crime: Not applicable. 
1.142  CPD: Not applicable. 
1.143  ICJS: A record of Huntley’s arrest was made on the ICJS. 
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allegation: rape involving IJ 

first contact with Humberside Police: 10 April 1998

1.144 	 On  10 April 1998, at approximately 07:00, IJ alleged to Humberside Police 
that Huntley had met her the previous evening in Hollywoods nightclub in 
Grimsby, shared a taxi with her and raped her at her home. 
1.145 	 Huntley was arrested at 09:10 the same day. He denied rape and claimed 
that he had had consensual sex with IJ. He provided a blood sample. He 
was interviewed at 15:52 by Detective Constable Ward and Detective 
Sergeant Hume under tape-recorded conditions. At 18:02 he was granted 
police bail to 2 May 1998. 
Case papers lost 
1.146 	 There are only a few records because the case papers have been lost. 
The details concerning how the case was disposed of are from police 
officers’ memories. 
1.147 	 According to Police Constable Stokes’ recollection, IJ stated in interview 
with the police that there had been no threats or coercion by Huntley; 
nor had IJ told Huntley that she did not wish to have sex or that she had 
felt frightened or under threat to do so; she simply stated that she had not 
wanted to have sex, but she had not told Huntley this. 
1.148 	 PC Stokes prepared a Crime Report on this basis. Her view, marked on the 
report, was that no crime had been committed. She submitted the report 
to Detective Inspector Christian, who evidently agreed. Accordingly, no 
further action was taken. 
Record keeping: Contact 6 
1.149  The  PNC: Not applicable, because Huntley was not charged. 
1.150 	 CIS Nominals: No record of Contact 6 exists. Either a record was made and 
deleted, or no record was made. 
1.151 	 Humberside  Police conclude that a record would have been made on CIS 
Nominals because, following Huntley’s arrest, the ‘Custody Record and Bail 
Form’ (which are in existence) should have been directed to the DIB for an 
entry to be made on the ‘General Information’ screen (dataset 11) of his CIS 
Nominals record. However, there is nothing to indicate that an Intelligence 
Report (Form 839) was prepared and submitted. The likelihood is that a 
record was created, but that it related only to bail. That would be consistent 
with the record created in relation to Contact 7, dealt with below. 
1.152 	 If  a  record  was created, when would it have been deleted? DCS Baggs 
concluded that any entry would probably have had a review, or provisional 
‘weed date’, only a matter of days after the date on which Huntley was 
due to answer bail: 2 May 1998; and that this record would probably 
have been allowed to ‘drop off’ within approximately one month of its 
review date. 
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meant that the report was not automatically archived after three years 
(the default review/weed date) but was kept indefinitely on the live system. 
It is not known why, when, or by whom this decision was made. 
1.154 	 The entry on CIS Crime did not record Huntley as being involved in the 
incident in any way. It did not record him as either having been arrested 
or interviewed. According to DCS Baggs’ report, the officer on the case 
should have provided the Central Crime Input Bureau (those responsible for 
inputting data onto CIS Crime) with Huntley’s name and URN and informed 
them that Huntley had been interviewed as a suspect. 
1.155  CPD: Not applicable. 
1.156  ICJS: An entry was made on the system. 
Contact 7 
allegation: rape involving KL

first contact with Humberside Police: 17 May 1998

1.157 	 At  03:42  on  17 May 1998, KL alleged that she had been raped by a man 
at 02:00 on her way home from Hollywoods nightclub in Grimsby. She ran 
home, and her father reported the incident to Humberside Police. 
1.158 	 KL was interviewed by the police later that day. She indicated that she did 
not know her attacker’s identity. She said that the man had threatened to 
kill her, raped her, and then apologised. 
1.159 	 The incident was widely reported in the local media. Late on the night of 
19 May 1998, an anonymous caller telephoned Grimsby Police to say that 
Huntley was responsible for the attack. 
1.160 	 The police attempted to trace Huntley. According to Detective Constable 
Hill, enquiries involved interrogating local and national computer systems 
which, to the best of his knowledge, produced no information regarding 
Huntley, and addresses were sought from other agencies. 
1.161 	 Detective Sergeant Hibbitt checked CIS Nominals (the local intelligence 
database) for references to Huntley. At that time: 
• 	 there was a record in relation to Contact 2 (the burglary) on CIS 
Nominals, created on 6 June 1996; and 
•  there was a record of Contact 2 on the PNC, created on 12 May 1998. 
The likelihood is that any record in relation to Contact 6 (the allegation of 
rape by IJ) would have concerned bail only, and would accordingly have 
dropped off CIS Nominals a matter of days after this date. 
Huntley arrested 
1.162 	 At about 00:45 on 21 May 1998, Huntley went to Grimsby police station of 
his own accord and was arrested. At this time, he was living at Veal Street, 
Grimsby. He was interviewed under caution by DC Hill and DS Hibbitt. 
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Huntley, he would have been aware that Huntley had been on bail in 
relation to Contact 6. 
1.164 	 Huntley said that he had had consensual sex with KL. He said that he had 
read the Grimsby Evening Telegraph on 18 May 1998 and was aware from 
the description that he was the man the police were seeking. He said that he 
was frightened because he had been accused of rape about six or seven 
weeks previously, and he did not think that the police would believe him. 
1.165 	 He also stated that his girlfriend was young but he had not laid a finger on 
her: ‘because she [was] not old enough’. He said that he had given the 
T-shirt he had been wearing, which KL had identified, to his girlfriend. 
1.166 	 When the girlfriend went to the police station, she told DS Hibbitt that she 
was 15 years old and that she had been Huntley’s girlfriend for three weeks. 
She was told to go home. Later, officers visited her and recovered the T-shirt. 
1.167 	 There is no indication that the girlfriend was asked about whether or not she 
had had sexual intercourse with Huntley. Indeed, it seems clear that she was 
only asked about the rape allegation, and she confirmed Huntley’s version 
of it. There is also no indication that DS Hibbitt, or any other officer involved 
in this Contact, was aware of the earlier underage sexual intercourse 
incidents. 
Huntley charged with rape 
1.168  At 19:33 on 21 May 1998, Huntley was charged with rape. 
1.169 	 The same evening, KL attended the police station, indicating that she had 
some further information. She was interviewed between 17:15 and 20:40, 
when she made a further witness statement in which she said she now 
remembered the name of her attacker: ‘Ian Huntley’. She said that she had 
contacted the police station to arrange to come in at 13:00 to tell them 
about this information, and had only learnt shortly afterwards that Huntley 
had been arrested. 
Remanded in custody 
1.170 	 Huntley appeared before Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates’ Court on 
22 May 1998 and was remanded in custody until 29 May 1998. 
1.171 	 A friend of KL’s, who was interviewed by the police, said that KL had told 
him about the rape on 18 May 1998, and the next evening she confided to 
him that it was Huntley who had raped her. She asked her friend to make 
an anonymous telephone call to the police to that effect. Such a call was 
made, but by another friend. 
Evidence reviewed 
1.172 	 On  28 May 1998, the evidence was reviewed, including an examination 
of the nightclub’s video footage. This showed KL and Huntley dancing 
together in an intimate way at the end of the night. KL was asked to go 
to the police station to view the footage. She identified herself dancing 
with Huntley but said she could not remember doing this. On 3 June 1998, 
KL made a third witness statement to that effect. 
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1.173  On  29 May 1998, Huntley was granted conditional bail. 
1.174 	 The papers were submitted to the CPS by DS Hibbitt on a ‘Confidential 
Information Form’. He requested that the case be reviewed in the light of 
the latest developments. DS Hibbitt properly noted that no further action 
was being taken on the previous allegation of rape against Huntley, which 
also involved a girl he had met in a nightclub. 
Case discontinued 
1.175 	 On  8 June 1998, DS Hibbitt met Andrew Horner, the Senior Crown Prosecutor 
at the Humberside branch of the CPS, and expressed his concerns about 
the direction the enquiry had taken. Mr Horner, with the agreement of 
DS Hibbitt, decided to discontinue the prosecution. 
1.176 	 On  30 June 1998, he gave notice to the Grimsby and Cleethorpes 
Magistrates’ Court that the CPS did not intend to continue the proceedings 
because there was not enough evidence to get a conviction. 
1.177  On  1 July 1998, the case was discontinued. 
Record keeping: Contact 7 
1.178 	 PNC: A record was created on 19 June 1998, as shown on Form 310. By 
18 February 1999, the record was updated to show that the case had 
been discontinued: ‘01/07/98 at Grimsby & Cleethorpes Magistrates Court 
Ref: 98/1940/288160Y Rape Not Guilty Discontinuance’. The update was 
some seven months after the discontinuance. 
1.179 	 On 18 February 1999, the case file was processed in the Administration 
Support Unit (ASU) responsible for creating and updating PNC records. 
Humberside Police do not know why there was a delay between the 
discontinuance (1 July 1998) and its entry onto the PNC. 
1.180 	 Humberside Police conclude that the record was removed from the PNC 
on 25 March 1999 because Huntley’s Criminal Records Office (CRO) number 
was deleted from the PNC on that date. The CRO number was allocated to 
Huntley on confirmation that the fingerprints taken when he was charged 
with rape were his. Humberside Police believe it is likely that the PNC entry 
for this offence would have been deleted on the same day. 
1.181 	 The 1995 ACPO Code, which is dealt with more fully at paragraph 3.68, 
states that cases (that is, records) should be considered for retention 
beyond a generally applicable 42-day period: 
‘in cases where a sexual offence is alleged, but the subject is 
acquitted or the case is discontinued because of the lack of 
corroboration or allegation of consent by the victim, the details may 
[then] be retained for a period of five years upon the authorisation 
of an officer not below the rank of superintendent and will be 
reviewed again at the end of the retention period’. 
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consideration. 
1.183 	 These provisions in the 1995 ACPO Code were brought to the attention of 
the ASU at Humberside Police and a local process was established for such 
cases. A form was created and circulated, along with advice on paper 
flows. The instructions state that each case involving ‘discontinuance’ 
relating to a sexual offence must be brought to the attention of the ASU 
supervisor. The file should then be forwarded to the Headquarters Criminal 
Justice Unit, together with the completed form, to be considered and 
signed off by a superintendent who could decide to retain the PNC record 
for anything up to five years, in keeping with the ACPO rules at the time, 
if satisfied that the preconditions for retention were met. 
1.184 	 There is no ‘Acquittals Notification’ form in the case papers for KL. This 
indicates, and Humberside Police accept, that the file was never forwarded 
to the superintendent to consider retention on the PNC. This means the 
record would have been automatically deleted, without review, 42 days 
after the result of the case was entered in February 1999. 
1.185 	 CIS Nominals: Humberside Police state that an entry would have been 
created on Huntley’s CIS Nominal record, in dataset 11 (that is, ‘General 
Information’), in relation to the arrest and any subsequent bail. The only 
records created related to bail. It is known from the print-out, dated 
7 July 1999, that the Nominals record was updated to include the following 
entry, dated 10 June 1998: 
‘Victoria House: Notification of admission on 29/5/98. Next 
appearance Grimsby 10/7/98 for Rape. Eval B2. 9173.’ 
The review date was set for a year later, 10 June 1999. 
1.186 	 The Nominals record was further updated to include the following entry, 
dated 9 July 1998: 
‘Probation Service. Subject left Victoria Bail Office / 31 / Normanby 
Rd, Scpe [Scunthorpe] on 1/7/98 [the date of the discontinuance]. 
Eval B2. 9174.’ 
The review date for this entry was set for 9 July 1999. An Intelligence Report, 
Form 839, was not prepared or submitted. 
1.187 	 It appears that the bail information recorded in these two entries did not 
have a manual review date entered, in accordance with the 1996 Force 
Weeding Rules. If review dates had been included, the entries would have 
been deleted approximately one month after entry (that is, by August 
1998). In fact, because of this error, those bail records remained on the 
CIS Nominals system until at least July 1999. 
1.188 	 There is a print-out of these CIS Nominals entries on 7 July 1999. It appears 
likely that the record was interrogated on 3 July 1999 during the course of 
the investigation into the allegation made by QR (Contact 10). The record 
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nothing to indicate that this did not happen. 
1.189 	 CIS Crime: A CIS Crime record was created correctly, showing ‘Huntley’ in 
dataset 3. This record, as in Contact 6, has been marked ‘retain’, keeping it 
on the live CIS Crime system. 
1.190  CPD: Not applicable. 
1.191  ICJS: An ICJS record was also created. 
Contact 8 
allegation: indecent assault on a child aged 11, MN 
first contact with Humberside Police: 4 July 1998 
first contact with Social Services: 6 July 1998 
1.192 	 On  4 July 1998, only three days after the rape case in Contact 7 was 
discontinued, a 12-year-old girl, MN, was returned to her home by the 
police after running away for the second time in two days. 
1.193 	 According to the police incident log, she alleged that 18 months earlier she 
had been raped by a ‘man named Ian’ who was a boyfriend of a friend. 
Later that day, the police log records that the allegation was not rape, as 
originally reported, but indecent assault, committed probably in September 
1997, when MN was 11 years old. 
1.194  MN made the following claims: 
1.194.1 Huntley had offered to show her where there were some good trees 
to climb in an orchard at the rear of the Grosvenor Public House, 
Humberston. 
1.194.2 Huntley then took her into the orchard where, over a period of 
45 minutes, he committed a serious sexual assault. 
1.194.3 MN told the police she was friends with Huntley’s then girlfriend. 
In September 1997, Huntley was living with his then girlfriend (aged 17) 
in a caravan in her parents’ rear garden, in the same street as MN. 
1.195 	 At 09:30 on 6 July 1998, Detective Sergeant George passed information 
about the allegation to Senior Social Worker, Ms Kotenko. At 11:00, DS 
George completed a ‘Record of Initial Decision’ recording that a joint 
decision was taken between him and Ms Kotenko to treat this as a police-
only investigation because the allegation involved abuse by a stranger 
and there were no child protection issues at that time. The ‘Record of Initial 
Decision’ identified the alleged abuser as ‘Ian Hunter’. 
1.196 	 MN was interviewed by Detective Constable Steed on the afternoon 
of 6 July 1998. The interview was video-recorded. There was no forensic 
evidence (unsurprisingly, given the lapse of time between the alleged 
incident and its being reported). 
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interview with MN, Police Constable Lill passed information to L. Flather 
at Social Services, who in turn passed the information to Ms Kotenko. The 
‘information’ appears simply to be the claim made by MN, previously 
provided on 6 July 1998. 
Arrest and bail 
1.198 	 Huntley was arrested 10 days later, on 26 July 1998. He was interviewed by 
DC Steed and Detective Constable Roworth and denied all aspects of the 
claims. He was granted police bail to 23 August 1998. 
1.199 	 A file was prepared by DC Steed and submitted for decision on how to 
proceed. It included a ‘Confidential Disclosure Form’ which recorded that 
Huntley had been recently arrested following a rape allegation, which she 
believed had been withdrawn by the complainant, and that he had one 
previous conviction for burglary. This record was inaccurate in almost every 
respect: 
• there  were  two allegations of rape by this date (Contacts 6 and 7); 
•  neither allegation had been withdrawn by the complainant; and 
• Huntley  had  not been convicted of burglary. 
It is not clear from where DC Steed got this information. 
No further action 
1.200 	 On  5 August 1998, Police Sergeant Tait, a designated ‘decision maker’, 
sent a minute to DC Steed saying: ‘Although we have the evidence that 
[MN] told two of her friends (correction, friend and brother) around the 
time of the alleged incident I do not feel there is a realistic prospect of 
conviction. Insufficient evidence. NFA [no further action]’. Huntley was 
released from police bail on 13 August 1998. 
1.201 	 On  14 August 1998, DC Steed completed a ‘Record of Subsequent Action’, 
which referred, correctly, to the details of the accused as: ‘Ian Kevin 
Huntley’, and contained his URN 192359 from the CIS. It also recorded ‘file to 
CPS – yes’ with the result ‘NFA’ (that is, no further action). It appears that the 
file was not in fact sent to the CPS. 
1.202 	 Probably in mid-August 1998, PS Tait signed off a version of the CIS Crime 
print-out with the initials ‘U/D’ (undetected) and sent it to the Administrative 
Support Unit of the Criminal Justice Department which, by this date, had 
taken over the role of entering records into the CIS Crime system. They 
recorded receipt on 20 October 1998. 
Record keeping: Contact 8 
1.203  PNC: Not applicable, because Huntley was not charged. 
1.204 	 CIS Nominals: According to Humberside Police, because Huntley was 
arrested, interviewed and bailed for this offence, the source documents 
would have been directed to the ‘A’ Division DIB, and an entry would 
have been created on his CIS Nominals record in dataset 11 (the ‘General 
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within a few days after the date on which he was due to answer bail on 
23 August 1998. Huntley was in fact released from police bail on 13 August 
1998, following the decision of 5 August 1998 to take no further action 
against him. 
1.205 	 There is no indication that an Intelligence Report (Form 839) was made at 
any stage for inclusion in CIS Nominals. Nor that consideration was given 
to whether or not a record of the incident should be maintained on CIS 
Nominals. According to Humberside Police, the officer in charge could 
have submitted Form 839, but this would not be expected as other source 
documents were generated. 
1.206 	 CIS Crime: The CIS Crime record was updated to show Huntley’s details as 
a suspect, but these details were entered into the unsearchable dataset 4 
(general information) rather than searchable dataset 3 (offenders/wanted 
persons). 
1.207 	 CPD: A record was made but with the incorrect name of ‘Ian Hunter’. 
This record survived the review and deletion process in January 2002. 
1.208  ICJS: A record was created. 
Contact 9 
allegation: rape involving OP

first contact with Humberside Police: 22 May 1999

1.209 	 On  22 May 1999, OP contacted the police. The incident log records that 
she told them that she had been raped approximately three months earlier, 
on 20 February 1999, against a wall after leaving Hollywoods nightclub in 
Grimsby, by a man she knew as ‘Ian’. 
1.210 	 On  23 May 1999, OP made a statement to the police during an interview in 
which her boyfriend was present. She said that in January that year she and 
a friend had met Ian, who was aged 25, and lived at 14 Abbey Drive East 
(an address in Grimsby). She said that she had previously visited his flat and 
he had telephoned her over the following few weeks. She alleged that he 
raped her after they had spent the evening with mutual friends. She told the 
police that she had told her friend about it the next day but decided not to 
inform the police. She said that her boyfriend, having contracted a sexually 
transmitted disease, confronted her a week after the alleged rape, but that 
she had not mentioned it. She did not know what Ian’s surname was, but he 
had said it used to be Huntley. 
Huntley’s alias 
1.211 	 In fact, it is known that Huntley changed his name by deed poll on 
26 May 1999. It therefore appears he had been using a different name 
before this date. 
1.212 	 On  24 May 1999, the police saw OP’s friend, who denied that OP had 
confided in her about the alleged rape. She said that OP and Huntley had 
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had decided to go to Huntley’s home address. 
1.213 	 On  25 May 1999, the police challenged OP’s story. She admitted that she 
had lied in her statement and alleged that sex had taken place at Huntley’s 
flat, but that it had been against her will. She also admitted that she had 
lied when she told police she had confided in a friend about being raped. 
1.214 	 On the same day, Detective Constable Chatha and DC Hill spoke to 
Huntley. From the outset, DC Chatha had been aware of Contact 7, 
probably from speaking to DC Hill. Huntley was not arrested or formally 
interviewed. He stated that sex had taken place consensually in his flat. It is 
evident that by this stage the officers involved had formed, unsurprisingly, a 
dim view of OP’s version of events. It is not clear whether they asked Huntley 
about any change in his name, but in the report subsequently prepared by 
DC Chatha he was referred to as ‘Ian Huntley’. 
1.215 	 The police again contacted OP and told her that the chances of a 
conviction against Huntley were slim because there was very little evidence, 
which in any event was already tainted by her lies. OP declined to make 
a further statement because she felt it was unlikely that any proceedings 
would be brought against Huntley. 
1.216 	 DC Chatha prepared a report. He recorded his view that the rape was 
reported because OP’s boyfriend had contracted a sexually transmitted 
disease. On 19 June 1999, Acting Detective Inspector Biggs endorsed the 
report, stating: 
‘In view of the prevarications and inconsistencies in details furnished 
by OP and the underlying reasons for the report being made[,] file 
as “no crime”’. 
Record keeping: Contact 9 
1.217  PNC: Not applicable, because Huntley was not charged. 
1.218 	 CIS Nominals: No source documentation that could have led to the 
creation of a record was prepared. In particular, there was no Intelligence 
Report, Form 839. 
1.219 	 CIS Crime: A record was made on CIS Crime. This recorded, in the 
unsearchable dataset 4 (general information), the suspect as being 
‘Ian, Address 14 Abbey Drive East Grimsby’. 
1.220 	 CPD: Humberside Police accept that as OP was 17 years old at the time 
of the alleged rape, and therefore a child as defined under the Children 
Act 1989, an entry should have been made on the CPD. However, they 
suggested that it could be argued that there was no need to create a CPD 
record, because OP would not have been the subject of a social services 
referral. 
1.221 	 Section 47 of the Children Act places a duty on local authorities to make, or 
cause to be made, enquiries when they have reasonable cause to believe 
that a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm. Humberside 
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whole thrust of the Area Child Protection Committee Guidelines and 
Procedures in place in 1999 was aimed at abuse within families or by other 
carers. According to Humberside’s custom and practice, ‘stranger rapes’ of 
17-year-old girls were not dealt with under the child protection procedures. 
1.222  ICJS: No record was created, as Huntley was not arrested. 
Contact 10 
allegation: rape involving QR

first contact with Humberside Police: 3 July 1999

1.223 	 On the morning of 3 July 1999, QR’s mother contacted the police and 
reported that, between 03:00 and 03:30, QR had been raped at the rear of 
the disused ambulance station on her way home from Hollywoods nightclub 
in Grimsby. 
1.224 	 Following media reports about the alleged rape, the police received a 
telephone call from OP’s (Contact 9) ex-boyfriend suggesting that the 
person responsible might be ‘Ian’ of an address in Grimsby. 
1.225 	 Police Constable Harding spent some time researching the Contact 9 
case and he discovered other similar offences in which Huntley had been 
implicated. PC Harding passed Huntley’s details to his supervisor, Detective 
Sergeant Houchin, as a suspect for the enquiry. 
1.226 	 It appears that CIS Nominals was interrogated on 7 July 1999 by 
PC Roworth. The print-out recorded the burglary charge that lay on file 
(Contact 2). It also showed that Huntley had been admitted to Victoria 
House Bail Office on 29 May 1998 and had been due to appear at Grimsby 
Magistrates’ Court on 10 July 1998 for a charge of rape (Contact 7), and 
that he had left Victoria House on 1 July 1998. 
1.227 	 On  14 July 1999, Huntley was interviewed by the police (Police Constable 
Keighley, Police Constable Hopper and DS Houchin) at his home, in Scotter, 
Lincolnshire. By this date, Huntley was using the name ‘Ian Nixon’, having 
changed his name by deed poll on 26 May 1999. He stated that he had not 
been to Grimsby since the beginning of June 1999. He provided a mouth 
swab for a DNA match. His alibi was supported by his girlfriend, Maxine Carr. 
Samples taken from the victim, QR, did not result in any scientific evidence 
to assist in identifying the assailant. 
1.228 	 A Suspect Form was completed after the interview with Huntley, which 
recorded that he had been identified as a potential suspect as a result 
of information provided by DC Hill (who had been involved in Contacts 7 
and 9); and that he had a ‘previous similar m.o. [modus operandi] & fits 
description’. 
PC Harding’s Intelligence Report 
1.229 	 PC Harding decided to submit an Intelligence Report on Huntley. He filled 
out Form 839 which is the only time in the history of the police contacts with 
Huntley that a police officer filled out such a form. The report read 
as follows: 
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31/01/74 – CRO 192359

Address: 3 Manchester House, High Street, Scotter

The above named has come to the attention of Grimsby CID in 4 

separate rape enquiries, beginning in April 1998 and one indecent 

assault in July 1998. 

HUNTLEY on all these occasions has targeted women that he knew 

or has befriended, usually in nightclubs. He either accompanies 

them home or walks with them and then rapes them. The problems 

[sic] with all of the cases has been that the victims have all known 

HUNTLEY and he has admitted having sex with them but with 

consent. The indecent assault was on a 12 year old family friend 

and again there was a lack of independent evidence to support 

a prosecution. HUNTLEY also seems to choose women who do not 

make ideal witnesses/complainants and two of the victims have 

initially lied about their knowledge of HUNTLEY, it is believed because 

they thought they would not be believed if they knew their attacker.

It is quite clear that HUNTLEY is a serial sex attacker and is at liberty to 

continue his activities. It may well be that other women have been 

forced to have sex with him after nightclub smooches and have 

decided not to report it. The relevant crime report file numbers for 

the Grimsby offences are:

AA/9586/98

AA/12577/98

AA/18632/98

AA/12353/99

If direct liaison is required please contact DS 5OI HOUCHIN or myself 

MICK HARDING in the Grimsby Drug Unit.’ 

1.230 	 The Crime Report numbers referred to Contacts 6 to 9, involving: IJ, KL, 
MN and OP. 
1.231  PC Harding faxed copies to: 
• 	 Lincolnshire Police (at two of their intelligence branches, in 
Gainsborough and Louth); 
• 	 Scunthorpe police station (in the Humberside Police area) because of 
Huntley’s Scotter address, which is close to Scunthorpe; and 
• 	 Humberside DIB, Grimsby. It is stamped as having been received on 
20 July 1999. 
1.232 	 Following Huntley’s arrest for the murders of Jessica Chapman and Holly 
Wells, QR was re-interviewed by Humberside Police and asked whether she 
had seen Huntley in the media coverage of the murders. QR said that she 
had and re-confirmed that he was not the man who had attacked her. 
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1.233  PNC: Not applicable, because Huntley was not charged for this offence. 
1.234 	 CIS Nominals: It is highly likely that the information on the Intelligence 
Report, Form 839, written by PC Harding, would have been put onto 
Huntley’s CIS Nominals record on or about 20 July 1999. However, the 
record and information in the PC Harding report were deleted. 
1.235 	 Alias not included on CIS Nominals 
CIS Nominals should have been updated to include Huntley’s alias of 
‘Nixon’. As this was not done, any future search could still only be done 
under ‘Huntley’. 
Deletion of the PC Harding report 
1.236 	 Further research by DCS Baggs during the Inquiry hearings revealed the 
following: 
1.236.1 From May 2000, the task of reviewing and deleting records was 
undertaken by DIB civilian support staff. 
1.236.2 It is likely that on 27 July 2000, one of those civilian support staff 
reviewed and deleted Huntley’s record (that is, the PC Harding 
report) as one of a batch included in a ‘weed run’. It appears that 
the deletion was either done in error or as a result of a misjudgement. 
1.237  CIS Crime: A record was created. This record did not name Huntley. 
1.238 	 CPD: Humberside Police accept that as OP was 17 years old at the time of 
the rape, an entry should have been made on the CPD. This was not done. 
1.239  ICJS: Not applicable, because Huntley was not arrested. 
Huntley’s application for disclosure 
under the Data Protection Act 1998 
1.240 	 On  1 October 1999, Huntley applied to Scunthorpe police station for 
disclosure of his PNC record. The first page of the application form is missing. 
It is known that there were different forms for a ‘PNC request’ (for disclosure 
of information held only on the PNC) and for a ‘PNC and Force request’ 
(to include also disclosure of information held at a local level by that police 
force). Humberside Police state Huntley’s request was a PNC-only form. 
1.241 	 The procedure was to send the application to the National Identification 
Service (NIS), which would then respond directly to the applicant – as the 
NIS did in this case. 
1.242 	 Huntley applied only for details of convictions, in the name of ‘Ian Nixon’. 
He indicated on the form that he had previously used the surname ‘Huntley’. 
In answer to the question: ‘Have you ever been accused or convicted of 
an offence?’ he ticked the box, and stated that in May 1998 he had been 
accused of rape in Grimsby. This was clearly not the whole truth. 
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meant there was only a PNC search. The other option, ‘PNC and Force’, 
included a search of the local police intelligence systems. As Huntley gave 
both his ‘Nixon’ and ‘Huntley’ names on the form, if a search had been 
requested on the local intelligence systems, he would probably have 
been told about the PC Harding report, (unless at that time it had been 
considered sufficiently operationally sensitive to withhold). 
1.244 	 He  gave his address as Manchester House, High Street, Scotter, Gainsborough 
[Lincolnshire]. For the previous ten years he gave: 
21 Veal St, Grimsby 
16 Pelham Rd, Immingham 
8 Abbey Drive East, Grimsby 
In fact, Huntley had at least nine different addresses during this period. 
1.245 	 On  6 October 1999, the application was forwarded by Jennifer Larkin, Data 
Protection Assistant at Humberside Police, to the NIS. Ms Larkin stated that, 
according to local practice in Humberside, she would have searched the 
PNC herself before sending the form to the NIS, but no search would have 
been made of the CIS. 
1.246 	 Ms Larkin stated that, when searching the PNC, she would have seen that 
there was a ‘lie on file’ recorded against him for the burglary (Contact 2). 
However, she stated that at no stage was it suggested to her that an 
application for subject access should be treated as an intelligence-
gathering opportunity, and she would not have understood it to be part of 
her role to inform police colleagues that Huntley had declared the use of 
another name. 
1.247 	 As stated above, Huntley would have received a response to his 
application direct from the NIS. According to the chronology, on 
11 November 1999, the NIS wrote to ‘Ian Nixon’, enclosing a copy of the 
PNC record in the name of ‘Ian Kevin Huntley’ showing the 1998 Grimsby 
Crown Court appearance for burglary being allowed to ‘lie on file’. 
1.248 	 Neither the NIS nor Humberside Police updated the PNC as a result of this 
Subject Access Request to record the name ‘Ian Nixon’ against the URN 
already associated with Huntley. Until mid-2003, Humberside Police did not 
have a procedure in place for updating the PNC with ad hoc intelligence. 
It is not known whether such procedures were in place in other police forces 
across the country, but Humberside Police were unaware of any. 
The recruitment and vetting processes 
1.249 	 The rest of this section looks at Huntley’s recruitment and vetting and the 
roles of: 
•  Soham Village College; (paragraphs 1.250–1.264) 
•  Education Personnel Management Ltd (EPM); (paragraphs 1.265–1.284) 
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•  Humberside Police (paragraphs 1.318–1.326); and 
•  the Huntley vetting check – December 2001 (paragraphs 1.327–1.366). 
The system in place nationally at the time of Huntley’s vetting is described in 
Appendix 4. 
Recruitment 
Soham Village College 
1.250 	 The post of residential site officer, or caretaker, at Soham Village College 
was advertised in the local press on 12 and 18 October 2001. The previous 
incumbent had been dismissed for having an inappropriate relationship 
with a pupil. 
1.251 	 Huntley  applied  on  19 October 2001 under the name ‘Ian Nixon’. He gave 
his permanent address as Ribstone House in Barrow-upon-Humber, within 
the Humberside Police area. In signing the form, Huntley agreed that if his 
application was successful a police check for convictions/cautions would 
be made. 
The school’s interview with Huntley 
1.252 	 He was interviewed on 9 November 2001 by the Principal, Howard Gilbert; 
the Vice-Principal, Mrs Bryden; and the Chairman of the Governors’ 
Premises Committee, Mr Dunham. Mr Gilbert states that no member of the 
panel had any reservations about Huntley’s integrity or demeanour. 
1.253 	 According to Mr Gilbert, the interview followed the school’s standard 
format. Child protection issues were raised by Mr Dunham, who asked 
Huntley how he would respond to a girl developing a crush on him. 
Mr Gilbert recalls that Huntley gave an entirely satisfactory answer, and the 
scenario was pursued to the extent that he was asked three questions on 
the matter. 
1.254 	 In his evidence, Mr Gilbert recognised that the interview could have been 
more focused and that more guidelines might be useful. He was not aware 
until recently of the 1992 report by the Committee of Inquiry, chaired by 
Norman Warner, Choosing with Care. He did not believe that it had been 
circulated to schools at that point in 2001. In fact, Home Office Circular 
47/93 specifically states that further information about the recruitment, 
selection and appointment of staff can be found in chapters 3 to 5 of that 
report (paragraph 22). However, Mr Gilbert was not aware of the terms of 
the Home Office Circular 47/93 at the time. In Mr Gilbert’s words: ‘That is 
why I employed advisers’. 
Employment history 
1.255 	 In addition to the Home Office Circular 47/93, the Department for Education 
and Skills (DfES) issued guidelines on 10 September 1998 on Recruitment 
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contact with children. These stated: 
‘Any information about previous employment should be scrutinised 
to ensure that it is consistent. Satisfactory explanations should be 
obtained for any gaps in employment.’ 
1.256 	 The employment history given by Huntley on his application form identified 
five employers for the 11-year period from 1990 to October 2001. It was 
clear from this record that he had not previously worked in any post 
involving significant contact with children. For each employer the dates of 
employment were simply given by year, rather than by month or specific 
date. It was also apparent that not every period of employment had 
lasted the whole year referred to: for example, Huntley stated that he had 
been employed by Kimberley Clark from 1999 to the present, while on the 
previous page he gave the date he was appointed as 25 October 1999. 
1.257 	 Mr Gilbert accepted that checking for any gaps in an applicant’s 
employment history, and obtaining a satisfactory explanation, formed an 
important part of recruitment. However, he had no recollection of going 
through the dates with Huntley at the interview to find out exactly when one 
period of employment started and another stopped. 
1.258 	 Mr Gilbert indicated that he was aware from discussion with Huntley 
that he did have some short-term contracts with other companies while 
at Kimberley Clark, but he could not recall if that discussion took place 
during the interview or later during his employment. I am aware from other 
evidence received by the Inquiry that Huntley had employment with at 
least one other company during this period but they were not, of course, 
contacted. 
Five open references 
1.259 	 Huntley brought five references to the interview. Each was in an ‘open’ or 
a ‘to whom it may concern’ style. 
•  Three related to his employment at Kimberley Clark Ltd: 
– 	 one on Kimberley Clark headed notepaper dated 22 September 
2001; 
– 	 one from the recruitment agency which had placed him there, 
dated 9 June 2000; and 
–  one dated 12 June 2000 from a work colleague. 
•  The other two references were both undated: 
–  one from an employment agency, Total Recruitment; and 
–  one from Petrochem UK Ltd. 
1.260 	 According to Mr Gilbert, relying on open references was exceptional 
at the time of Huntley’s appointment, and the only time he can recall it 
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1998 provided: 
‘References should always be taken up, and should be obtained 
directly from the referee. It is not good practice to rely solely on 
references or testimonials provided by the candidate.’ 
1.261 	 Mr Gilbert accepted that the recruitment process followed in Huntley’s case 
did not conform to these guidelines. 
1.262 	 At the time, Soham Village College used a standard letter and form which 
were sent to referees, asking for their opinion of the candidate’s suitability 
for the post, with reference, if possible, to particular areas. 
1.263 	 Mr Gilbert was confident that for support staff appointments, the referee 
would have been asked for their opinion on the candidate’s suitability 
to work with children. None of the open references provided by Huntley 
addressed this. Mr Gilbert accepted this was a question which should have 
been asked of the referees. However, as the school did not contact any 
of the referees or follow up the references in any way, this issue was never 
raised with them. Mr Gilbert accepted that the references should have 
been followed through and that not to have done so was a mistake. 
1.264 	 The decision to offer Huntley the post, subject to a police check, was taken 
on the same day as he was interviewed, 9 November 2001. Mrs Bryden 
telephoned his home that evening and left a message with Maxine Carr to 
say that he had been offered the job. 
EPM 
1.265  Soham Village College retains EPM as a personnel service provider. 
1.266 	 EPM,  formerly the Education Personnel Unit of Cambridgeshire County 
Council, was outsourced on 1 April 1993. It is a Registered Body and provides 
services to about 500 schools throughout England, including the great 
majority of maintained schools in the Cambridgeshire Constabulary area. 
1.267 	 On  13 November 2001, Soham Village College instructed EPM to issue 
an employment contract to Huntley and carry out medical, police and 
Protection of Children Act (POCA) List checks on him. On the same day, 
EPM sent Huntley: 
1.267.1 a contract to his home address in Barrow-upon-Humber. 
The contract said that the appointment was subject to a 
Criminal Conviction search by the Criminal Records Bureau of 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary; and 
1.267.2 a medical clearance form, which Huntley signed on 3 December 
2001. It was received by EPM the next day. 
1.268 	 On or around the same date, EPM carried out a check against the POCA 
List website, for which EPM have approved access. Huntley was not on 
the POCA List or List 99 in November 2001. In a statement to the Inquiry, 
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that the check was done in the name of Nixon and Huntley’. 
The Police Check Form 
1.269 	 At some point following the employment offer, Soham Village College gave 
Huntley a copy of the standard Police Check Form, provided by EPM. The 
form was consistent with the model annexed to Home Office Circular 47/93, 
but included an additional ‘Part B’ to be completed by the Principal, which 
required him to sign to confirm that the applicant’s date of birth had been 
verified. This additional section had been inserted at EPM’s request, with the 
agreement of Cambridgeshire Constabulary, after the introduction of Local 
Management of Schools (LMS). Mr Gilbert believes that Huntley provided 
a driving licence, passport or birth certificate, but cannot recall which. The 
guidance given to schools by EPM when Home Office Circular 47/93 was 
issued was that the proof-of-age document should be the birth certificate. 
1.270 	 It is also worth noting that if Huntley had provided his birth certificate, as 
EPM had advised Soham Village College, it would have shown the name 
‘Huntley’ rather than ‘Nixon’ because, unlike a driving licence or passport, 
a birth certificate could not have been changed when Huntley changed 
his name by deed poll. 
1.271 	 The completed Police Check Form is no longer in existence because it was 
destroyed as part of EPM’s practice, as required by Home Office Circular 
47/93. 
1.272 	 According to Mr Gilbert, the College would normally encourage the 
successful applicant to have completed ‘Part A’ of the Police Check Form 
and have given evidence about date of birth on a pre-employment visit, or, 
failing that, immediately on employment. In Huntley’s case, Mr Gilbert was 
sure that Huntley brought in the form and supporting document the day he 
started his job on 26 November 2001. As a result, the police check process 
had only just begun by the time Huntley had actually started working and 
living at 5 College Close. 
1.273 	 Mr Gilbert stated that the College was trying to expedite the matter, as 
they had lost the previous caretaker very suddenly. The post had been 
vacant since early October 2001, and in the meantime the work was being 
temporarily handled by a local company and appropriate shift work. 
According to Mr Gilbert, it was fairly common that the outcome of the 
police check would not be known by the time the successful applicant 
started employment. 
1.274 	 EPM received Huntley’s Police Check Form from Soham Village College on 
4 December 2001. By that time, ‘Part A’ would have been completed by 
Huntley, and ‘Part B’ signed by a member of staff at the school to confirm 
that his date of birth had been verified. Huntley had applied for the post 
in the name of ‘Ian Nixon’ but had stated on his application form that his 
father was a site manager in a local school. According to supplementary 
evidence, submitted by Maureen Cooper, following her attendance at the 
Inquiry, EPM also provided personnel services to that school and EPM were 
aware that the caretaker there was Kevin Huntley. 
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of EPM, this was either Mrs Cooper or Bev Curtis. The Senior Nominated 
Officer was required to confirm that, among other matters, the particulars 
on the form had been verified and that the Senior Nominated Officer was 
satisfied that they were accurate. 
1.276 	 Mrs Cooper gave evidence to the Inquiry on the steps EPM took before 
sending the form to the Cambridgeshire Constabulary. According to Mrs 
Cooper, the details on the form would be checked against the original job 
application and instructions received from the school. So, in Huntley’s case, 
EPM would have checked that the Police Check Form showed: 
•  5 College Close, Soham as his present address; and 
• 	 Ribstone House, Barrow-on-Humber as his previous address. This was on 
the job application form, and the address to where the employment 
contract had been sent. 
1.277  However,  EPM: 
1.277.1 carried out no further verification process or independent check of 
the information provided on the Police Check Form in relation to 
other possible previous addresses; 
1.277.2 did no checks of the accuracy about the ‘previous surnames’ box, 
whether blank or otherwise; and 
1.277.3 did no independent checks about the applicant’s identity, except 
to ‘make sure that the application form received from the school 
identified the individual’. 
1.278 	 With regard to ‘aliases’ and ‘previous addresses’, EPM relied on an 
individual’s honesty to provide the details requested on the Police Check 
Form. Mrs Cooper accepted that in signing the declaration that the Senior 
Nominated Officer had verified the particulars and was satisfied they were 
accurate, she was signing something that was not accurate. However, it 
was Mrs Cooper’s evidence that EPM’s approach to Police Check Forms 
reflected national practice. 
1.279 	 On  4 December 2001, the day they received it from Soham Village College, 
EPM promptly forwarded the Police Check Form to Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary. 
1.280 	 A month later, on 4 January 2002, Cambridgeshire Constabulary sent back 
the Police Check Form to EPM. It recorded ‘No trace’. This information was 
passed on to Soham Village College, and Huntley was confirmed in his post 
as caretaker. 
If there had been a ‘trace’ on the Police Check Form 
1.281 	 Before turning to the police check process itself, I should deal with 
Mr Gilbert’s understanding of what the position would have been if the 
Police Check Form had been returned showing a ‘trace’. 
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had the information concerning Huntley’s contact with Humberside Police 
been made available to him, ‘it is probable that I could not have used it 
directly with Huntley other than to monitor him more closely’. 
1.283 	 Mr Gilbert stated that he had received this advice from EPM. EPM have 
subsequently clarified that no advice was given to Mr Gilbert at the time 
Huntley was recruited – there being, of course, no need to do so as the 
police check was returned ‘no trace’. However, confusion appears to have 
arisen in respect of advice given by Mr Curtis of EPM to Mr Gilbert at the 
time of Huntley’s trial, as to what the situation might have been had some 
form of intelligence been disclosed. 
1.284 	 It is not necessary for me to resolve how this confusion arose, but I would 
wish to make the position in this respect clear. If information had been 
disclosed to Soham Village College under the regime established by Home 
Office Circular 47/93, unless the police had specifically placed restrictions 
upon its use for reasons of operational sensitivity, there was nothing to 
prevent Mr Gilbert from discussing it with Huntley. Indeed, he was obliged 
to do so if the information, given as a result of the police check, differed 
from that given by Huntley and was of significance. This remains the position 
under the current regime. 
The police vetting process 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary 
1.285 	 The department responsible for vetting at Cambridgeshire Constabulary is 
the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB). This is the local bureau which should not 
be confused with the national Criminal Records Bureau. 
1.286 	 In December 2001, the local CRB was made up of two groups of staff. 
There were nine shift-workers who: 
•  carried out the police checks for the protection of children; 
• 	 performed a range of other duties, including responding to telephone 
requests from officers for information from the PNC (radio requests were 
dealt with by the Force Control Room); 
• updated  the  PNC; 
•  worked a series of shifts: 22:00–06:00; 06:00–14:00; and 14:00–22:00. 
There were also five day-workers who dealt with updates to the PNC, 
including court results, summonses, fingerprints, etc. They did not deal with 
the Police Check Forms. 
1.287 	 Both the day-workers and shift-workers were managed by the Team 
Leaders, Carole Lightley and Steve Barnes, who were in turn managed by 
the CRB Manager, Deborah Fairbank. Miss Lightley, who joined as Team 
Leader in December 2000, oversaw the day-to-day child protection checks. 
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who was also responsible for a number of other operational and policy 
functions. In December 2001, this was Detective Superintendent Haddow, 
who had been appointed on 5 September 2001, but did not take up the 
post until mid-November 2001. 
1.289 	 Det Supt Haddow’s predecessor was Temporary Detective Chief 
Superintendent Stevenson, who had held the post since 2 May 2000. While 
Det Supt Haddow was absent between September and mid-November 
2001, Acting Superintendent Phillipson undertook the role of Acting Head 
of Crime Support. 
Difficulties at the CRB 
1.290 	 According to Cambridgeshire Constabulary’s evidence to the Inquiry, 
there were a number of difficulties within the CRB at the time, namely: 
•  a general staff shortage; 
•  a shortage of fully-trained staff; 
•  large and increasing volumes of work; and 
•  staff absence caused by sickness and disciplinary problems. 
Staffing Cambridgeshire CRB 
1.291 	 As early as January 2001, Miss Fairbank proposed the recruitment of five 
new members of staff between March and December 2001 for the work 
resulting from the launch of the national CRB. 
1.292 	 It was planned that the national CRB would meet all reasonable start-up 
costs. They expected to begin registration from 1 March 2001 and issue 
‘Standard’ and ‘Enhanced’ disclosures from August. 
1.293 	 By March 2001, the launch date had been moved back to 15 October. 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary agreed to begin recruiting staff in June, 
unless a case could be made to bring them in earlier. 
1.294 	 On 12 March, Det Supt Stevenson informed Miss Fairbank that she could 
recruit a new Team Leader, with £10,000 which the unit had received to 
help with the launch. However, it appears that the funding was not in place 
because on 23 March, Miss Fairbank asked Det Supt Stevenson to review a 
request for additional funding, to employ a Team Leader before the 
six-week build-up to the October launch. 
1.295 	 The Chief Constable approved this, and funding was sought from the 
national CRB. Although, in his oral evidence, the Chief Constable stated 
that he had authorised other funds to speed up recruitment, it is clear from 
the documents that the request was made only for a Team Leader. 
1.296 	 By 26 April 2001, Cambridgeshire waited for written confirmation from the 
CRB. By 25 May, the national CRB had guaranteed funding for a Team 
Leader and four new operators from 3 September (six weeks before the 
launch date), and funding for the Team Leader from July. To allow time for 
training, the Team Leader and two operators would be recruited in June, 
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be funded locally. 
1.297 	 In early August 2001, the two new operators (Jackie Blyton and Julie Behan) 
were recruited; Steve Barnes was transferred to the CRB as an additional 
Team Leader. A further operator (Jacqueline Giddings) was recruited on 
1 October 2001. 
1.298 	 According to Cambridgeshire police witnesses, new operators took at least 
three months to train. Ms Blyton and Ms Behan therefore completed their 
training by early November 2001, and Mrs Giddings was due to complete 
hers by 1 January 2002, although this period was apparently extended by 
a month. 
Increase in applications not anticipated 
1.299 	 The national CRB’s launch date was repeatedly put back and it finally 
launched in March 2002. During 2001, the number of applications for police 
checks received by Cambridgeshire CRB increased from 1,308 in February 
2001 to 1,723 in December 2001, peaking at 2,076 in July 2001. However, the 
increase in police check applications before the launch of the national CRB 
was not anticipated by Cambridgeshire Constabulary at the time. 
1.300 	 Det Supt Haddow’s evidence was that there was no discussion about work 
pressures during any of the meetings of the PNC Steering Group and that 
nobody anticipated that there would be the level of increase [in work] that 
they were later subject to. Instead, the focus was on the implementation of 
the CRB itself. The timing of the recruitment of the new staff members and 
Team Leader was calculated on the anticipated increase in work when the 
national CRB actually launched, with a lead-in period for training. 
1.301 	 It was suggested that the rise in police check applications was 
unforeseeable. Miss Lightley’s evidence was that she and her colleagues 
believed that organisations were getting all their checks in at this stage 
to avoid having to pay for checks via the CRB. This is clearly a sensible 
and reasonable assumption. However, it is difficult to see why it could not 
have been made before the increase happened, and Det Supt Haddow 
indeed accepted that it would have been reasonable for Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary to have anticipated an increase. 
Sickness and disciplinary problems 
1.302 	 In  addition to the difficulties caused by the unanticipated increase in police 
check application numbers, Cambridgeshire witnesses also referred to staff 
sickness and disciplinary problems. During the relevant period, this involved 
one operator who was suspended in September 2001, and following a 
disciplinary hearing on 12 December, reported sick and did not return to work. 
Processing police checks – the system until 2001 
1.303 	 Until late 2001, it appears that the system for processing police checks 
remained substantially unchanged from that introduced in about 1994. 
By the time Miss Lightley joined in December 2000, the system for each 
Police Check Form was: 
62  The Bichard Inquiry – Contacts, recruitment and vetting – the facts 1.303.1 On arrival, a Police Check Form was placed in an in-tray. Certain 
details were entered onto the Child Access Database, including the 
name, alias, date and place of birth of the applicant. Each form 
was given a unique computerised number. 
1.303.2 After entry on the database, an operator carried out a search 
against that applicant’s name on the PNC, CIS (the Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary’s local intelligence and local convictions system) and 
‘Intrepid’ (which enabled operators to access information from 
Cambridgeshire’s Family Support Units, including child abuse or 
domestic violence incidents). 
1.303.3 The operator would also check to see if any of the addresses on 
the applicant’s form for the past five years were located in another 
police force’s area – a so-called ‘foreign force’. If so, a fax would be 
sent to that ‘foreign force’, asking for information. 
1.303.4 The Child Access Database had an automated fax system. Once 
the ‘foreign force’ had been identified, the operator could find the 
relevant fax number for that force on the computer system, enter 
the command and a fax form would be automatically generated 
and sent to the relevant ‘foreign force’. Faxes sent in this way were 
automatically logged on the database. 
1.303.5 If the automated fax system was not working, it was still possible for 
the computer to generate the fax form, the relevant fields of which 
were filled in with the information held about the applicant on the 
Child Access Database. That fax form would then be printed off, 
and the operator would write in the name of the ‘foreign force’ to 
which it was directed, and send the fax manually. When a manual 
fax was sent, there was no automatic record on the Child Access 
Database. 
1.303.6 Once the fax was sent, it would be filed in a book, which was 
alphabetically labelled, to await a response. 
If there was ‘no trace’ 
1.303.7 If there was ‘no trace’ on any of the checks, the operator would 
close the file and put the application into the out-tray. The Child 
Access Database would be endorsed to say this had happened. 
If there was a ‘trace’ 
1.303.8 If any of the checks showed a ‘trace’, the information would be 
printed off and the application passed to a Team Leader, and 
ultimately to the Head of Crime Support, to consider disclosure to 
the prospective employer. All convictions (unless spent and deleted) 
would be disclosed. If it was considered appropriate to disclose 
other information, it would be put in a letter drafted by a Team 
Leader and signed by the Head of Crime Support. The information 
was then sent to the employer and marked ‘confidential’. 
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1.304 	 Miss Lightley explained that a variation on the system was introduced as a 
result of the large number of police check applications being received in 
late 2001. Rather than carry out a check on one application form against a 
series of databases in a specific order, as had previously been the case, the 
new operators were taught to check a number of application forms against 
one database, a ‘batch check’ process. According to Miss Lightley, the 
process which evolved was based on a series of ‘trays’: 
1.304.1 On arrival, the application form was placed in Tray 1. 
1.304.2 The application’s ‘arrival’ was entered on the Child Access 
Database. The form was then moved on to Tray 2. 
1.304.3 The form was removed from Tray 2 for checks against the 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary’s local intelligence database, CIS, 
and against the PNC. As in the earlier system, if there was a trace, 
this information would be printed off and attached to the form. 
It was then passed to a Team Leader (Miss Lightley or Mr Barnes) 
to consider disclosure. If they had doubts, they would refer the 
matter up to the Head of Crime Support – Det Supt Haddow in 
December 2001. 
1.304.4 If a ‘foreign force’ was identified, a fax would be sent to that force 
asking for details. The form was removed from the tray and filed 
under the applicant’s name in an alphabetical filing system. When a 
response was received, the application was taken out of the file and 
put in Tray 3. 
1.304.5 The replies from ‘foreign forces’ had to be made in writing. 
According to Miss Lightley, Cambridgeshire CRB would not accept 
or rely on oral information from a ‘foreign force’. If there was a 
trace, it would be referred to a Team Leader and, if necessary, to 
Det Supt Haddow. 
1.304.6 The form would be removed from Tray 3 to carry out a check 
against the Intrepid system. If there was a trace, the form and the 
relevant print-out would be referred to a Team Leader and, 
if necessary, Det Supt Haddow. 
1.304.7 After all enquiries were completed, the file would be closed and an 
entry made on the Child Access Database recording whether there 
was a ‘trace’ or ‘no trace’ and the date on which the file 
was closed. 
1.304.8 A hard copy of the completed request was not kept. 
1.305 	 According to a number of the Cambridgeshire witnesses, a further variation 
might arise if the CIS or PNC systems were not available, in which case the 
operator did the Intrepid enquiry after taking the form from Tray 2 rather 
than Tray 3. 
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approach. It is now apparent that this was not the case. Only the 
inexperienced operators, that is, the new recruits, were doing so. 
The difficulties with the ‘tray’ system 
1.307 	 The critical difference between the ‘tray’ or ‘batch’ system and the system 
previously in place was that, rather than one person being responsible for 
conducting all the checks on an application, each application might be 
processed by a number of different people. There were never any written 
instructions on how to deal with the ‘tray’ system and it is clear that different 
operators developed their own ways of working. In particular: 
• 	 there was no consistent practice or instruction as to when in the process 
a ‘foreign force’ fax should be sent; and 
• 	 there was no consistent practice or instruction as to how and when 
a file or database should be endorsed to show that the checks had 
been done. 
Confusion over sending of the ‘foreign force’ fax 
1.308 	 There was evident confusion as to when a ‘foreign force’ should be 
identified and a fax sent: 
1.308.1 Miss Lightley stated that this would take place after PNC and CIS 
checks but that, if they were not available, Intrepid was checked first. 
The operator ‘might’ also find a ‘foreign force’ address at that time 
and make the fax enquiry. 
1.308.2 Paul Watts, an experienced operator, understood that a fax did not 
need to be sent to a ‘foreign force’ at the time of the check against 
Intrepid, but expected any ‘foreign force’ check to be performed 
when the PNC check was done. 
1.308.3 Det Supt Haddow believed that sending a fax to a ‘foreign force’ 
was identified when the form was entered onto the Child Access 
Database. 
Confusion over endorsements 
1.309 	 There was also considerable variation between the operators as to whether 
the form would be endorsed to show that the checks had been done: 
1.309.1 Miss Lightley believed that all operators would manually endorse the 
form if they had done something to it. 
1.309.2 Rather than endorse the form, Mrs Giddings would put a Post-it note 
on the file saying that other checks needed to be completed. 
1.309.3 Ms Nicholson, an experienced operator, described the problem 
she had as to which checks had been done, because operators all 
worked differently: some would endorse the form, some would not. 
1.310 	 According to Miss Lightley, when the automated fax system was not 
functioning, the operator raising the fax enquiry would record this under the 
The Bichard Inquiry – Contacts, recruitment and vetting – the facts  65 ‘Comments’ field on the database. However, Ms Nicholson said that this 
endorsing procedure was not followed by all operators. 
No adequate safety net 
1.311 	 The final, and potentially most significant, problem with the ‘tray’ system 
was that there was no, or no adequate, safety net at the end of the process 
to ensure that all checks had been properly completed. Miss Lightley 
expressed the ‘hope’ that, at the booking-out stage, somebody would 
notice that the application had not gone to the ‘foreign force’ if it needed 
to. But there were no written instructions to that effect and her ‘hope’ was 
in fact ill-founded. Not one of the witness statements from Cambridgeshire 
CRB, including that of Miss Lightley, referred to any requirement to check 
that an application had been sent to a ‘foreign force’ when it needed to. 
Supplementary evidence after the hearings 
1.312 	 Following the hearings, the Inquiry received supplementary evidence on this 
point from Cambridgeshire Constabulary, suggesting that the forms were 
in fact routinely checked before posting out, to ensure that the paperwork 
was complete and that all the necessary checks had been conducted. 
In particular, Miss Lightley now states that Ms Nicholson has recalled that, 
prior to the posting out of forms to the respective bodies, she would arrange 
them in order; and check that all of the signatures were on the forms, and 
the ‘boxes on the process sheet ticked’. 
1.313 	 It is somewhat surprising that this is the first mention of there having been 
a process sheet containing boxes, particularly when Det Supt Haddow, 
Miss Lightley and Chief Constable Lloyd each agreed with Counsel to 
the Inquiry’s suggestion that such a form would have been a good idea. 
No copy of any such sheet has been provided to the Inquiry. 
1.314 	 However, I do not find that it is necessary to resolve this matter. If, as 
Ms Nicholson now contends, it was her practice to check that all checks 
had been completed before the forms were posted out, then in the case of 
the Huntley check, either that practice was not followed or the check failed 
to identify that no foreign force fax had been sent. Either way, the situation 
is no more satisfactory than it was at the time that I heard the evidence 
from the relevant Cambridgeshire Constabulary witnesses. 
1.315 	 Ms Nicholson has stated that if she picked up a form with a PNC 
endorsement on it, but nothing to indicate that a ‘foreign force’ fax had 
been sent, she would almost certainly close the file. There is no evidence to 
suggest that any operator reviewed any application to ensure that all the 
checks, which should have been made, were in fact completed. 
1.316  Miss Lightley described it, with the benefit of hindsight, as a very poor system. 
The current system 
1.317 	 As a result of the implementation of the national CRB, the current system in 
Cambridgeshire CRB is different. Applications are received electronically 
from the national CRB. The local CRB is required only to check its own 
records, and there is no need to carry out ‘foreign force’ checks. The 
national CRB deals with these, which are identified on an applicant’s 
‘Current and Previous addresses’ sections on the Police Check Form. 
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Staffing levels within Cambridgeshire CRB have improved, and there are 
now 10 operators who do only child protection checks and one operator 
must perform every check on each application. 
Humberside Police 
1.318 	 In the following paragraphs, I examine the Humberside Police system in 2001 
when dealing with vetting requests from other forces. 
1.319 	 The Vetting Section, run by a Disclosure Officer who worked to the 
Humberside Police Data Protection Officer, was responsible for the vetting 
procedures. 
CIS checks 
1.320 	 On receipt of a request, the Vetting Section ran a search against the 
‘General Information’ screen (dataset 11) on CIS Nominals only. They did 
not realise that the capacity of the CIS 2 system (introduced in late 1999) 
also allowed them to check a name through the CIS Crime system. Thus, 
in December 2001 the Vetting Section’s searches were only of the CIS 
Nominals system. This remained the position until March 2003 when they 
became aware of the capacity to search both CIS Nominals and CIS Crime 
at the same time. 
No CPD checks 
1.321 	 It  was  not Humberside Police practice to conduct checks against the Child 
Protection Database (CPD) in December 2001. 
1.322  From 1998, there were continuing discussions about the need for: 
•  a CPD ‘weeding’ policy; and 
•  the possibility of searching the CPD during vetting checks. 
These discussions led to no action for some years, until January 2002, when 
a weeding policy was eventually implemented. 
1.323 	 In September 2002, following an IT networking solution, the Vetting Section 
was able to check the CPD direct. However, there were still major problems: 
•  CPD’s records were inadequate and incomplete; and 
• 	 many searches led to paper files held by the various Family Protection 
Units. 
1.324 	 Such were the problems that, after two or three months, Humberside Police 
decided to stop entering information onto the CPD at all. However, this 
decision was reversed in March 2003 and, following a decision in May 2003, 
the database was rewritten and re-populated with historical data. 
The current vetting system in Humberside Police 
1.325 	 The current position is that the Vetting Section checks CIS Nominals and 
CIS Crime together in one search. They now also routinely check the CPD, 
the domestic violence database and the ICJS. 
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allows a range of databases to be searched from a single access point. 
The vetting section is currently piloting use of this data warehouse. The 
advantages of such a system in the vetting context are obvious. 
The Huntley vetting check – December 2001 
1.327 	 On  8 December 2001, Cambridgeshire CRB received the Police Check Form 
from EPM. 
1.328 	 As described above, an entry was made on the Child Access Database, 
which recorded Mr Barnes as making the original entry and the date as 
8 December 2001: 
•  The surname is recorded as ‘Nixon’ and the alias as ‘Huntley’. 
• 	 The date of birth is recorded as ‘31/10/74’. This was an error because it 
should have been entered as ‘31/01/74’. 
• 	 No record was made of either Huntley’s current address or any previous 
address provided on the Police Check Form, because the system did 
not allow for it. 
1.329 	 On  9 December 2001, another operator, Mr Watts, conducted a ‘batch 
check’ on a number of individuals against the Intrepid system. He checked 
against ‘Ian Nixon’, ‘Ian Huntley’, and ‘Ian Nixon’ with the alias ‘Ian 
Huntley’. The results were ‘no trace’. 
1.330 	 It is not known why the ‘Intrepid’ check was done first in this case. If the 
‘tray’ system had been followed, the PNC and CIS checks should have 
been carried out first. Mr Watts believes that it was probably because the 
PNC system was down at the time, although there may have been another 
explanation. 
1.331 	 Unsurprisingly, Mr Watts does not remember the detail of this particular 
application form. However, he thinks it likely that he put the form back 
in the tray, expecting any ‘foreign forces’ enquiry to be raised when the 
PNC check was done, according to the ‘tray’ system as he understood it. 
He suggests it is possible that no ‘foreign force’ address was on the 
application form to start with. For the reasons I give below, I do not consider 
this to have been the case. 
A PNC check in name of ‘Nixon’ but not ‘Huntley’ 
1.332 	 At  20:15  on  21 December 2001, 12 days later, a different member of the 
Cambridgeshire CRB, Mrs Giddings, conducted a PNC check against the 
name of ‘Ian Nixon’ but not ‘Ian Huntley’. No trace was found in the name 
of ‘Ian Nixon’. 
1.333 	 Mrs Giddings was a relatively new member of staff, having joined on 
1 October 2001. From around November 2001, her tutor, Marie Dobson, was 
on sick leave, including the week 17–23 December 2001. During this period 
Mrs Giddings operated without direct supervision, her work being checked 
by whoever was in at the time. In Mrs Giddings’ words, she ‘felt a little lost 
during this period’. 
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Giddings entered Huntley’s correct date of birth (30/01/74), presumably by 
referring to the date on the Police Check Form itself rather than the date 
on the Child Access Database. There is, therefore, no reason why a search 
against ‘Huntley’ would not have also included the correct date of birth. 
In any event, if a search had been made using the incorrect date of birth 
(30/10/74), three possible names would have been revealed, including 
Huntley’s and showing his correct date and place of birth (Grimsby); this 
could then have been compared with the actual application form. If more 
than one potential record had been disclosed, the operator could have 
accessed individual records to confirm which details matched the person 
being checked. 
1.335 	 Thus, it is clear to me that the error made by Mr Barnes when inputting 
Huntley’s details did not have any material effect on the vetting searches 
because: 
• 	 the PNC search was not conducted in the name of ‘Huntley’ so the 
question of whether the wrong date of birth led to the entry being 
missed does not arise; and 
• 	 even if a search had been made in the name of ‘Ian Huntley’, it 
seems extremely unlikely that the operator would have discounted the 
information simply because of an obvious error in the date of birth. 
What might a search in the name of ‘Huntley’ have revealed? 
1.336 	 If a PNC search in the name of ‘Huntley’ had led to Huntley’s record, what 
would it have revealed? 
1.337 	 The first screen of each record is the ‘nominal’ screen, which shows details 
of the subject’s name, date and place of birth, sex, ethnic code and last 
known address. According to Miss Lightley, after checking the nominal 
screen to see that the correct person had been identified, a ‘disclosure 
print’ would have been requested. It is important to note that a number 
of other types of prints may also be requested from the PNC, including 
a ‘police print’. A ‘disclosure print’ only contains details of convictions, 
reprimands, warnings and cautions. It would not have included a charge 
which had been left to ‘lie on file’, as was the case on Huntley’s PNC record 
following the burglary (Contact 2). 
1.338 	 Miss Lightley states, however, that the ‘disclosure print’ would have been 
checked by a supervisor and that, as one herself, her suspicions would 
have been drawn to the lack of convictions on a PNC print-out. She would, 
therefore, have checked the record for any impending prosecutions. She 
states that she would have checked the ‘method’ of the ‘lie on file’, [that 
is, the nature of the offence] which would have been revealed to her at 
the time. 
1.339 	 Ronald Causer, from Cambridgeshire CRB, has explained how entries other 
than convictions, reprimands, warnings and cautions may be accessed. 
The front nominal page of any record includes a ‘banner’ line, identifying 
the search, under which is a series of codes. In Huntley’s case, these codes 
were ‘AS1, DH1, LX1’. 
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an arrest/report on one occasion. 
• 	 DH indicates the ‘disposal history’ of the arrest/summons case and DH1 
indicates there has been a disposal history on one occasion. 
• 	 LX refers to ‘local references’. If further information is required, then the 
police force or station listed should be contacted. LX1 indicates that 
one force or station has information. 
1.340 	 An operator could either scroll through the record’s individual pages, or 
access the relevant page, for example, by entering ‘DH’ to find out more 
about the disposal history, which in Huntley’s case would have shown the 
burglary ‘lie on file’ from Contact 2. It would also have been possible to 
expand this information to view the court details as to disposal: details of 
the case’s administration and the modus operandi. 
What information would have been passed on? 
1.341 	 If  the  search  had revealed the burglary ‘lie on file’ case, the next 
hypothetical question is: would this information have been passed on to 
the employer? 
1.342 	 Det Supt Haddow, who would have taken the decision at the time, stated 
that when considering disclosure he used a guide, which consisted of 
paragraphs 35 and 36 of Home Office Circular 47/93. Although these 
paragraphs are, on their face value, directed at how the potential 
employer will make use of the information, I consider it was entirely 
appropriate and sensible for Det Supt Haddow to have used them to inform 
himself as to whether information was ‘relevant’ and should be disclosed, 
as he was required to do under paragraph 16. Det Supt Haddow explained 
that he would, therefore, have considered the matter as follows: 
1.342.1 The ‘lie on file’ was for a dishonesty offence, and the guidance 
suggested that dishonesty is not as strong a contra-indicator as sex, 
violence or drugs-related offences. 
1.342.2 The nature of a school caretaker’s job clearly needed careful 
consideration for access to children, and information or intelligence 
specifically relating to children would have been of relevance. 
However, the ‘lie on file’ related to dishonesty and a burglary. 
1.342.3 In terms of frequency, the burglary ‘lie on file’ was a single, isolated 
instance of dishonesty. 
1.342.4 The offence had taken place nearly six years earlier, in 1995, 
although the case only reached court in 1998. 
1.342.5 Having moved on to consider legality, necessity, proportionality 
and justification, he would have struggled to justify any decision to 
disclose, whether from a human rights perspective or otherwise. 
1.343 	 In my view, Det Supt Haddow’s approach is entirely justified, and had the 
issue arisen, a decision not to have disclosed Huntley’s ‘lie on file’ charge 
for burglary would not have been open to criticism. That is not to say, of 
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circumstances in which it might be relevant to the suitability of a person to 
work with children. 
The ‘foreign force’ check 
1.344 	 In contrast to the Intrepid and PNC systems, where it has been possible to 
identify what checks were made and when, it is not possible to ascertain 
what, if any, ‘foreign force’ requests were made about Huntley. This is 
because the Cambridgeshire Child Access Database had developed a 
fault on 7 December 2001 which was not fixed until 10 January 2002. The 
result was that faxes requesting checks from other forces had to be sent 
manually, so there was no automatic endorsement on the database to 
record that a fax had been sent. I therefore need to analyse in some detail 
the facts, such as they are known, surrounding this issue. 
Addresses from other areas? 
1.345 	 The first question is whether Huntley disclosed addresses from any other 
police force area on his Police Check Form. As already explained, no copy 
of the completed form exists. 
1.346 	 On  8 December 2001, the date on which the Police Check Form was 
received, Huntley was living at 5 College Close, Soham, within the 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary area. However, while he may have given 
that address as his then current address, Mrs Cooper, of EPM, told the Inquiry 
that she would have checked to ensure that Huntley had included the 
Ribstone House, Barrow-upon-Humber address, since it was the address to 
which they sent the employment contract. 
1.347 	 Therefore, the overwhelming likelihood is that Huntley included an address 
inside the Humberside Police area on the Police Check Form. 
1.348 	 It is, however, not possible to identify which, if any, other addresses he might 
also have provided. For example, if Huntley had included only the Ribstone 
House address under the ‘previous addresses for the last 5 years’ section, 
EPM would not have undertaken any check to confirm whether he had 
lived there for the full five years. 
1.349 	 In fact, the Humberside Police CIS Nominals system records eight separate 
addresses for Huntley during the five-year period to December 2001 
(and there may, of course, have been more of which the police were 
not aware). One address at Manchester House, Scotter, fell within the 
Lincolnshire Police area. It is not possible to know whether this was included 
on the Police Check Form. It is known that Huntley had failed to provide 
a complete set of his addresses on at least one form in the past. When 
making his Subject Access Request for information held about him on the 
PNC, he gave his home address as Manchester House, but failed to declare 
all his addresses for the previous ten years, as required. It is also known that 
when Maxine Carr applied for CRB Disclosure in June 2002, she failed to 
declare the Manchester House address. 
The fax to Humberside Police 
1.350 	 Cambridgeshire Constabulary have reviewed their telephone call records 
for the period 8 December 2001 (the day the Police Check Form was 
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CPD), to the relevant units of Humberside and Lincolnshire police to which 
any request for information would have been made. 
1.351 	 A fax was sent from Cambridgeshire CRB at 13:15 on 23 December 2001 
(a Sunday) to Humberside CRB. The content is unknown, but it must have 
been relatively few pages as the transmission time was only 44 seconds. This 
was the only fax sent by Cambridgeshire to Humberside during that period. 
1.352 	 As far as Lincolnshire is concerned, one fax was sent from Cambridgeshire 
CRB, at 16:54 on 8 December 2001, to a fax number shared by the then 
Disclosure Clerk and the Criminal Justice Information Unit of Lincolnshire 
Police. Another fax was sent at 16:31 on 11 December. There is no record 
of any fax being sent on 23 December, the only day (during the relevant 
period) on which a fax was sent to Humberside. 
1.353 	 The fax to Humberside was sent two days after Mrs Giddings’ PNC check 
against the name of ‘Nixon’. She, and a number of other Cambridgeshire 
police witnesses, stated that the member of staff who noticed the need for, 
and raised, a fax query would usually send it themselves. Occasionally, if they 
were very busy or interrupted, they might pass the query on to somebody on 
the next shift, but it would certainly not be any later than that. If Mrs Giddings 
had noticed the need to send a fax to Humberside, it should have been sent, 
at the latest, by 06: 00 on 22 December. No fax to Humberside was sent until 
23 December at 13:15 – five shifts after Mrs Giddings’ shift. 
1.354 	 The shift operator at 13:15 on 23 December 2001 was Mr Causer. Unsurprisingly, 
he does not remember sending this particular fax and has no memory of its 
content. Unlike his newer colleagues, including Mrs Giddings, who operated 
the ‘tray’ system, Mr Causer’s usual practice was to perform all tasks on one 
enquiry at the same time. 
1.355 	 Cambridgeshire CRB’s Child Access Database indicates that the disclosure 
request was closed by Pamela Nicholson as ‘no trace’ at 21:35 on 
23 December. It is not known why this was done. Ms Nicholson has no 
recollection of closing this file and assumes that it was a form that she 
removed from the ‘booking out’ tray and actioned. Her evidence was 
that if she had picked up a form from the ‘booking out’ tray with the PNC 
endorsement on it, but nothing to indicate that a foreign force fax had been 
sent, she would almost certainly close it on the Child Access Database. 
1.356 	 It is clear that, even if a fax request about Huntley was sent earlier on 
23 December 2001, no reply from Humberside had been received by this 
time. Cambridgeshire telephone records establish that a fax was sent from 
Humberside CRB to Cambridgeshire at 09:12 on Monday, 24 December 
2001. Again, it is not known what the content of the fax was, but the 
transmission was just 37 seconds. 
1.357 	 Although the automated faxing system at Cambridge CRB was not working 
at the time, the actual fax form itself would still be generated because the 
Child Access Database would automatically fill in its relevant fields, so any 
fax form sent about Huntley would have included both the name ‘Nixon’ 
and the alias ‘Huntley’. 
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would have interrogated CIS Nominals, the only system against which 
vetting queries were searched at the time. However, Humberside Police 
have established that Huntley’s CIS Nominals record was not looked at 
between 1 December 2001 and 15 January 2002. They cannot check 
whether a search was done against the name ‘Ian Nixon’, because if no 
record exists to start with, there is no audit trail. 
Extremely unlikely that a fax was sent 
1.359 	 Chief Constable Lloyd has accepted that it is more likely than not that no 
fax was sent. Because of this acceptance, the Inquiry did not question any 
Humberside Police witnesses about whether the fax was sent. On the basis 
of the facts now known, as set out above, I consider that it is possible to go 
further than the Chief Constable and I have concluded that it is extremely 
unlikely that any ‘foreign force’ fax was sent by Cambridgeshire CRB in 
respect of Huntley. My reasons are as follows. 
1.359.1 The only fax which was sent to Humberside Police during this period 
was on 23 December 2001 at 13:15. 
1.359.2 The delay between the PNC check at 20:15 on 21 December 2001 
and the sending of the fax on 23 December suggests that it was not 
sent as a result of Mrs Giddings having noticed the need to send 
a ‘foreign force’ fax at the time, which, according to a number of 
witnesses, would have happened by the following shift at the latest. 
1.359.3 Mr Causer’s usual practice was to carry out all checks on an 
application form at the same time. He conducted no other checks 
against Huntley at this time. It is therefore unlikely that he would 
have reviewed the Police Check Form and identified the need to 
send a fax to Humberside Police. 
1.359.4 Ms Nicholson closed the file at 21:35 on 23 December 2001. At that 
time no response to the fax of 13:15 earlier that day could have 
been received. This would suggest that neither the paper file nor 
the database were endorsed to the effect that any such fax had 
been sent. 
1.359.5 No search was undertaken by Humberside Police during the 
relevant period against the name ‘Huntley’. There is no reason to 
assume that there would not have been a search if a request had 
been made. 
1.359.6 It is extremely unlikely that a request was made and a search 
undertaken only against the name of ‘Ian Nixon’, given that: 
–  the fax would have contained both names; and 
– 	 there is no reason to assume that Humberside Police would have 
made the same mistake of searching under only one name, as 
Cambridgeshire CRB did when searching the PNC. 
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1.360 	 The next question is: what information would have been revealed, even if 
a request had been made to Humberside Police? 
1.361 	 Humberside Police’s record creation, retention and vetting systems and 
practices are the subject of extensive consideration above. By December 
2001, the following records concerning Huntley remained: 
1.361.1 There were two entries on the Child Protection Database (unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old, Contact 4; and indecent 
assault on an 11-year-old girl, Contact 8). 
1.361.2 It is possible that there were two further entries at that date in 
relation to Contacts 1 and 3 (unlawful sexual intercourse with 
15-year-old girls) if they were made but then weeded in the 
January 2002 weed of the CPD. 
1.361.3 There were entries on the CIS Crime system, at least in relation to the 
allegations of rape and indecent assault. 
1.361.4 There were also entries on the ICJS system in relation to the 
allegations of rape and indecent assault. 
1.362 	 However, there were almost certainly no entries on CIS Nominals, the 
PC Harding report having been deleted in mid-2000. 
1.363 	 The Vetting Section would not have searched the CPD (because it was 
standard practice not to use it for vetting), nor the CIS Crime or the ICJS 
systems. Furthermore, Humberside Police had not altered any of their 
records, or the PNC, to record the alias ‘Ian Nixon’. Thus, regardless of 
whether the request to Humberside Police had been in the name of 
‘Ian Huntley’ or ‘Ian Nixon’, the response would still have been ‘no trace’ 
in December 2001. 
What if Lincolnshire Police had been contacted? 
1.364 	 The situation may well have been different had Lincolnshire Police been 
asked by Cambridgeshire CRB for any local intelligence. PC Harding had 
sent his report to them and they had put it onto their intelligence system on 
20 July 1999. This would not be reviewed for weeding until 19 January 2002 
(two and a half years after the entry was made). 
1.365 	 As I have set out above, it is not possible to ascertain whether Huntley 
included his Lincolnshire address on the Police Check Form. If he did 
not, there would not have been any reason for Cambridgeshire CRB to 
contact Lincolnshire Police. However, assuming that he did, in the light of 
the evidence from the operators involved, I consider that it is extremely 
unlikely that any fax was sent because I consider it extremely unlikely that 
Lincolnshire was identified by a Cambridgeshire CRB operator as a ‘foreign 
force’ on 8 or 9 December 2001. 
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have been identified at a different time to Humberside, assuming, of 
course, that both addresses were included. As I have already concluded, 
I consider it extremely unlikely that Humberside Police were ever identified 
as a ‘foreign force’. But in the unlikely event that they were, this would not 
have happened until 23 December 2001 and there is no suggestion that 
Lincolnshire Police were identified around this time. 
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vetting – the findings 
Events in Humberside 
Humberside Police 
2.1 ￿ I have concluded, in the light of all the evidence presented to the Inquiry, 
that there were the most fundamental failures by Humberside Police to 
maintain adequate intelligence. These were not solely the consequence 
of individual errors – although there were some – nor were they confined to 
the contacts involving Huntley. These failings were, in the words of the 
Chief Constable himself, ‘systemic and corporate’. They were more than 
that: they were endemic. And they continued for very many years. 
2.2 ￿ The failings meant that the pattern of allegations against Huntley was 
not recorded and so was not available to officers investigating the later 
contacts. 
2.3 ￿ I stress at the outset that, although individual officers are named below, the 
evidence suggested that the problems were not confined to those involved 
in the contacts with Huntley. 
2.4 ￿ I deal first with the failures of Humberside Police to maintain adequate 
intelligence (paragraphs 2.5–2.72) and move on to look at why there was a 
consequent failure to identify a behaviour pattern (paragraphs 2.73–2.82). 
Failure to maintain adequate intelligence 
2.5 ￿ The core force intelligence system was CIS Nominals. This was not used 
properly. Some records were made on CIS Crime and the Child Protection 
Database (CPD) but the CPD was not used as an intelligence tool, having 
been effectively written off by officers in the Child Protection Units as 
‘unreliable’. CIS Crime was of little use in future cases because: 
•  it was not routinely searched by police officers during investigations; and 
• ￿ most of the information put onto it in dealings with Huntley was wrongly 
entered. This meant that it could not be searched later in any event. 
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I deal with in turn in later paragraphs. These were: 
• ￿ failure to use the principal intelligence tool – CIS Nominals – properly 
(paragraphs 2.7–2.17); 
•  failure of the Form 839 intelligence system (paragraphs 2.18–2.30); 
•  failure to use CIS Crime properly (paragraphs 2.31–2.34); 
• ￿ failure to use the CPD and the systems within the Child Protection Units 
properly (paragraphs 2.35–2.45); 
• ￿ failure of information sharing between Social Services and Humberside 
Police (paragraphs 2.46–2.48); and 
• ￿ failings and confusion surrounding record review and deletion generally 
(paragraphs 2.49–2.72). 
Failure to use CIS Nominals properly 
2.7 ￿ The process of creating records on the police force’s principal intelligence 
information technology (IT) tool – CIS Nominals – was fundamentally flawed 
during the relevant period, April 1995 to mid-July 1999. 
2.8 ￿ If operated efficiently, CIS Nominals would have enabled behaviour 
patterns and allegations against an individual to be identified. It was 
therefore important, as Dectective Chief Superintendent Baggs agreed, 
that relevant information should find its way onto the system to help in 
crucial decision making. This way, investigating officers would not have 
to rely on their memories of past contacts to discern the all-important 
behaviour patterns. 
2.9 ￿ CIS Nominals did not operate efficiently in the contacts involving Huntley: 
not because of the odd, isolated human error – but because of the raft of 
basic systemic problems. As a result, there was not one single occasion in 
all of the incidents in which the record creation system worked as it should 
have done. 
2.10 ￿ There was a surprising and alarming level of ignorance among officers on 
the ground about even the basics of the IT system for creating and retaining 
records on CIS Nominals, as appears, for example, from the evidence of 
Dectective Inspector Billam, Detective Sergeant Hibbitt and Detective 
Constable Chatha. Thus: 
2.10.1 ￿ DI Billam accepted that he had ‘no knowledge at all’ as to how 
the CIS Nominals system worked in the creation of records. This was 
perhaps not least because: 
• ￿ he had had no training on CIS Nominals. Consequently, he did 
not know enough about the system to know whether it would 
have been useful to search CIS Nominals; and 
• ￿ he had no idea whether any record had been made on the 
system, even relating to an incident such as Contact 1. 
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operational officers) did not know: 
• ￿ what information was being extracted from the variety of 
documentation they submitted to the Divisional Intelligence 
Bureaux (DIBx); or 
• ￿ for how long different types of information (such as bail 
information) would have stayed on the system. 
2.10.3 ￿ DC Chatha assumed that information would remain on CIS 
Nominals. He did not think it was relevant for him to know how long 
information stayed on it. 
2.10.4 ￿ The position at the time was encapsulated by DS Hibbitt’s statement, 
‘I do not need to know. I just supply the information basically.’ 
2.11 ￿ DI Billam believed that he had performed his role adequately by sending 
a crime report (a print-off from CIS Crime and other handwritten crime 
reports and documents) to the DIB. He assumed (at least in those cases in 
which crime reports were generated) that those who worked at the DIB 
would then ‘extract the intelligence’ and enter it on the relevant computer 
systems. 
2.12 ￿ This assumption was wrong. The DIB did not routinely analyse these 
documents to extract intelligence to key into CIS Nominals. Rather, the DIB, 
on receipt of such documents, carried out a limited ‘crime recording’ role 
and closed the file. This was a fundamental misunderstanding. It inevitably 
undermined the effectiveness of CIS Nominals. 
2.13 ￿ It is both surprising and a source of concern that an officer of DI Billam’s 
experience, with his supervisory responsibilities as head of one of the Child 
Protection Units, apparently did not know how even the basics of the system 
worked. 
2.14 ￿ Other officers, such as DS Hibbitt, were not under the illusion that crime 
reports were used to generate intelligence records on CIS Nominals. (Crime 
reports were sent to the Central Crime Inputting Bureau to be put onto 
CIS Crime – that is, a separate office from the DIB.) Their belief was the 
different, and also mistaken, one that intelligence was routinely extracted 
by those at the DIB from the documents that they sent there (that is, Form 
310, filled in at the time of arrest or summons). That belief was mistaken 
because it seems clear that the only information extracted related to bail, 
and had a correspondingly short period before it was deleted from the 
system. Those documents did not include (except for Contact 10) 
the Intelligence Report, Form 839, which is dealt with below. 
2.15 ￿ The lower ranks of police officer can more readily state that the failure 
of understanding was the fault of those higher up not giving appropriate 
training and guidance about how the systems should have worked. The 
major failing was one of management. 
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an active interest in ensuring that the right information is submitted from 
themselves and those working to them. The evidence suggests that this was 
not consistently the case in Humberside Police. 
2.17 ￿ There were also problems with the second link in the chain leading to 
record creation on CIS Nominals – those working within the DIBx themselves. 
The relevant intelligence work that police officers envisaged was taking 
place at the DIBx was not happening. Intelligence was not being ‘analysed’ 
or ‘extracted’. In addition, at least one important mistake was made on 
the sole occasion when an Intelligence Form was submitted by PC Harding: 
Huntley’s alias was not put onto the system, despite being included in the 
handwritten report. 
Failure of the Form 839 intelligence system 
2.18 ￿ A further significant reason for the fact that the CIS Nominals system was 
not working properly was that the importance of submitting separate 
Intelligence Reports on Form 839 was not understood. 
2.19 ￿ Humberside Police officers rarely considered preparing and submitting a 
Form 839 because they believed that, if other documents had already 
been submitted, there was no need. 
2.20 ￿ DS Hibbitt’s view, therefore, was that submitting a Form 310 was sufficient 
and completed his part in the intelligence record creation exercise. To him, 
Form 839 was for people not charged or arrested. 
2.21 ￿ For his part, DI Billam ‘very seldom’ came across this form and stated that 
it was really only used by the Child Protection Units when officers on the 
beat came across something not connected to child protection. DI Billam 
accepted that there was ‘a practice not to submit the forms’. As he put it: 
‘whichever office I worked from, they never submitted those forms ... It just 
did not happen.’ DI Billam did not regard it as being any part of his function 
to consider or analyse what might usefully be retained as future intelligence 
in any case. 
2.22 ￿ Some of the senior officers suggested in evidence to the Inquiry that the 
submission of Form 839 would have been unnecessarily duplicative. I do not 
accept that. 
2.23 ￿ Police officers involved in the investigation of, and decision making about, 
an incident were uniquely well placed to ensure that intelligence was 
properly recorded for future use – that the information necessary to ensure 
that the incident was portrayed in sufficient detail was in fact recorded. 
Officers did not need to be ‘intelligence specialists’ or expert in the 
analytical models used for grading intelligence (such as the 5x5x5 system 
and its predecessor, the 4x4 system, which graded intelligence information 
according to the reliability of the information and the source). 
2.24 ￿ Police officers’ active involvement in the intelligence recording process 
should have been routine. As the evidence referred to above indicates, 
it was anything but. 
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source for the creation of a CIS Nominals record. Total reliance on the 
submission to the DIBx of other documentation (such as Form 310) increased 
the chances of peripheral information, such as bail details, being the only 
item recorded for any length of time on the intelligence systems – precisely 
what happened in the case of Huntley. Even where other documentation 
was submitted to the DIBx, Form 839 enabled officers on the ground to have 
an active input into the intelligence process. It would have had the effect 
of making them focus on the creation of an intelligence record, which 
would be of maximum use to officers making decisions in the future. 
2.26 ￿ The consequence of Form 839 not being completed was that, until the last 
contact (10), only bail information was extracted and put on CIS Nominals 
(to be deleted a short time afterwards). The submission of Form 839 would, 
therefore, have been far from a duplication of information. 
2.27 ￿ It would not have taken an officer long to complete Form 839 in any 
of the contacts involving Huntley – particularly at the conclusion of an 
investigation, when reasons for disposal and a broad assessment of the 
allegation could be given quickly. The added value of submitting Form 839 
is graphically illustrated by PC Harding’s report. 
2.28 ￿ Senior officers were unaware of this situation, even up to the day when 
the Inquiry took oral evidence. Chief Constable Westwood himself 
acknowledged that the first time he had appreciated the position was 
when he heard his officers being examined at the hearings. I find it 
unacceptable that such serious failings in Humberside Police’s intelligence 
systems should remain undetected for a period of years. 
2.29 ￿ I also do not accept the argument advanced at the hearings by 
DCS Baggs and then the Chief Constable that the real and principal cause 
of the problems was the misunderstanding among officers that intelligence 
was being extracted from the documentation they submitted. 
2.30 ￿ As set out above, it was not that there was one misunderstanding 
among officers on the ground. Rather, there was a variety of basic 
misunderstandings about how the system operated. In addition, that 
argument fails, even in the face of the evidence provided to the Inquiry, 
to acknowledge the extent of the problems I identify above and in the 
following paragraphs. In particular, it fails to acknowledge the need for 
officers to be actively involved in assisting with and shaping intelligence 
records. The failure of the Form 839 intelligence system provides an example 
of the wider problem: that officers did not fully appreciate the value of 
intelligence, or the importance of their role in ensuring that it was properly 
recorded. Management failed to identify and address the problem. 
Failure to use CIS Crime properly 
2.31 ￿ CIS Crime was not being operated properly. There was one dataset 
(number 3) through which an individual could be searched for using a 
Unique Reference Number (URN). That dataset should have contained 
details of the name ‘Ian Huntley’ whenever a record was made on 
CIS Crime. 
The Bichard Inquiry – Contacts, recruitment and vetting – the findings  81 2.32 ￿ There was not merely one isolated failure to put Huntley’s name onto CIS 
Crime. It did not happen in five of the contacts: 
•  Contact 1: ‘Huntley’ was named in dataset 4 but not in dataset 3 
– so his name could not be searched for later; 
•  Contacts 4 and 6: he was not recorded in either dataset 3 or dataset 4; 
• ￿ Contact 8: he was named in dataset 4 but not in dataset 3 – so his 
name could not be searched for later; and 
• ￿ Contact 9: he was not named in dataset 3 – so his name could not be 
searched for, but his first name (‘Ian’) was put in dataset 4. The failing 
this time was at the inputting stage onto CIS Crime by the Central Crime 
Inputting Bureau. 
2.33 ￿ The use of the feature that enabled information to be retained on the live 
CIS Crime also appears to have been random. It was used only in Contacts 
6 and 7. (It was so used despite the fact that only bail information from 
these two contacts was recorded on Humberside Police’s intelligence 
system, CIS Nominals.) 
2.34 ￿ Given the sheer scale of the errors over a period of years, the likelihood is 
that Huntley’s was not an isolated case and that for a number of years 
CIS Crime was not being ‘populated’ (that is, filled in) with information 
from other systems. I refer later (paragraph 2.108) to the failure to use its full 
potential for vetting purposes following the introduction of the CIS 2 system 
at the end of 1999. 
Failure to use the CPD properly 
2.35 ￿ As operated, the CPD was largely worthless. DI Billam did not use it. He 
regarded it as ‘unreliable’ because of the: 
•  information that was put onto it; and the 
•  incomplete nature of the intelligence that was on it. 
In his words: ‘from past experience I did not get anything out of it that I 
wanted; consequently I never used it again, or very seldom’. He did not 
even know whether it could be searched by the name of the alleged 
abuser. It was not standard practice, as far as he was aware, for his officers 
to interrogate it at the start of a referral. 
2.36 ￿ If it had been used efficiently and effectively, the CPD could have been 
a useful operational tool and could have been used to make behaviour 
patterns visible. Both DCS Hunter and Chief Constable Westwood suggested 
that it had been designed primarily as a statistical rather than as an 
intelligence tool. A late statement received by the Inquiry from the now-
retired officer in charge of its actual design claims that, on the contrary, 
it was designed primarily as an intelligence tool. Whether or not this was the 
case, the CPD clearly had the capacity to be a useful intelligence tool. 
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2.37.1 ￿ From their evidence, Social Services did not consider it necessary 
to maintain an accessible record of child abusers because of the 
CPD’s existence. 
2.37.2 ￿ DCS Hunter, responsible for child protection in Humberside Police at 
the time, justified the absence of any manual system for indexing or 
filing nominal records (to enable past contacts with alleged abusers 
to be checked) on the basis of the CPD’s existence. 
2.37.3 ￿ The fact that the CPD had effectively been written off by its 
principal users, coupled with the problems with CIS Nominals, meant 
that officers in the Child Protection Units would be likely to make 
decisions that were uninformed by the history of past contacts with 
alleged abusers. As Contacts 1 to 4 illustrate, officers’ memories 
are not a substitute for keeping proper and accessible intelligence 
records. 
2.38 ￿ Several police witnesses, including DI Billam, DCS Hunter and Chief 
Constable Westwood, all suggested that the core problem with the CPD 
was its unreliability, due to the nature of the information being put onto it. 
It may have been that much of the information going into the CPD was 
unreliable; however: 
2.38.1 ￿ The contacts involving Huntley would have presented no such 
reliability problem. They could have been the subject of useful CPD 
records, revealing a worrying pattern of allegations and behaviour. 
For Contacts 1, 3, 4 and 8, Form 547 (‘Suspected Child Abuse 
– Record of Initial Decision’) was completed. Huntley’s name and 
date of birth were available from Contact 1 and the nature of the 
allegations was recordable. 
2.38.2 ￿ It should not have been difficult to find a way to devise an effective 
system of intelligence gathering. As the questioning of DCS Hunter 
indicated, information could be placed on either, or preferably on 
both, the CPD and CIS Nominals, with clear guidance to officers on 
the ground. The existence of the CPD alongside CIS Nominals could 
together have been used to record the complete history of contacts 
between Huntley and the police. 
2.39  DI Billam’s evidence was that: 
2.39.1 ￿ only the Police National Computer (PNC) would be routinely 
checked for convictions (and, after November 1995, cautions); 
2.39.2 ￿ it was not standard practice for officers to check CIS Nominals or the 
CPD against the name of the alleged abuser (although evidence 
given by other officers was that they probably would have checked 
CIS Nominals); and 
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not kept or indexed in such a way as to make it easy to search by 
the name of the alleged abuser). 
2.40  It appears from DCS Hunter’s evidence that: 
2.40.1 ￿ he conducted no strategic review of the information systems 
supporting the work of the Child Protection Units throughout the 
period August 1999 (when he assumed functional responsibility for 
the CPD) until 2001; and 
2.40.2 ￿ he was not aware throughout that period either that the CPD was 
not being used by officers in the Child Protection Units, or that they 
considered the CPD unreliable. 
2.41 ￿ He accepted responsibility for the fact that systems were not in place which 
would have informed him of the true position. It is clear that those systems 
should have been in place when the CPD’s problems were as fundamental 
as they were. 
2.42 ￿ Eventually, in 2001 and 2002, the CPD was reviewed. The conclusion 
reached by DCS Hunter was that the CPD was ‘inefficient ... not being used 
and ... something that was not of real value to us’. He accepted that, if 
such a review had been conducted earlier, the overall conclusion would 
have been the same. But he was unable to explain why no such review had 
been done earlier. Neither can I. 
2.43 ￿ There is an additional point about the CPD. The Child Protection Database’s 
name suggests that it would have been an obvious place to search as part 
of a vetting check into those who might work with children. Until 1998, that 
possibility was not even considered by Humberside Police. DCS Hunter and 
Chief Constable Westwood accepted that the period between 1998, when 
consideration was first given to the use of the CPD as a vetting tool, and 
2002, the year when it was finally used for vetting, was unacceptably long. 
2.44 ￿ In their evidence, Humberside Police argued that the inherent unreliability 
of some of the information on the CPD justified it not being searched as part 
of a vetting check. I have dealt with this above. Even if that was a problem, 
it could not justify not even considering the use of the CPD in vetting for 
such a long period. There is no reason why the systems feeding into the CPD 
could not have been adapted to make it more suitable for vetting use. 
Indeed, if the problem had been actively considered, the eventual review 
would have happened earlier, leading to an improved CPD that was useful 
as both an intelligence and a vetting tool. 
2.45 ￿ I  deal with problems relating to the review and deletion of CPD records in 
paragraphs 2.68–2.72. 
Failure of information sharing 
2.46 ￿ Information sharing between Social Services and Humberside Police was 
flawed. There were misconceptions on both sides. That is a matter for which 
both agencies were responsible. Both accepted the importance of sharing 
information, including the relevant history of an alleged abuser. However, 
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past contacts and relied exclusively on the police keeping traceable 
records of alleged abusers. Given that there would be circumstances 
in which allegations would not be referred to the police, this is less than 
satisfactory, though it appears to reflect a position which existed nationally. 
2.47 ￿ DI Billam, the head of one of the four Child Protection Units, had no 
knowledge of the systems operated by Social Services. He assumed that 
they were proper and efficient. 
2.48 ￿ He also suggested that he would have routinely asked Social Services at 
the start of a case whether there was ‘any history’. But in the absence of 
any system at Social Services for checking past contacts with an alleged 
abuser, this was a question that would only have elicited a useful answer 
if the person to whom it was addressed had been involved in the incident 
and remembered it. It is evident from the facts of Contacts 2A, 3 and 4 just 
how unreliable a source memory can be, even in cases involving common 
personnel and when incidents happened within days of each other. 
Failures and confusion surrounding record review and deletion 
2.49 ￿ As a result of data protection legislation, there is a need for the police to 
periodically review intelligence and other records. There are two basic 
functions involved: review and, if appropriate, deletion. There is an obvious 
and critical distinction between the two. 
2.50 ￿ If records are not properly reviewed, valuable information can be lost in 
their deletion. The review process needs to be undertaken by those able 
to make appropriate and informed judgements. 
2.51 ￿ The picture that emerged from the evidence was one of confusion and lack 
of effective management of the review function. There were inconsistent 
practices because, for no good reason, each computer system treated 
‘review’ in a significantly different way. 
Lack of guidance and training 
2.52 ￿ There was confusion in Humberside Police’s approach to the review and 
deletion of records on CIS Nominals on two levels. 
2.53  First, it was unclear which guidance governed the process. 
2.53.1 ￿ In his report to the Inquiry, DCS Baggs suggested that, from the 
date of their introduction, the 1996 Force Weeding Rules became 
the ‘definitive’ guidance. However, after further research, in his oral 
evidence he suggested that the previous 1990 guidance had in fact 
survived the introduction of the 1996 Force Weeding Rules, although 
he accepted that the 1996 Force Weeding Rules could be read as 
having superseded the 1990 Standing Order entirely. 
2.53.2 ￿ He also identified a wide variety of other possible guidance sources 
on the review function and on how decisions about deletion should 
be taken. There is little or no indication that officers, or civilian staff, 
conducting the reviewing/deleting functions at the DIB had any 
clearer idea of the guidance they were supposed to be applying. 
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that there was little or nothing in the way of clear guidance as 
to how the reviewing and deleting functions were to be carried 
out. The absence of helpful guidance is illustrated in an email 
from DS Snowden in September 2002 which stated that he had 
‘managed to find’ some guidance on review/deletion from 1996. 
2.54 ￿ There was also little or no formal training. Officers and civilian staff appear 
to have learnt on the job on the basis of approaches passed down from 
those above them in each of the four DIBx. 
2.55 ￿ The picture that emerged from the evidence was of officers such as Police 
Constable Appleton doing the best they could, with only a broad awareness 
of some force and national guidance. The question being asked by 
PC Appleton, according to his statement and evidence, was in reality 
the single broad question identified by Chief Constable Westwood in his 
evidence: ‘Why do we need to keep this?’ It is inevitable, in any situation 
in which individual items and whole records need to be reviewed on their 
merits, that there would be an element of discretion. However, the problem 
with asking that question in such broad terms is that it is likely to lead to 
inconsistent approaches between the four DIBx and between individuals 
within them. While Chief Constable Westwood did not accept that point, 
DCS Baggs did accept that there was an inconsistent approach between 
the DIBx. 
2.56 ￿ More generally, the absence of clear guidance and formal training can 
only have hindered the efficient performance of the reviewing and deletion 
functions and increased the likelihood of the kind of mistakes made in the 
contacts involving Huntley. 
The meaning of ‘review’ and ‘delete’ 
2.57 ￿ Second, there was confusion, even in the guidance that was available, 
between the ‘review’ and ‘delete’ functions. So far as intelligence was 
concerned, the ‘definitive’ 1996 Force Weeding Rules provided that: 
‘Information held should be reviewed and weeded accordingly after 
12 months. No weed date should exceed this period.’ 
2.58 ￿ DCS Baggs accepted that this document was ‘not awfully helpful’ and 
that there was ‘certainly some confusion in the policy’. He suggested that 
confusion developed over time between the concepts of ‘review’ and 
‘weed’ but that there was no confusion between the concepts of ‘delete’ 
and ‘weed’. However, the first sentence of the passage quoted above uses 
‘review’ as distinct from ‘weed’, so ‘weed’ must mean something other 
than ‘review’ and can only sensibly be read as meaning ‘delete’. The term 
‘weed’ in the second sentence must be given the same meaning as in 
the first sentence, that is, ‘delete’. It is, on any view, clear that there was 
potential for confusion between ‘delete’ and ‘weed’. 
2.59 ￿ There were other problems affecting the ‘review’ and ‘delete’ functions. 
There was a concern not to breach the data protection legislation. This 
meant that if there was any doubt as to whether a record should be 
deleted, it would be deleted. There were also resource problems so officers 
and staff were often significantly behind with reviews and then had to do 
them under pressure. 
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passed obviously had the potential to lose records in the absence of a 
review. (Certainly, officers believed that was happening, for example a 
police constable expressed that view in 1995, as did Mrs Thompson who 
worked in one of the DIBx.) 
2.61 ￿ The history of the review and delete functions on CIS Nominals illustrates the 
problems. When the CIS system changed from CIS 1 to CIS 2 at the end of 
1999 (for Y2K compliance), the ‘weed run’ was suspended for a period of 
some six to seven months for fear of records being lost. 
2.62 ￿ Then, by February 2001, for reasons that are likely to be linked to the 
problems outlined above, the Director of Intelligence at the time concluded 
that intelligence was ‘haemorrhaging’ from CIS Nominals. It is his word, 
though it cannot now be ascertained how many records were lost without 
proper review. The only sensible inference is that a large number were lost. 
The problems were sufficiently serious for him to again suspend the ‘weed 
run’ at this time. 
2.63 ￿ It then took Humberside Police over 18 months to put in place even the first 
stage of a solution. This involved a system where only 20 records at a time 
would need to be reviewed, and in which there was no automatic deletion 
by default. This was implemented only in September 2002. By that date, 
there was still no clear policy for the review and delete functions. That took 
a further year. 
The deletion of PC Harding’s report 
2.64 ￿ The deletion of the PC Harding Intelligence Report further illustrates the 
problems. 
2.65 ￿ As set out above, the report was probably put onto CIS Nominals in about 
July 1999 and deleted on 27 July 2000. All concerned accepted that this 
should not have happened. I strongly agree. As DCS Baggs accepted, in 
the end there were only two possibilities: 
• ￿ either the PC Harding Intelligence Report had been deleted as a result 
of ‘pure error’ (such as pushing the wrong key); or 
•  it had been deleted as a result of an error of judgement. 
2.66 ￿ I also note that, according to DCS Baggs, there had been a decision in 
May 2000 to transfer the responsibility for the review and delete functions 
from officers to civilian staff. PC Appleton produced a second statement, 
shortly before he gave evidence, which indicated that he had been 
responsible for training these staff. He indicated in his evidence that this had 
consisted of the same sort of informal on-the-job training he had received. 
However, it is evident that no one monitored, checked or audited the staff’s 
performance. 
2.67 ￿ All the officers involved with the four DIBx (PC Appleton and Police Sergeant 
Brown, for example) considered that the kind of information in the PC 
Harding Intelligence Report should not have been deleted 12 months after 
creation. Yet this is precisely what happened. In the light of this, it is difficult 
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and delete functions in July 2000 understood what they should be doing. 
Review and deletion of CPD records 
2.68 ￿ The CPD was introduced in 1991 and from that date there was an 
obligation under the data protection legislation to have some system or 
policy in place for reviewing (and, if necessary, deleting) records held on it. 
According to Humberside Police’s evidence, data protection was a matter 
of concern across the force. 
2.69 ￿ Although data protection requirements had been widely disseminated 
across the force, no policy for reviewing and deleting records on the CPD 
was even considered until 1998. DCS Hunter acknowledged that this was a 
breach of the legislation. 
2.70 ￿ When it was considered, it took three or four years for any policy to be 
formulated. This is an unacceptably long time. 
2.71 ￿ Once the policy was drawn up, records were reviewed and deleted as 
appropriate. The records which it is known were made, or were likely to 
have been made, on Huntley do not inspire confidence, either in the policy 
or in its application. 
2.72 ￿ For example, it is likely that records were made on the CPD relating to 
Contacts 1 and 3. But these were deleted, even though they were part of 
Huntley’s behaviour pattern. In contrast, the record of Contact 4 should 
have been deleted but was not. 
Failure to identify a pattern 
2.73 ￿ All of the Humberside officers who gave oral evidence, up to and including 
Chief Constable Westwood, accepted that: 
• ￿ patterns of behaviour are important in crime generally and are 
particularly important in the context of sexual offences; 
• ￿ knowing about past allegations could be extremely important in 
informing decision making in any particular case; and 
• ￿ the ability to identify developing behaviour patterns depends on the 
availability of easily accessible records about past contacts. 
2.74 ￿ Knowledge of past allegations, and developing behaviour patterns, does 
not negate the need for each case to be viewed on its individual merits 
when decisions are taken as to whether or not there is sufficient evidence 
to charge or support a prosecution. 
2.75 ￿ There is, however, a range of other decisions where knowledge of past 
allegations would be, in the words of DI Billam, ‘absolutely critical to the 
proper performance of the police function’. Examples include: 
• ￿ whether the investigation should be a joint Humberside Police and 
Social Services investigation rather than solely a Social Services 
investigation (as in the EF case, Contact 3); 
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•  whether or not past incidents should be re-opened; and 
• ￿ whether or not it was in the public interest to prosecute, assuming that 
there was enough evidence. 
2.76 ￿ As a result of the failure to maintain intelligence records effectively, 
Humberside Police failed to identify a pattern of behaviour remotely soon 
enough as the following commentary illustrates: 
Contact 1 
2.76.1 ￿When  investigating  Contact 1, Humberside Police were unaware 
of the domestic violence allegation made against Huntley by his 
wife. Social Services did not tell them about it and their systems did 
not enable them to search back against the name of an alleged 
abuser. 
2.76.2 ￿ No record was made about Contact 1 on CIS Nominals. Every 
Humberside Police witness, when asked about Contact 1, 
considered that a record should have been made about it on 
CIS Nominals. If that had been done, Huntley would have been 
ascribed a URN which could have been used in the future to search 
CIS Crime properly. It should have made little, if any, difference if 
that record was of a caution (in which case it would have been 
kept for five years at least) or of the incident itself (in which case it 
should have been kept for at least one year, taking it beyond the 
first contact in Contact 3). 
2.76.3 ￿ The very existence of a CIS Nominals record about Contact 1, 
if properly made and retained, would undoubtedly have influenced 
the creation (and retention) of records about later contacts. 
Contact 3 
2.76.4 ￿When  investigating  Contact 3, Humberside Police were not only 
unaware of the domestic violence allegation, they were also 
unaware of Contact 1 and Contact 2A (again because Social 
Services had not told them). No record was made of Contact 3 on 
CIS Nominals or on CIS Crime. A record probably was made on the 
CPD, but that was of no intelligence value as used by the force. 
2.76.5 ￿ If Contact 1 had been recorded on CIS Nominals, and if CIS 
Nominals had been routinely searched when Humberside Police 
received a referral from Social Services (as it should have been), 
then in all likelihood Contact 3 would not have been a social 
services-only investigation. Huntley had been warned in the clearest 
terms during an interview about Contact 1, yet nine months later he 
was alleged to be doing the same thing again. 
2.76.6 The only sensible decision would then have been a joint investigation. 
2.76.7 ￿ A record on CIS Nominals could and should have been made, 
showing that no prosecution or other formal step had been taken 
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accepted that, if a record had been made in relation to Contact 
1 on CIS Nominals, he would have expected an Intelligence Report 
on Form 839 to have been submitted about Contact 3 (even if it 
had remained a social services-only investigation, which seems 
unlikely). Huntley’s behaviour pattern would then have been visible. 
2.76.8 ￿ If Contact 2A had also been referred to the police (or if the police 
had been informed of it), there would have been all the more 
reason to make these records. 
Contact 4 
2.76.9 ￿When  investigating  Contact 4, Humberside Police failed to make 
any connection with any of the previous incidents, even Contact 
3, which had been dealt with only a matter of days before by 
DI Billam. No record was created on CIS Nominals about Contact 
4. There were CIS Crime and CPD records. But, as explained above, 
these were not used as intelligence tools. 
2.76.10 However, if Contacts 1 and 3 had been on CIS Nominals, a record 
could and should also have been made of Contact 4. Again, 
DCS Baggs accepted this. There would have been nothing to 
prevent that record from being used to make a candid assessment 
of the reliability, or otherwise, of the allegation. 
2.76.11 If  these steps had been taken, as they should have been, a record 
would in all probability have been on CIS Nominals in April 1998, 
the date of the first of the rape allegations (Contact 6). Given 
the nature of the allegations (and the reliability of the information 
regarding Contacts 1 and 3), it would have been sensible and 
justifiable to keep the record for at least a two-year period. 
Retention for at least that period is consistent with the evidence 
of the DIB’s staff working at the time. 
Contact 6 
2.76.12 ￿ When investigating Contact 6, the officers dealing with the case 
were unaware that Huntley had ever come into contact with them 
over allegations about sexual offences. No record had ever been 
made on CIS Nominals about the earlier contacts. The only record 
on CIS Nominals was to do with the burglary (Contact 2). 
2.76.13 Humberside Police officers believe that a record relating to Contact 
6 would have been created from the forms submitted. (Those forms 
did not include an Intelligence Report on the dedicated form, 
Form 839.) However, the only record now related to bail. As a result, 
it would have been deleted after about a month. No record was 
made of the core allegation, or of the necessary facts, for it to be 
viewed in its proper context in future. 
Contact 7 
2.76.14 ￿ Once again only bail information was recorded on CIS Nominals in 
relation to Contact 7. It should have been given a review date a 
month later. In error, that was not done. The fortuitous consequence 
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date by default. Again, no record was made of the core allegation 
or of the facts necessary for it to be viewed in its proper context in 
future. 
Contact 8 
2.76.15 Again, Humberside Police believe that the only record created 
(if any) on CIS Nominals in relation to Contact 8 would have been 
deleted a short time after its creation. 
Contact 9 

2.76.16 No  record was created on CIS Nominals in Contact 9. 

Contact 10 
2.76.17 Form  839 was finally prepared and submitted by PC Harding in 
Contact 10. This was the only time in all the contacts that any 
police officer completed and submitted such a form. Because of 
the failure to record and retain proper details that would make the 
pattern of allegations visible, it took PC Harding five to six hours of 
research through non-indexed manual records to discover Contacts 
6 onwards. The resources devoted to Contact 10 fortunately 
enabled him to carry out that research. However, he did not 
discover anything about the earlier unlawful sexual intercourse and 
indecent assault allegations. Even when his report was submitted, 
a critical piece of information, Huntley’s alias as ‘Ian Nixon’, was 
missed and so did not find its way onto CIS Nominals. 
2.77 ￿ I comment on one other matter in the context of this record creation and 
retention. Halfway through his evidence, DCS Baggs produced a document 
which he described as the product of applying ‘force policy in terms of 
grading intelligence to the various contacts’. 
2.78 ￿ The document supported a thesis that, even if the incidents had been 
properly recorded and force deletion policies then applied, the result would 
still have been that records would not have survived on CIS Nominals. This 
meant that the records would have been in the same, or substantially the 
same, state by the end of the sequence as was in fact the case. 
2.79  The document was fundamentally flawed in two key aspects: 
2.79.1 ￿ The first is that it sought to characterise the intelligence that should 
have been recorded following Contact 1 as ‘low grade’ (and thus 
properly liable for deletion after a few months). DCS Baggs came to 
this view, he said, on the advice of the ‘intelligence professionals’. 
That advice was a nonsense. The incident involved a properly 
recorded, signed confession by the alleged offender under police 
caution, and the record of an interview with the victim signed by 
her as a true record. The only reason for not taking formal action 
was the understandable unwillingness of AB to take part in the 
prosecution of her then boyfriend. 
2.79.2 ￿ DCS Baggs accepted that this information was ‘fairly reliable’ and 
the result of applying the intelligence-grading system caused him 
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intelligence that should have been graded as the most reliable, 
which means that had it been recorded onto the systems, it would 
have stayed there. 
2.79.3 ￿The  second flaw is that the document only looked at each of the 
incidents in isolation from each other. This approach was symptomatic 
of much of Humberside Police’s approach at the time and in their 
evidence to the Inquiry. As DCS Baggs accepted, once a behaviour 
pattern starts developing, it becomes obvious that the intelligence 
should be kept. 
2.80 ￿ The failure to discern and record Huntley’s behaviour pattern had a serious 
consequence. It meant that police decisions were taken in isolation, 
uninformed by the history of Huntley’s previous contacts with the police. 
2.81 ￿ The potential importance of this was illustrated by the acceptance by 
police officers that their actions might well have been different had they 
known about past incidents. For example, during the investigation of 
Contact 7, it appeared that Huntley had a 15-year-old ‘girlfriend’ to whom 
he had given the T-shirt worn on the evening of the alleged rape. Huntley 
denied that he had had a sexual relationship with her. The girl was not even 
asked by the police about that relationship because they were focusing 
instead on investigating the alleged rape. DS Hibbitt acknowledged that, 
had he known about the earlier incidents, he might have investigated the 
relationship with the 15-year-old further. Similarly, DI Billam acknowledged 
that he would probably have acted differently if the link back to the past 
allegations, notably Contact 2A, had been apparent. 
2.82 ￿ Therefore, police decisions as to the handling and investigation of the 
incidents might have been different if Huntley’s behaviour pattern had 
been recognised. What cannot be known is whether the disposal of any 
of the incidents would, or should, have been different as a result, or what 
impact, if any, it would have had on Huntley’s subsequent conduct. The 
most that can be said is that such opportunity as there was, was missed. 
The caution issue – Contact 1 
2.83 ￿ The Inquiry considered in some detail whether Huntley should have been 
formally cautioned in relation to Contact 1. That decision now seems less 
critical for the following reasons: 
2.83.1 ￿ If a caution had been given, it would not have been recorded on 
the PNC because this was only possible after November 1995 (and 
Humberside Police did not enter old cautions retrospectively). 
2.83.2 ￿ A record of Contact 1 should have been made on CIS Nominals, 
whether or not a caution had been given. 
2.84 ￿ In November 2003, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) 
stated in their report into Humberside Police’s dealings with Huntley that, as 
regards Contact 1, ‘in the opinion of both HMIC and the now current chief 
officers in Humberside, Huntley should have received at least a caution for 
the offence’. In their oral evidence, both Peter Todd, Assistant Inspector of 
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that view. 
2.85 ￿ Humberside Police’s submission to the Inquiry stated that ‘it would have 
been possible to give a formal police caution but this might have been 
brought into question, despite the admission [by Huntley]’, because it was 
‘arguable that there would have been insufficient evidence with which to 
support a prosecution, part of the criteria necessary to support a caution’. 
2.86 ￿ By the time the Humberside Police witnesses came to give oral evidence, 
their position had hardened against giving a caution (although DI Billam 
had consistently asserted that a caution would not have been 
appropriate). The Chief Constable’s view had changed entirely from the 
view recorded in the HMIC report. It appears that the principal reason 
for that change was that at the time the view had been offered he had 
assumed that there had been a formal signed statement from AB. 
2.87 ￿ Home Office Circular 18/1994 contained revised national standards for 
cautioning. Paragraph 2 provided that a caution should not be given unless 
there is evidence of the offender’s guilt sufficient to give a realistic prospect 
of conviction. The question is whether this test could be satisfied in a case 
where: 
• ￿ there was a properly recorded confession (by Huntley) made under 
caution; 
• ￿ the complainant (AB) had been interviewed by the police and had 
signed pocketbook notes of that interview confirming that it was ‘a true 
account’; but 
• ￿ the complainant had also indicated that she did not wish to prosecute 
and had not made a formal statement to the police. 
2.88 ￿ A range of views emerged about this. DI Billam considered that there might 
be circumstances in which the signed confession alone would be sufficient, 
but both he and Detective Superintendent Higgins regarded it as fatal to a 
prosecution that the complainant did not wish to make a formal complaint. 
2.89 ￿ DCS Baggs and the Chief Constable regarded it as critical that there was 
no signed statement from AB. The distinction they drew depended on the 
format of the statement, and the fact that section 9 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1967 requires statements to contain certain declarations beyond those 
recorded in the pocketbook of AB’s interview. They regarded this point as 
being more important than whether the complainant was willing to support 
the prosecution. 
2.90 ￿ Notwithstanding its lesser importance, my conclusions on the matter of the 
caution are as follows: 
2.90.1 ￿ The ‘realistic prospect of conviction’ test does not depend upon the 
complainant being willing to support the prosecution. 
2.90.2 ￿ A signed confession alone might be sufficient to satisfy the test 
in a case such as this. However, there would be concerns about 
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15-year-old girl. 
2.90.3 ￿ It is possible that, although not wishing to prosecute, AB would have 
been prepared to sign such a statement, given that she had been 
prepared to sign the pocketbook. My view is that this possibility 
should have been explored with AB and her parents. The evidence 
is not entirely clear in this respect. My view is that this aspect was not 
explored either at all or as fully as it might have been. 
2.90.4 ￿ If such a statement had been provided, a caution would have 
been appropriate and should have been given, not least because 
of the difference in age between AB and Huntley. 
2.90.5 ￿ Given the difficult elements of judgement involved, I do not criticise 
DI Billam for his decision not to issue a caution. 
Humberside Police’s senior management 
2.91 ￿ The need for officers on the ground to be educated and trained in 
the value of intelligence, and the systems that support its recording, is 
fundamental to effective policing and informed decision making. So is 
effective management. 
2.92 ￿ HMIC made these points clearly in their evidence. Humberside Police’s 
management should also have been aware of them during the relevant 
period, not least because in 1997 HMIC published the results of its 
thematic inspection into criminal intelligence good practice, Policing with 
Intelligence. The executive summary stated that good quality intelligence 
was the lifeblood of the Police Service and then stressed the need for: 
• ￿ enthusiastic leadership to communicate the value of intelligence to all 
levels of the police force; 
•  a clear intelligence strategy to be communicated to all staff; and 
•  education, training and support to be provided in this context. 
2.93 ￿ Criticism for the catalogue of errors and failures in the information systems 
dealt with in paragraphs 2.1–2.82 could be directed at a variety of levels 
within Humberside Police. In general terms, the more senior the officer 
connected with the particular failure or system, the greater the degree of 
responsibility. Thus, as I noted above, officers at the lower levels of seniority 
can more legitimately say that guidance and training should have ensured 
that they clearly understood what was needed from them. 
2.94 ￿ The final responsibility for these serious failures, and for the matters dealt 
with in this section, rests with Chief Constable Westwood. He was 
Chief Constable from March 1999, and as such became ultimately 
responsible for the information management and IT systems. The wide-
ranging and systemic failures I have identified in respect of these systems 
existed in March 1999, and thus predated him becoming Chief Constable. 
However, they were not identified and continued for a considerable period 
thereafter. Chief Constable Westwood must take personal responsibility for 
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Deputy Chief Constable, the second most senior officer on the force. 
Although he was a member of the senior management group, he had no 
direct responsibility for information management and IT. 
2.95 ￿ In any event, he has throughout accepted that, as the current Chief 
Constable, he assumes corporate responsibility for the Humberside 
Police failures identified in this report whenever they occurred. Given his 
assumption of responsibility, the Inquiry has not heard from the other senior 
management in the chief officers’ group. It would be inappropriate to 
speculate as to what criticisms, if any, would have been made of them. 
The management of record creation 
2.96 ￿ As Chief Constable Westwood accepted, at its most basic, management 
involves three things: 
•  the active identification of (systemic) problems; 
• ￿ dealing with the problems identified effectively, sensibly and promptly; 
and 
• ￿ communicating solutions to officers on the ground, through, for 
example, guidance, training, auditing and inspections. 
2.97 ￿ In relation to the first of these, Chief Constable Westwood accepted 
that each of the three major IT systems of relevance (CIS Nominals, 
CIS Crime and the CPD) had fundamental systemic problems at the 
time. He accepted that he did not know whether senior officers knew 
about these problems. He accepted that, if an appropriately detailed 
examination of the systems had been conducted at the time, the problems 
would have been identified. 
2.98 ￿ He accepted that CIS Nominals, which should have led to the creation of 
records on Huntley, failed almost entirely; there were clear systems errors 
that should have been picked up by management and put right; and there 
had been several opportunities for management to have done so which 
had not been taken. 
2.99 ￿ In his oral evidence, Chief Constable Westwood repeatedly cited as the key 
failure the mistaken belief among officers that intelligence was being pulled 
off crime reports in order to create records on CIS Nominals. However, this 
was not identified at all by him in his written evidence to the Inquiry. Nor 
was it mentioned in any of the other documents submitted by Humberside 
Police – despite the work that had evidently gone into their preparation. It is 
disturbing that he was unaware of this failure prior to hearing his officers give 
evidence to the Inquiry. 
2.100 ￿ In relation to guidance and training, Chief Constable Westwood accepted 
that there should have been more training and guidance about the 
record creation process and about who was responsible for aspects of 
it. He did not know whether there had been any consideration given by 
management to the adequacy or otherwise of the training and guidance 
for officers. 
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not appreciated by officers on the ground at the relevant time (in the late 
1990s). This also does not appear to have been known or appreciated by 
management. Chief Constable Westwood did not know when this lack of 
appreciation first happened but accepted that the problem was not being 
addressed with the necessary speed and energy (at least before 2001). 
The failure is all the more surprising because of the publication of the HMIC 
thematic report on intelligence in 1997, which I have referred to above. 
2.102 ￿ Chief Constable Westwood suggested that this problem had been 
identified by about 2001 and that the position was very different and 
‘enormously better’ by 2002. This does not explain why it had not been 
appreciated before by management nor why, as late as October 
2002, Humberside Police’s own Director of Intelligence was describing 
‘an alarming ignorance of what constitutes intelligence, how it should 
be recorded, then how it should be graded, stored, disseminated and 
weeded’ among officers. There is every reason to suppose that the level of 
ignorance was even greater in the late 1990s. 
2.103 ￿ In his report to the Inquiry and in his evidence, Chief Constable Westwood 
also accepted that insufficient resources were directed to ensuring that 
the information systems were working efficiently, and that there was 
inadequate auditing or inspection by management to ensure that they 
were working efficiently. 
The management of the review and deletion of records 
2.104 ￿ The Chief Constable acknowledged in his report to the Inquiry that there 
had been inconsistent review and deletion practices in the three main 
databases. Records on the CPD were not reviewed in any organised sense 
until 2002, and he acknowledged in his oral evidence that he had not been 
aware of this, nor of the fact that for a long period the force’s practices 
were consequently in breach of the data protection legislation. 
2.105 ￿ He was unaware of the guidance or rules concerning when a record should 
be reviewed and when it should be deleted. He was unaware, for example, 
of the 1996 Force Weeding Rules, and considered that they represented a 
level of detail about which he could not reasonably be expected to know. 
2.106 ￿ He was not aware of the suspension of the ‘weed run’ at the time of the 
transfer from the CIS 1 system to CIS 2. Nor was he aware of the suspension 
of the ‘weed run’ in February 2001, nor of the fact that this had happened 
because it was thought that intelligence was ‘haemorrhaging’ from CIS 
Nominals. He would have expected to have been told this but was not, 
and apparently had no management systems in place that might bring the 
matter to his attention. 
The management of the vetting systems 
2.107 ￿ As set out above, Chief Constable Westwood accepted in his report to the 
Inquiry and in his evidence that it had taken an unacceptably long time 
for management to make the CPD available for vetting purposes after the 
matter had been raised with him personally in 1998. The database finally 
became available for vetting in 2002. 
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additional search function in CIS 2 (searching CIS Nominals through 
CIS Crime) was unacceptably long. It could and should have been 
recognised and dealt with much earlier. 
Humberside Police’s press release following Huntley’s conviction 
2.109 ￿ Humberside Police released a lengthy press statement on 17 December 
2003. This was the product of careful preparation. In addition, Chief 
Constable Westwood conducted a series of interviews to coincide with 
the release of the press statement. My interest in the press statement is in 
relation to the claimed impact of the data protection legislation on record 
keeping. 
2.110 ￿ I make it plain that I do not consider that Chief Constable Westwood acted 
dishonestly or intended to mislead the public. In my view, however, the 
contents of the press release and the answers given by Chief Constable 
Westwood in interviews were seriously misjudged. 
2.111 ￿ The press release plainly suggested that a principal reason for the 
information now known about Huntley’s contacts with Humberside Police 
not being available to them (that is, Humberside Police) in December 
2001 was that the Information Commissioner did not consider employment 
vetting a policing purpose under data protection legislation. The clear 
suggestion was that the records had had to be destroyed in order to 
comply with this requirement. 
2.112 ￿ The suggestion was wrong. Chief Constable Westwood accepted in his 
evidence that the Information Commissioner’s views on the issue had 
little or nothing to do with that information not being on the Humberside 
Police systems. At the time, he should also have known he was unlikely to 
be in possession of the full facts and that greater care was needed before 
making a statement to the public of this importance, in the terms in which it 
was cast. 
2.113 ￿ Chief Constable Westwood acknowledged that he had not consulted 
either the force’s solicitor or the force’s Data Protection Officer, Richard 
Heatley, about this part of the statement. That is surprising. Mr Heatley 
stated that it was unusual for Chief Constable Westwood not to consult him 
on such matters, and that the view in the press release was not, and would 
not have been, his view. 
2.114 ￿ Chief Constable Westwood also stated in his oral evidence that that 
part of the press release was an error, resulting from his misunderstanding 
of a telephone conversation he had had with Assistant Information 
Commissioner (AIC) David Smith. His evidence was that he had gone 
through all Humberside Police’s contacts with Huntley with AIC Smith and 
had been told in general terms that information could not be kept purely 
for the purposes of employment vetting. 
2.115 ￿ AIC Smith disagreed with this version of events. He does not recollect having 
gone through the detail of the contacts with Huntley. His position was that 
there could have been no room for misunderstanding by Chief Constable 
Westwood. 
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position, it is difficult to see how Chief Constable Westwood could have 
concluded – even on the facts as they appear to have been known to him 
in December 2003 following the HMIC inspection – that the reason for the 
absence of records from the various systems was that they could not be 
kept for employment-vetting purposes. 
2.117 ￿ The press release was also incomplete in relation to Contact 1. It mentioned 
the fact that AB had ‘admitted the allegation’ but failed to mention 
that the police had interviewed Huntley under caution and that he had 
admitted both aspects of the offence. 
Conclusions about Humberside Police 
2.118 ￿ At the outset of his oral evidence, Chief Constable Westwood accepted 
that the nature and extent of the problems illustrated by the contacts 
involving Huntley raised serious questions about the quality of Humberside 
Police’s management at the time. I share that view. 
2.119 ￿ I have detailed above the scale of the problems and by any definition 
these were fundamental and systemic: the failure in the operation of the 
three databases most relevant to child protection; the inadequate training 
and guidance for officers in record creation, review and deletion; and 
the lack of effective management audits or inspections to check that the 
systems were operating effectively. These all contributed to the failure to 
identify any pattern in Huntley’s behaviour. 
2.120  The Inquiry also received other worrying evidence of failure. 
2.120.1 In October 2003, HMIC conducted a Basic Command Unit 
inspection of one of the divisions of Humberside Police. That report 
identified a number of familiar problems and difficulties with record 
creation and with the effective and efficient performance of the 
intelligence functions. It also identified problems with the quality of 
leadership, the clarity of accountability and the effectiveness of 
communication. In fairness, Chief Constable Westwood disputes 
these findings, although HMIC stands by them in substance. 
2.120.2 In October 2003, Humberside Police were one of three or four forces 
in England and Wales judged by ACPO’s National Intelligence 
Model Compliance Team to be unlikely to be in a position to 
meet the minimum standards of National Intelligence Model 
implementation by the due date of 1 April 2004. As a result of 
considerable additional and urgent work led by Chief Constable 
Westwood, that date has now been met. 
2.121 ￿ The lack of awareness of the nature or scale of these problems, failings and 
misunderstandings over such long periods is deeply shocking. 
2.122 ￿ There seems also to have been insufficient strategic review of information 
management systems, despite the fact that all those involved in 
management accepted the critical importance of those systems to 
effective policing. The reviews that did take place resulted in a strategy of 
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developing a roll-out plan for NSPIS products. They did not address urgently 
enough the problems of the existing systems and whether these needed to 
be modified or improved in the interim. 
2.123 ￿ I am fully conscious that senior management cannot be realistically 
expected to know about every failure. However, when the problems are 
of this scale in a function critical to effective policing, the importance of 
which had been highlighted nationally on several occasions by HMIC, then 
I do believe that senior management could and should have done more to 
identify and then deal with them. The nature of that responsibility has been 
described above. From March 1999 at the latest, that was ultimately the 
personal responsibility of Chief Constable Westwood. 
Implementing change 
2.124 ￿ I acknowledge that, particularly in the last two years, Humberside Police 
have devoted considerable time, resources and effort to addressing the 
problems with their intelligence systems and practices. This report confirms 
just how necessary these and other changes were, but in fairness I should 
draw attention to them. 
2.125 ￿ For example, a new custody recording system, as part of NSPIS, will enable 
information entered in the custody suite to be placed directly on the PNC, 
avoiding the duplication of paper records then being input by other staff. 
2.126 ￿ In addition, although the basic structure of the CIS remains the same, there 
are important changes under way or already implemented. 
2.126.1 Active consideration is being given to streamlining the two main 
sources of information: Form 839 (Intelligence Report) and Form 310 
(‘Phoenix Descriptive’, the form from which information is put onto 
the PNC and CIS Nominals). The aim is to ensure that information 
is passed from the officer on the ground to the PNC and CIS 
systems (notably by the use of electronic forms) with a minimum of 
intermediate steps. 
2.126.2 A Humberside Police Force Intelligence Model has been developed 
in order to implement the National Intelligence Model (NIM). The 
latter is a management system designed to ensure that policing is 
intelligence-led by specifying the constituent parts of an effective 
intelligence system. 
2.126.3 In September 2003, Humberside Police published a practice 
direction called Intelligence: Collection, Assessment, Recording, 
Dissemination and Review. This was designed to give guidance to 
officers about each of these areas and to ensure that the disparate 
systems and practices that existed before were harmonised. It 
highlights the need for intelligence to be evaluated using the 
5x5x5 method and to be submitted on Form 839 for inclusion 
on CIS Nominals. 
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the new CIS system, and other information systems, will be housed. This will 
facilitate single-point access to the data stored on numerous separate 
systems. 
2.128 ￿ A detailed review of child protection (and domestic violence) procedures 
was begun in September 2002 and led to an action plan approved a year 
later. The review specifically considered information management, noting 
the inadequacies of the current system and the manner in which it was 
used. It concluded that ‘any intelligence from the child protection arena 
should be stored on the force’s central intelligence system [CIS]’. 
2.129 ￿ Humberside Police now have a delivery plan which seeks to address 
a wide range of intelligence-related issues and which is intended to 
produce significant improvements within the short term. The plan will be 
independently quality-assured and will be managed and audited by 
the Chief Constable with the participation of a number of stakeholders, 
particularly the Police Authority, HMIC and the Home Office Policing 
Standards Unit. 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
2.130 ￿ HMIC is the national body with responsibility for inspecting police forces 
to ensure that they are operating efficiently and effectively. It is clear that 
Humberside Police fell short of that standard in some important respects. 
This raises the question of whether HMIC should have identified the failings in 
Humberside at an earlier date. 
2.131 ￿ In my view, HMIC could and should have been more proactive. Information 
systems are of obvious importance to policing and they could have been 
inspected effectively with relative ease. So, for example, it should have 
been possible to ask of any police force: 
•  Were the systems in place as effective and efficient as they could be? 
• ￿ Were they operating as effectively and efficiently as possible? For 
example, did the integral parts of any such system (such as officers on 
the ground and data-inputting staff) know enough about the workings 
of the system and their role in it? 
•  To what extent was there proper management of the systems? 
2.132 ￿ Given the range and scale of the particular problems in Humberside Police 
in each of these respects, it is surprising that HMIC did not pick them up 
earlier, even accepting that HMIC cannot be expected to be a substitute 
for proper local police management. 
2.133 ￿ In reaching the conclusion that they should have done more, I was 
particularly struck by two matters: 
2.133.1 HMIC inspected Humberside Police on a number of occasions over 
the relevant period. In their report to the Inquiry they cited extracts 
from their own reports concerned with IT, information systems 
and intelligence. HMIC accepted that these problem areas kept 
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have revealed the fundamental systemic problems identified during 
the Inquiry. 
2.133.2 When the tragedy had occurred and HMIC went in again in 
October 2003, they were able to reach clear and damning 
views about the inadequacy of a number of systems and vetting 
processes very quickly, meaning that the problems were not hidden 
or difficult to uncover when the inspection probed properly. 
Humberside Police Authority 
2.134 ￿ Humberside Police Authority cannot entirely escape responsibility for the 
serious failings in systems and management at Humberside Police in the 
relevant period. In their favour are two points: first, until relatively recently 
they were not resourced to carry out in-depth monitoring of police 
performance; second, there is understandable sensitivity on the part of the 
Police Authority not to trespass into matters of operational policing, these 
being the province of the force’s management. 
2.135 ￿ Nonetheless, the Police Authority appears at the time to have monitored 
police performance primarily by reacting to matters raised by the 
police themselves. Unless difficult or probing questions are asked about 
matters beyond those that the police choose to raise, no problem will be 
uncovered. There was, in my view, sufficient in the HMIC reports to have 
caused the Police Authority to start asking more difficult questions. There is 
no indication that this happened. 
Social Services 
2.136  Social Services were involved in Contacts A, 1, 2A, 3, 4 and 8. 
2.137 ￿ The systems operated by Social Services at the time were designed to 
enable links to be made to past contacts with service users only – in other 
words, in alleged abuse of children cases, the children themselves. There 
was no system for filing or indexing manual records in a manner that would 
have revealed past contacts with alleged abusers. This was consistent with 
national practice. 
2.138 ￿ Likewise, the Social Services Information Database (SSID), a nationally 
recognised system used by many social services authorities, could be 
searched against the names of the service users but not against the names 
of the alleged abusers. In those circumstances, the only possibility of a 
social worker recognising that a particular alleged abuser had a history of 
contact with Social Services was through memory. The problem with such a 
system is best illustrated by the fact that Phil Watters was involved in a series 
of the incidents and appears not to have made the Huntley link between 
any of them. 
2.139 ￿ Social Services argue, with some justification, that the need to keep records 
of abusers in a searchable form was not recognised nationally. They also 
argue that they relied on information systems maintained by the police 
either nationally (the PNC) or locally (the Humberside CPD). 
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judgement on incidents in which Huntley had come into contact with them, 
without referring the matter to the police. In such cases there would, of course, 
be no possibility of the police creating a record, but the contact might still be 
relevant as part of an emerging behaviour pattern. Also, having access to a 
manual or computerised system, which enabled past contacts with alleged 
abusers to be checked, would have helped Social Services to make properly 
informed decisions about whether or not to refer an incident to the police. 
2.141 ￿ It will be for Sir Christopher Kelly, as Chairman of the Serious Case Review, 
to explore whether that was an acceptable system for Social Services to 
have operated at the time and what improvements could be made to it. 
2.142 ￿ In the event, no link was made by Social Services between the incidents. 
This in itself is surprising because, even leaving aside Contact 1 which 
occurred some nine months earlier (in August 1995), Contacts 2A, 3 and 4 
all came to Social Services’ attention within a matter of weeks and involved 
common personnel. It might be thought, but it will be for Sir Christopher Kelly 
to examine, that at least the links between Contacts 2A, 3 and 4 should 
have been made, even given the constraints of the record-keeping systems 
and the officers’ workload. 
2.143 ￿ In  addition to the contacts which the Inquiry examined, it is apparent from 
information obtained by Social Services and provided as supplementary 
evidence, that Huntley was probably involved sexually with one other girl 
under the age of 16, but none of the Social Services’ computerised records 
that remain in respect of this girl mention the name Huntley. Such actions by 
the Social Services as are recorded do not show any reference to Humberside 
Police. 
Areas of concern 
2.144 ￿ Sir Christopher Kelly will no doubt also examine with special care Contacts 
1 (AB), 2A (CD) and 3 (EF). These cases raise particular concern, as was 
acknowledged by Mr Eaden in his evidence, in which he described his 
view of the handling of the CD case as being ‘totally inadequate in every 
respect’. The particular areas of concern seem from the evidence I have 
seen to be as follows: 
2.144.1 ￿ Why in Contact 1 (AB) did social workers conclude there were no 
significant welfare concerns, even though the 15-year-old girl was 
staying with a 21-year-old boyfriend, with whom she admitted having 
sex? 
2.144.2 Why was the CD case (Contact 2A) not referred to the police once 
it became clear that an allegation had been made that CD had 
had sexual intercourse with Huntley, or even at the later stage when 
the EF case (Contact 3) was referred to the police? 
2.144.3 ￿ Why was no action taken to prevent CD from living alone with Ian 
Huntley in his father’s house after the father had left on business? Why 
was no such action taken despite repeated warnings that that situation 
was about to occur and despite the fact that allegations of unlawful 
sexual intercourse between CD and Huntley had been made? 
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School, dated 1 May 1996, recording the allegations about Huntley 
having unlawful sexual intercourse with CD and her friend EF, 
not passed to the police either in the context of the CD case or 
even in the context of the EF case when that case was referred 
to the police? 
2.144.5 Why was the allegation made in the CD case not passed on to the 
police as part of the relevant context in which the EF case arose? 
2.144.6 Why was it considered appropriate for the EF case to be a ‘social 
services only’ investigation? 
2.144.7 What do the facts of Social Services’ handling of the CD (Contact 
2A) and EF (Contact 3) cases in particular indicate about the 
adequacy of the systems and the manner in which Social Services’ 
functions were being performed at the time? 
Events in Cambridgeshire 
2.145 ￿ In the following paragraphs, I set out my findings in relation to the handling 
of the vetting process and Huntley’s application for the job of caretaker at 
Soham Village College. 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary 
2.146 ￿ It is very worrying that so many different mistakes appear to have been 
made in this one case. 
2.146.1 An error was made in entering Huntley’s date of birth in the Child 
Access Database. 
2.146.2 An error was made in the PNC check, which was only carried 
out against the name of ‘Ian Nixon’, and not against that of ‘Ian 
Huntley’. 
2.146.3 An error was almost certainly made in failing to send a ‘foreign 
force’ fax to Humberside Police. 
2.146.4 An error was almost certainly made in failing to scrutinise the Police 
Check Form before closing off the file to ensure that any ‘foreign 
force’ faxes which should have been sent had been. 
2.146.5 In the very unlikely event that a fax was sent, an error was made in 
closing the file before any reply had been received. 
An investigation into the Child Access checks 
2.147 ￿ In August 2003, the Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire commissioned an 
investigation into the processing of Child Access checks for Huntley and 
Maxine Carr. It considered whether any misconduct had been committed 
by Cambridgeshire Constabulary’s staff and reviewed existing procedures, 
together with any recommendations for change. 
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Cambridgeshire Constabulary. DCI Ingrey observed that the new system, 
under the National CRB, ‘cured’ the failings in the previous system. However, 
among his conclusions, DCI Ingrey found: 
‘7 ￿ Management and supervision of both the system itself, and 
the staff operating it, were not adequate and in reality 
non-existent. 
8 ￿ The Child Access Database is a good tool but contained 
insufficient auditing information. There was, for example, 
no field to enter addresses, and no means by which an 
operator could update as each stage was completed. 
9 ￿ From interviewing Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) operators, 
it is very evident that all staff adapted the process to suit 
their own individual working practices. One cannot blame 
individuals for doing this but it is an inevitable conclusion 
that management and supervisors should have recognised 
this and assured corporacy of the process. 
10 ￿ In Stage 2 [checking against PNC, CIS and Intrepid] – the 
most important stage – some operators checked an 
individual form through all the databases before moving to 
the next form. Others, such as Mrs Giddings, did a batch on 
one database at a time, and if left uncompleted she would 
leave a Post-it note on the batch as to what had been 
checked and what remained to be done. She was at a loss 
to explain what would happen should the Post-it become 
unattached! Some operators made a note on the original 
Disclosure Form as they completed any action in relation to 
it, others did not. 
11 ￿ I have established that some CRB operators were steadfastly 
refusing to carry out Child Access checks at all, arguing that 
such tasks were not in the job description for CRB operators 
at the time. It appears that this was rectified in 2001, but it 
highlights the apparent complacency over this aspect of 
CRB work. 
12 ￿ All CRB staff, from management and supervisors to 
operators, referred to the task as secondary to the main 
function of the CRB, which was dealing with PNC enquiries 
by operational officers. 
... 
24 ￿ Unfortunately, it will never be known exactly why [the 
Huntley file] was closed on 23 December 2001. The fault 
lies in the flawed process due to lack of auditing, recording 
and supervision of the system. 
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under the 2001 system and the results despatched to the 
requesting agencies contained accurate results.’ 
2.149 ￿ While accepting the broad thrust of DCI Ingrey’s findings, Chief Constable 
Lloyd, in his evidence, commented on paragraphs 7 and 11 above. 
He rejected the suggestion that management and supervision were 
‘non-existent’ (paragraph 7) but accepted that they were inadequate. 
He explained, as regards paragraph 11, that ‘some’ CRB operators referred 
to ‘one’ member of staff. 
2.150 ￿ In his first witness statement to the Inquiry, Chief Constable Lloyd identified 
and apologised for two errors during the processing of the Child Access 
check in relation to Huntley, namely the error in entering his date of birth 
incorrectly and the failure to carry out a PNC check against the name of 
‘Ian Huntley’. 
2.151 ￿ He referred to DCI Ingrey’s report as having, among other things, 
highlighted those two errors. However, as is clear from the evidence 
received by the Inquiry, and from DCI Ingrey’s report itself, the errors in the 
Huntley check were not just limited to the two identified. Chief Constable 
Lloyd was unable to offer an explanation as to why he had not referred 
to the other errors in his first witness statement. His suggestion that the 
Assistant Chief Constable had put in a statement dealing with those points 
was mistaken, albeit the evidence and information submitted on behalf 
of Cambridgeshire Constabulary made proper disclosure of the errors and 
failings that existed at the time. 
2.152 ￿ In fact, as Chief Constable Lloyd accepted during his oral evidence, 
the number and seriousness of the errors in this case suggested that the 
problems were not just human errors but that there were problems with the 
vetting system as it was being operated. In particular, he accepted that the 
system was vulnerable because of the lack of supervision and audit. 
2.153 ￿ The head of the CRB unit in December 2001 was Det Supt Haddow, as 
Head of Crime Support, having taken up his post in mid-November 2001 
following an absence for ill health and injury. Det Supt Haddow’s evidence 
was that while, in an ideal world, he would have liked to have reviewed 
the system that was in place, this was not appropriate since a new system 
needed to be in place by March 2002. 
2.154 ￿ I consider that Det Supt Haddow’s decision to focus on the new CRB 
system, rather than the existing one, is understandable in the circumstances, 
particularly given how recently he had taken up the post of Head of Crime 
Support. Equally, I consider that it would be unreasonable to have expected 
Det Supt Phillipson, who acted as temporary Head of Crime Support during 
Det Supt Haddow’s absence from 5 September to mid-November 2001, to 
have undertaken a thorough review of the system. 
2.155 ￿ Det Supt Haddow’s predecessor in the post was Detective Chief 
Superintendent Stevenson, who had been Head of Crime Support since 
May 2000. It is clear from his evidence that his focus during 2001 was also 
on the implementation of the new CRB, rather than on the existing system. 
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the adequacy of the systems then in place. He told the Inquiry: ‘I look back 
on it now and I know that, as I carry responsibility for it, I think that maybe I 
did miss an opportunity to delve deeper into that.’ 
2.157 ￿ He proffered a number of mitigating factors: the system was about to change 
and the need was to get the new systems operating effectively; he was 
aware of the pressures and had provided support by approving more staff. 
2.158 ￿ Chief Constable Lloyd accepted that, ultimately, the responsibility rested 
with him and that as Deputy Chief Constable in 2001 he had direct line 
management responsibility for the CRB. 
2.159 ￿ Following the hearing, Cambridgeshire Constabulary informed the Inquiry 
of the outcome of its review of a random sample of records of other Child 
Access police checks conducted during 2001. No errors were found in any 
of them, which considerably reduces the likelihood that errors, such as those 
in the case of Huntley, occurred in other cases. 
Failures and errors 
2.160  I have cause to criticise the following failures and errors: 
2.160.1 There was a failure to anticipate the increase in Child Access 
applications before the CRB’s launch. 
2.160.2 There was a failure to supervise and manage the Cambridgeshire 
CRB in such a way as to deal with the increased volume of 
applications. 
2.160.3 Those failures allowed a situation to arise where the system for 
undertaking Child Access checks was fundamentally weak. 
In particular: 
• ￿ There was no consistency between the approaches of different 
operators undertaking the checks as to the point at which 
‘foreign forces’ should be identified and how, if at all, the fact 
that a check had been made should be recorded on the file or 
Child Access Database. 
• ￿ Supervisors and management were unaware of those variations 
at the time. 
• ￿ There was no, or no adequate, ‘safety-net’ in the system to 
ensure that all necessary checks had been done before a file 
was closed. 
•  The system contained no adequate audit function. 
•  There was a lack of guidance about the process. 
2.161 ￿ Cambridgeshire Constabulary made a series of potentially significant errors 
in their handling of the police check, including it being extremely unlikely 
that a fax search request was sent to Humberside Police. 
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corporate. 
Soham Village College 
2.163 ￿ I want to pay testimony to the excellent achievements of Soham Village 
College under the leadership of the Principal, Howard Gilbert, as described 
in the Ofsted inspection of April 2003, which I entirely endorse. 
2.164 ￿ There are, nonetheless, a number of aspects in Huntley’s recruitment 
process which give rise to concern. In particular: 
2.164.1 Soham Village College should not have accepted the ‘open’ 
references provided by Huntley, particularly in circumstances where 
it was clear that he had not previously held any post involving 
significant contact with children, and accordingly none of the 
references were directed to, or even considered, the issue of his 
suitability to work with children. 
2.164.2 The interview process failed to identify either the employment history 
gaps or undisclosed employers in Huntley’s application. 
2.164.3 There was no reason why the police check process could not have 
been completed before Huntley started work at the school. 
2.165 ￿ In my view, as Mr Gilbert properly accepted during the course of giving 
evidence, it was a mistake on his part not to take up the references. It does 
not, of course, follow that if he had done so anything further would have 
been revealed. It also appears from the subsequent enquiries made by 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary that at least four of the references were 
authentic. However, the failure to follow up the references fell short of 
acceptable recruitment practice relating to people applying to work with 
children, and could in itself have had significant implications. 
2.166 ￿ I also consider that Mr Gilbert ought to have ensured that Huntley did not 
take up the post, or move into the accommodation at 5 College Close, 
until the results of the police check had been received. Although it is clear 
that during autumn 2002, as a result of difficulties with the implementation of 
the CRB, it was necessary for a number of members of staff to take up their 
posts nationally before the results of their police checks, I do not consider 
that this provides a justification for the decision in December 2001 to 
allow Huntley to start work on site before the Police Check Form was even 
completed, far less before the result was received. 
2.167 ￿ While Mr Gilbert is not to be criticised for relying upon a professional 
personnel service provider for advice, it is also a matter of some surprise and 
concern that he was unaware of the terms of Home Office Circular 47/93 at 
that time. 
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2.168 ￿ With regard to the issues raised by the evidence of Education Personnel 
Management Ltd (EPM), I am concerned about the following matters: 
2.168.1 The declaration made by a Senior Nominated Officer of EPM on 
Huntley’s Police Check Form to ‘confirm that ... the particulars 
provided have been verified and I am satisfied they are accurate’ 
was not entirely accurate. Neither EPM nor another body on their 
behalf made any independent check or verification of any part 
of the contents of any Police Check Forms, save for the check by 
Soham Village College of Huntley’s date of birth. 
2.168.2 Reliance simply on an applicant’s honesty in providing those details 
is unacceptable in the child protection context. 
2.169 ￿ There is force in the point made by EPM that Home Office Circular 47/93 did 
not expressly state which particulars provided by the applicant on the form 
should be verified by the Senior Nominated Officer. Given the importance 
of the five-year address history in ensuring that requests were made of the 
appropriate police forces, it would clearly have been helpful for the Circular 
to have highlighted this point. 
2.170 ￿ However, the declaration on the form itself stated in terms that such 
particulars had been verified. Accordingly, as Mrs Cooper accepted, a 
declaration was signed to say that something had been verified when it 
had not. I consider it unwise to have done so, and as EPM accept, with the 
benefit of hindsight, it would have been sensible for them, and other Senior 
Nominated Officers, to point out the deficiencies in the wording of the 
Circular to the relevant government departments. If EPM really formed the 
view that no checks could realistically be made, it was incumbent on them 
to say so, allowing those who relied on their inaccurate confirmation to be 
forewarned that they had not carried out any independent checking. 
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structure – the facts 
3.1 	 This section of the report provides background on a number of issues that 
have a bearing on the Inquiry: 
• the  legislation; 
•  the policing structure; 
• information  systems; 
•  information management; and 
•  recruitment and vetting. 
The legislation 
The Data Protection Act 1984 
3.2 	 The Data Protection Act 1984 created a statutory scheme for the regulation 
of automatically-processed information. It did not apply to manual records. 
The Act established eight data protection principles with which ‘data users’ 
had to comply when processing personal data. If the Data Protection 
Registrar (now called the Information Commissioner) was satisfied that 
a registered data user had contravened any of the data protection 
principles, he could serve an enforcement notice requiring that person to 
take steps to comply. 
3.3 	 The following three principles were of particular relevance in Humberside 
Police’s contacts with Huntley: 
‘ (4) 	 Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall be adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to that purpose or those 
purposes. 
(5) 	 Personal data shall be accurate and where necessary kept up 
to date. 
(6) 	 Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for 
longer than necessary for that purpose or those purposes.’ 
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user whether the data being held included personal data of which the 
individual was the subject, and was entitled to be supplied with a copy of 
the data. 
3.5 	 However, where personal data was held for the purpose of preventing 
or detecting crime, or for apprehending or prosecuting offenders, it was 
exempt if its provision would be likely to prejudice that purpose. 
The Data Protection Act 1998 
3.6 	 In 1998 a second Data Protection Act was passed, following the adoption 
of a Directive (96/46) by the European Parliament. 
3.7 	 The 1998 Act is significantly wider in scope than the 1984 Act, as it applies 
not only to automatically-processed information, but also to some manual 
files. 
3.8 	 The 1998 Act imposes a duty on any ‘data controller’ to comply with eight 
data protection principles, which are in similar, although not identical, form 
to those in the 1984 Act. Four are of particular relevance to this Inquiry: 
‘ (2) 	 Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and 
lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner 
incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. 
(3) 	 Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
(4) 	 Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up 
to date. 
(5) 	 Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be 
kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.’ 
3.9 	 The 1998 Act contains guidance on the interpretation of certain of these 
principles, but does not include any guidance as to the fifth principle 
(above). 
The Information Commissioner 
3.10 	 The Office of the Data Protection Registrar was renamed by the 1998 Act as 
the Data Protection Commissioner, which has subsequently been renamed, 
by the Freedom of Information Act 2000, as the Information Commissioner. 
3.11 	 The Information Commissioner has a number of enforcement powers under 
the Data Protection Act 1998 and, if satisfied that a data controller has 
contravened any of the data protection principles, may serve a preliminary 
enforcement notice raising issues of concern about the creation, retention 
or use of data and inviting a response. This is a power which has been used 
on occasion by the Information Commissioner in relation to police systems 
and specifically in relation to the disclosure of intelligence by the police 
as part of an enhanced vetting process. If a preliminary notice does not 
achieve the desired result, an enforcement notice can then be served 
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fails to comply with an enforcement notice is guilty of an offence. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 
3.12 	 The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000. The Act 
imposes specific obligations on public bodies and the courts to take 
account of and apply rights and freedoms accorded under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
3.13 	 The Act provides that, so far as possible, legislation must be read and given 
effect in a way that is compatible with the Convention. 
3.14 	 A ‘public authority’, which would include a police officer, must act in a 
way that is compatible with the Convention. Where a public authority fails 
to act in a way that is compatible with Convention rights, it will be acting 
unlawfully unless it is obliged to so act by virtue of primary legislation. 
3.15  Of particular relevance to this Inquiry is article 8. This provides that: 
‘ (1) 	 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) 	 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with law and 
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
The policing structure 
The structure up to October 2002 
3.16 	 Policing in England and Wales is based upon a tripartite structure comprising 
the Home Secretary, local police authorities and Chief Constables. 
3.17 	 Under the Police Act 1996, England and Wales are divided into 43 police 
areas. A local police authority is established for each area. (For the City of 
London police area the police authority is the Common Council of the City 
of London.) 
3.18 	 It is the responsibility of each police authority to secure the maintenance 
of an efficient and effective police force for that area (Police Act 1996, 
section 6(1)). Police authorities have a crucial role in relation to funding, 
budget setting and procurement and have a statutory duty to ensure value 
for money at a local level. All major information technology (IT) contracts 
are signed by authorities and not Chief Constables. In discharging its 
functions, a police authority is subject to a degree of central supervision 
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authority is obliged to have regard to any: 
•  objectives determined by the Secretary of State by order; 
•  annual objectives determined by the police authority itself; 
•  performance targets established by the police authority; and 
•  local policing plans issued by the authority. 
3.19 	 Where the Secretary of State has determined an objective for policing, he 
can direct police authorities to establish levels of performance to achieve 
that objective. 
3.20 	 The Police Act also enables the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice 
relating to the discharge by police authorities of any of their functions 
(section 39). 
3.21 	 Under the Local Government Act 1999, police authorities were also made 
responsible for undertaking Best Value Reviews (BVRs) of their forces. In 
principle, this responsibility gave them an opportunity to be much more 
proactive than they had been in the past. 
3.22 	 The operational direction and control of a police force continues to be 
vested in the Chief Constable (Police Act 1996, section 10(1)). In discharging 
these functions the Chief Constable must have regard to the local policing 
plan issued by the police authority for the area (Police Act 1996, section 
10(2)). 
After October 2002 – the Police Reform Act 2002 
3.23 	 From 1 October 2002, the Police Reform Act 2002 amended the Police Act 
1996 in a number of ways. 
3.24 	 The Secretary of State is now under a duty to prepare a National Policing 
Plan each year, setting out the strategic priorities for the police forces in 
England and Wales for a period of three years (Police Act 1996, section 36A, 
inserted by the Police Reform Act 2002, section 1). The first of these plans 
dealt with the period 2003–2006, and the second with 2004–2007. 
3.25 	 Under the Police Reform Act 2002, the Secretary of State may now issue 
codes of practice to chief officers as well as to police authorities. 
3.26 	 The Secretary of State may also make regulations requiring all police forces 
in England and Wales to adopt particular procedures or practices (Police 
Act 1996, section 53A, inserted by the Police Reform Act 2002, section 7). 
3.27 	 Other performance-standard changes were introduced in or around 2002 
and two are relevant. First, the Policing Performance Assessment Framework 
(PPAF) measures police performance on a quantitative (how many) and 
qualitative (how well) basis; and secondly, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) has introduced a Baseline Assessment, described in 
more detail below (paragraphs 3.33–3.36). 
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3.28 	 There are three other organisations that play an important part in the 
management and oversight of police forces: 
• HMIC; 
•  the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO); and 
•  the Association of Police Authorities (APA). 
3.29 	 In addition, the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) has 
a strategic and technical role in the development, procurement and 
implementation of IT at a national level. 
HMIC 
3.30 	 HMIC’s statutory function is to inspect and report to the Secretary of State 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces (Police Act 1996, 
section 54). Their inspections take a variety of forms: 
• 	 force inspections, which examine the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of all forces (and other policing organisations inspected); 
• 	 thematic inspections, which examine specific police activities in a 
limited number of forces to extract good practice for the benefit of the 
wider service; 
• 	 basic command unit inspections, which examine performance and 
leadership at a local level; 
• 	 Best Value Review (BVR) inspections, which assess BVRs of policing 
services undertaken by the police authorities (in response to the Local 
Government Act 1999). This is the only area where HMIC actually inspects 
the functions of the police authority rather than the police force; 
• 	 joint inspections, which involve inspection in collaboration with other 
inspectorates, such as the Courts’ Service Inspectorate, on specific 
functions or areas; and 
• 	 Police National Computer (PNC) inspections, which are carried out 
by a specialist audit team, using nationally-agreed standards and 
procedures, to examine forces’ compliance with their obligations in 
respect of the PNC. 
3.31 	 The resulting reports contribute to the spread of agreed standards and 
good practice as well as exposing shortcomings in police efficiency or 
effectiveness. However, those reports used not to be backed up by a 
sanction to enforce the report’s recommendations beyond the grave step 
of asserting that a police force was not efficient or effective, which in turn 
could affect central government’s award of the Police Grant. As HMIC 
acknowledges, this rendered their involvement less effective than it might 
have been because it was open to individual forces to react slowly, or 
perhaps not at all, to the recommendations. 
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•  inspections based on published protocols; 
• their  persuasiveness; 
• 	 their ability to present their argument from a position of professional 
strength; and 
•  the fact that reports were published. 
New inspection regime 
3.33 	 The position was changed by the Police Reform Act 2002. If HMIC now 
concludes, as a result of an inspection, that a force, or any part of it, is not 
efficient or effective, or that it will cease to be so unless remedial measures 
are taken, the Secretary of State can direct a police authority to take 
specified remedial measures (Police Act 1996, section 41A, inserted by the 
Police Reform Act 2002, section 5). The Secretary of State may also require 
the police authority to submit an action plan. 
3.34 	 HMIC determines the regularity and intensity of inspections, based on 
an assessment of a police force’s needs. To coincide with the powers 
introduced under the Police Reform Act 2002, HMIC has undertaken a 
Baseline Assessment of all forces to identify performance in spring 2004 
as a benchmark against which to measure improvements in performance 
and identify areas for targeted inspections. 
3.35 	 Instead of the existing annual inspection cycle, HMIC proposes to inspect 
forces that are performing well less frequently, and those that are not 
performing so well more regularly. Every force will be subject to a rolling 
three-year programme of inspections, targeted primarily at the areas 
identified in the Baseline Assessment and updated annually to ensure 
continued relevance. In addition, under the new structure every force has 
an HMIC lead staff officer who will be in regular contact (at least quarterly) 
with the force. 
3.36 	 HMIC will decide which particular issues should be part of a thematic 
inspection, after consulting with the Secretary of State and others such 
as ACPO, the APA and other bodies relevant to an inspection theme (for 
example, Victim Support in relation to crime issues). In particular, lead staff 
officers may identify an issue that needs attention through their contact 
with local police forces. 
3.37 	 In the period relevant to this Inquiry, HMIC had a series of contacts with 
Humberside Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary. 
ACPO 
3.38 	 ACPO consists of members from the rank of Assistant Chief Constable 
(or the equivalent) and above from 44 forces (43 from England and Wales, 
and the Police Service of Northern Ireland). It was established over 50 years 
ago with the aim of developing policing policies and sharing good practice 
across the whole police service. 
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it is not binding upon individual forces or authorities, other than by 
agreement. ACPO has no power to mandate police authorities or Home 
Office action or spending. Forces are free to introduce and implement their 
own policies, even where ACPO has agreed a national policy. In these 
circumstances, forces are invited to provide their justification for departing 
from national policy. The Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland 
(ACPOS) performs a similar role in relation to the eight Scottish forces. 
They gave evidence to this Inquiry (see paragraph 4.26–4.29). 
APA 
3.40 	 The APA was set up on 1 April 1997 to represent police authorities in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland on national and local issues. It 
influences policy and supports local police authorities in their important 
responsibilities. 
PITO 
3.41 	 PITO is a non-departmental public body established under section 109 of 
the Police Act 1997. Originally part of the Home Office in a non-statutory 
form, PITO was given statutory form in April 1998. It is governed by a board 
which includes nominees from ACPO, the APA, the Home Office, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and independent members. It has responsibility for the 
development and provision of information and communications systems 
and services to meet police needs. In particular, it manages the PNC on 
behalf of the police. It is in the process of introducing the National Strategy 
for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) Custody and Case Preparation 
systems (see paragraphs 3.55–3.61). 
Information systems 
The PNC 
3.42 	 The PNC is a series of databases used by all forces in England and Wales. 
Mechanisms exist to include the Scottish and other police forces, for 
example the British Transport Police. It is an effective system which gives 
over 138,000 police officers instant access to critical policing information. 
It has a well-deserved reputation for reliability and accessibility and reviews 
have shown that it provides a high-quality service. 
3.43 	 The Phoenix database, which forms the core of the PNC, was launched 
in 1995 and includes details of all people convicted or cautioned for 
recordable offences (those offences that carry the option of imprisonment), 
as well as some other more minor offences (listed in regulations made under 
section 27(4) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984). Details include 
the individual’s name, known aliases, sex, age, height and distinguishing 
features. The details can be amended and updated as appropriate, for 
example to record an alias. It also records other details about a person’s 
contact with the police and the criminal justice system. 
3.44 	 When the Phoenix database was introduced, the task of entering data was 
taken on by individual police forces, each of which has direct access to 
the system. This meant that responsibility for the use of the database, the 
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the information put onto it has, since 1995, been the responsibility of the 
chief officers of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. 
3.45 	 The first time a record is created on the PNC, it generates a unique PNC 
identification number for the individual concerned which is prefixed by the 
last two numbers of the year in which it was created, for example 96. This 
number remains the same whatever subsequent records are entered about 
that person. 
3.46 	 The first record made on the PNC by the police is called the ‘arrest/ 
summons report’. The name of this report suggests that the record should be 
created at the point of arrest. It appears to have been the original intention 
that every arrest would be recorded on the PNC. 
3.47 	 However, other than in exceptional cases (for example, arrests under the 
Prevention of Terrorism legislation), the first record on the PNC is not in 
practice made unless and until a person is charged (or cautioned), which 
may be some considerable time after arrest. 
3.48 	 The police were and still are responsible for inputting court results on 
the PNC. 
Reports on PNC’s record creation 
3.49 	 Since 1995, when individual police forces assumed responsibility for putting 
records on the PNC, there have been major and continuing problems, 
especially with the timeliness of record creation. There have been no fewer 
than five detailed reports on these issues. These are: 
•  one by PITO in 1996; 
•  one by the Home Office Police Research Group; and 
•  three by HMIC. 
PNC Codes of Compliance 
3.50 	 ACPO, after a considerable delay, issued PNC Codes of Compliance 
‘Timeliness Performance Indicators’ in April 2000, setting standards for 
timeliness and accuracy of PNC data entry. Even then, standards did not 
improve to any significant degree until about 2001, and it needed a further 
critical report from HMIC to achieve those improvements. It is little wonder 
that HMIC’s report to the Inquiry should describe police performance in this 
area as ‘abysmal’. 
3.51 	 In response to continuing concern about whether recent improvements 
would be sustained, in spring 2003 the Home Office established an ACPO-
led implementation group. A draft code was published in November 2003, 
entitled Code of Practice for Use of the Police National Computer, the 
intention being for it to be issued under the new Police Reform Act regime 
and to be dealt with by the Central Police Training and Development 
Authority, Centrex, which is responsible for providing PNC training courses. 
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3.52 	 The closing date for responses to the draft Code of Practice was the end of 
January 2004 and the code has now been finalised. Once implemented, 
it will require that details of 90 per cent of a police force’s recordable 
offences must be put on the PNC within 24 hours of a person being arrested, 
charged, reported, summonsed, cautioned or given a fixed penalty notice. 
One hundred per cent must be put on the PNC within three days. It will 
also require that court results, in a minimum of 50 per cent of cases, should 
be entered on the PNC within seven days of a case’s conclusion. This will 
increase to 75 per cent of cases, six months after the code starts. 
3.53 	 It should be said that performance has improved in advance of the code 
being published. For example, the target for the arrest/summons report, 
which begins a new PNC record, is for 90 per cent to be entered within one 
day. In April 2001 the national average was 38 per cent. In April 2004 it had 
improved to 81.2 per cent in England and 83.9 per cent in Wales. 
3.54 	 For court results, the target is currently for the police to input 100 per cent 
within three days of receipt from the courts. In March 2002 in England, 29 
per cent of results were entered within seven days of the outcome of the 
case and 16.6 per cent in Wales. This period includes the time taken for the 
court to relay the information to the police. By March 2004, these figures 
had improved to 42.4 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. There is clearly 
still room for improvement, but progress now seems to be under way. 
NSPIS 
3.55 	 In 1994, an NSPIS project was set up to standardise the 43 police forces 
onto a compatible IT architecture, running national software applications. 
The intention was for all forces to use the same IT systems. A wide range 
of policing functions was to have been covered. There were 38 different 
applications in the original specification, which included, critically for this 
Inquiry, plans for a common IT system for managing criminal intelligence. 
3.56 	 The position today is that a number of applications are in use, including 
Command and Control, Holmes 2, a national DNA database, a digital 
national radio communication service (Airwave) and a National 
Automated Fingerprint Information System (NAFIS). There is also a Violent 
and Sex Offenders’ Register (VISOR). 
3.57 	 Of particular interest to the Inquiry are the Custody and the Case 
Preparation applications. The first aims to improve the efficiency of custody 
suites so that police staff can record personal and arrest details accurately. 
It produces a custody log and an audited log of actions taken during a 
detention period. It directly links local police to the PNC and enables: 
•  the first PNC search to take place when a person arrives in custody; and 
• 	 the arrest/summons report to be input directly by the officer responsible 
for the investigation (currently, a report can be input only once a 
charge has been made). There has recently been a ‘Change Request’ 
to ensure record creation on the PNC is more directly linked to arrest, 
and this is being addressed urgently. 
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prosecution case files, which can then be presented to others involved later 
on in the criminal process, including the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
and the Court Service. There is an interface between the Case Preparation 
and Custody applications which enables the custody details to be 
transferred across. 
3.59 	 The Case Preparation application also interfaces with the PNC, enabling 
court results, and other disposals, to be put directly on the PNC. However, 
there needs to be a link with the relevant court’s IT system in order for 
this to work effectively. Another government body, the Criminal Justice 
Information Technology group (CJIT), is currently reviewing the IT systems 
needed to create a ‘joined-up’ system across the whole criminal 
justice system. 
3.60 	 At present, the courts pass the information on to the police, who review and 
input the information on the system. The proposed date for a handover of 
this function to the courts themselves is still as far away as 2006, despite the 
obvious and considerable benefits that this change should bring. 
No common IT system for managing criminal intelligence 
3.61 	 These achievements notwithstanding, there is still no common IT system for 
managing criminal intelligence. The national solution was removed from 
the NSPIS implementation plan in 2000 when it was judged that there were 
insufficient funds to deliver all the applications. It was recognised that 
intelligence and management information was to be widely accessible at 
force, regional and national levels but might need key feeder systems in 
place to be fully effective. It was decided that a national business process 
of intelligence handling should be developed first (the National Intelligence 
Model, see below). 
Local IT systems, applications and criminal intelligence 
3.62 	 The Inquiry does not have a complete picture of local IT systems or 
applications, either in the 1995–2001 period or today. However, certain 
features of the local police computerised systems have emerged. 
3.63 	 There was, and remains, no uniformity of approach. Each of the 43 police 
forces has a variety of IT systems, which are used for a variety of different 
purposes. The interfaces between systems at local force-to-force level are 
almost non-existent. Even within forces, the interface between systems has 
been patchy at best. While not all functions or applications necessarily 
need to be linked between police forces, this is not the case with intra-force 
applications. Improvements in this unhappy position are limited, although 
in some instances, such as the PNC, the capacity is available to store and 
distribute reliable information nationally between forces. 
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The National Intelligence Model 
3.64 	 The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is a management framework that 
requires police forces to analyse and address the methods by which 
intelligence is obtained, created, stored and used. Its aim is to enhance 
intelligence-led policing. It will involve forces, and those responsible for 
their supervision, having to focus on and solve the problems created by 
the many and varied local intelligence systems that currently exist. 
3.65 	 ACPO has taken the lead in promoting and implementing NIM. By April 
2004, forces were expected, in accordance with the National Policing 
Plan issued by the Secretary of State, to have implemented NIM to defined 
minimum standards (those standards having been set out in early 2003). 
3.66 	 There is, however, a lack of clear, national guidance for the police about 
information management – the way in which information is recorded (and 
reviewed, retained or deleted). 
3.67 	 There is reference to record creation in the ACPO Code of Practice on 
Data Protection 2002 (which superseded the 1995 Code) but this does little 
more than summarise the importance, highlighted by the data protection 
legislation, of information being relevant, accurate and up to date. The 
experience of this Inquiry indicates that there is a pressing need for clearer 
guidance in this area. 
Reviewing, retaining and deleting records 
National guidance 
3.68 	 The 1995 ACPO Code was based on the Data Protection Act 1984 and 
its provisions were to be kept under review by the ACPO Data Protection 
Working Group. The Code’s aim was to describe good data protection 
practice. The foreword by the then Data Protection Registrar drew attention 
to the new guidelines for the review and deletion of criminal records. 
It also stated that recommended retention periods could only ever be 
a benchmark. 
3.69 	 Principle 6 of the Data Protection Act 1984 (‘Personal data held for any 
purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than necessary for that 
purpose or those purposes’) was not the subject of interpretive guidance in 
the legislation. The Code, however, devoted eight pages to the suggested 
approach to be applied by forces to the retention of data in compliance 
with this principle. 
3.70 	 The guidance stressed that no absolute rules could be laid down about 
how long particular items of personal data should be retained. Decisions 
had to be made by considering the information in the light of the prevailing 
circumstances, but a series of questions helped test whether information 
should be retained. These included: What purpose does the data now 
serve? Is the data still relevant to the registered purposes? How useful is 
the information likely to be in the future? The guidance also advised that it 
might be necessary to consult the officer responsible for making the initial 
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manual records (even though there was as yet no legal requirement to 
review and weed manual records). 
Built-in automatic review 
3.71 	 Where practicable, it suggested that an ‘automatic review’ should be built 
into systems to prompt a decision on continued retention after a pre-set 
period. Thus, the process envisaged a ‘review’ rather than ‘automatic 
deletion’. 
General rules on retention and ‘weeding’ 
3.72 	 The 1995 Code went on to reproduce guidance set out by ACPO’s Crime 
Committee in a policy document circulated on 16 June 1995, General Rules 
for Criminal Record Weeding on Police Computer Systems. This dealt with 
the retention of records by reference to the outcome of a case. 
3.73  Some of the general rules were as follows: 
3.73.1 	 In cases of conviction for a reportable offence (all offences that 
carry the option of imprisonment), retention would be for 20 years. 
Exceptions to this included cases where the conviction was for an 
offence against a child or young person. In these cases, the record 
was to be kept until the offender was 70 years old, subject to a 
minimum 20-year retention period. 
3.73.2 	 In cases of a rape conviction, the record was to be retained for the 
life of the offender. 
3.73.3 	 Records of cautions (assuming there were no other convictions or 
further cautions) would be retained for five years. 
3.73.4 	 Records of disposals other than conviction, caution, acquittal, 
discontinuance and ‘not guilty bind-over’, were to be retained for 
the same periods as set out for convictions: that is, 20 years for 
most offences. 
3.74 	 Acquittals and ‘discontinued cases without caution’ were not normally to 
be retained beyond a 42-day period from the disposal’s notification date. 
But this general rule was subject to some exceptions when the record 
‘should be considered for retention’. These included: 
3.74.1 	 Acquittal for an offence of unlawful sexual intercourse by a male 
with a female under 16 (discontinuance is not expressly mentioned). 
In such a case, the record was to be deleted when the male’s age 
reached 25, subject to no other offences being recorded. 
3.74.2 	 If there was an acquittal or discontinuance because of a lack of 
corroboration or an allegation of consent in a case in which a sexual 
offence was alleged, the record could be retained for five years on the 
authorisation of an officer not below the rank of superintendent, and 
the record would be reviewed at the end of that period. 
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making that decision. Three criteria were identified as necessary 
preconditions for retention: 
• 	 the case’s circumstances would give cause for concern if the 
subject was to apply for employment in a post that involved 
substantial access to vulnerable persons; 
• 	 the facts of the case show that the subject’s involvement was 
based on information that was high quality and could be graded 
A1 (meaning the highest grade) when the 4x4 reliability test was 
applied (see Glossary); and 
• 	 the decision to retain the information could be defended on 
public interest grounds. 
3.75 	 In September 1999, ACPO’s Crime Committee published new Weeding 
Rules for Criminal Records. The rules changed the general period of 
retention from 20 years to 10 years but again there were exceptions, 
including one for cases in which the conviction was for an offence involving 
a child or a young person as victim. In such a case, the record was to be 
retained either until the subject died or until the subject reached 100 years 
of age. 
3.76 	 In addition, records of disposals were to be retained for 10 years for 
most offences. 
3.77 	 The 1999 Weeding Rules document removed the reference to A1 
intelligence, no doubt because it was thought desirable to allow for 
somewhat greater flexibility in judging the reliability of the source of 
information, while still requiring the public interest test to be met. 
3.78 	 In October 2002, the ACPO Code of Practice on Data Protection was 
revised. The 2002 ACPO Code included a foreword by the then Information 
Commissioner. That foreword welcomed the Code as helpful guidance 
into which her office had had an input. It also stressed that any retention 
period specified could only be a benchmark, and that the Information 
Commissioner would be obliged to examine, on its individual merits, any 
case referred to her. Paragraph 8.2 of the 2002 Code states that it is not 
possible to lay down absolute rules regarding retention periods; however, 
such rules should be established where possible. 
3.79 	 The 2002 ACPO Code reproduced the 1999 ACPO Weeding Rules 
(as revised in November 2000). It did not make any changes of significance 
for the Inquiry. 
3.80 	 Criminal intelligence records (that is, information not related to convictions) 
were dealt with in paragraph 8.5 of the 2002 ACPO Code. Whereas the 
1995 Code had recommended variable review periods of 6, 12 and 
24 months depending on the grading of the intelligence against a 4x4 
model, the 2002 Code recommended that all intelligence reports should 
be regularly reviewed and considered for deletion, subject to a maximum 
review period of 12 months. 
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3.81 	 Each of the 43 police forces produced its own set of local guidance and 
directions to give effect to ACPO’s (and others’) national guidance. Their 
precise content varied widely. On occasion, local forces had a different 
approach to that contained in the national guidance, as the position in 
Humberside demonstrated. 
HMIC overview 
3.82 	 HMIC inspection activity in the area of data protection and weeding has 
been minimal. The weeding of records is not included within the normal 
inspection processes by HMIC (except with regard to very specific PNC 
inspections), nor are there any written inspection protocols to cover 
weeding or data retention disciplines. The reason for this, according to 
Sir Keith Povey, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, is that it had 
never previously surfaced as an issue, although now that it has done so it 
has been identified as an important priority. 
Recruitment and the national vetting system 
Recruitment 
3.83 	 It is already made clear to employers that vetting should be seen as 
complementary to existing recruitment practice and should only be 
sought after a candidate has a provisional offer of employment or a 
voluntary position. Vetting is not a substitute for the full range of existing 
pre-appointment checks, such as taking up references and enquiring into 
a person’s previous employment history. 
Overview of the basic vetting regime 
3.84 	 If the vetting system, involving police checks for intelligence about an 
individual, is to work effectively: 
•  intelligence records need to be created properly; 
• 	 those records need to be reviewed properly and not deleted 
inappropriately; 
• 	 requests for searches need to be directed properly to the right forces in 
whose areas an applicant might have lived; 
• 	 each of those forces needs to search properly all relevant databases to 
pull together the intelligence; and 
• 	 in order to meet their responsibilities effectively, the police need to 
involve other parties in the process. 
3.85 	 Part V of the Police Act 1997 established a statutory scheme for the issuing 
of ‘criminal record certificates’, which led to the establishment of the 
national Criminal Records Bureau (CRB), which was launched in 
March 2002. 
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individual concerned on a prescribed form, and it must be countersigned 
by a representative of a Registered Body – an organisation listed in a 
register maintained by the national CRB. 
3.87 	 The countersignature is to certify that the disclosure application is required 
for the purpose of asking an exempted question under the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975. This enables spent convictions 
to be disclosed and is taken into account when an applicant’s suitability 
is considered for employment, other work or positions of trust involving 
children or vulnerable adults. The Registered Body is most likely to be the 
employer or a voluntary organisation, but could be another body acting 
on their behalf (such as Education Personnel Management Ltd, which 
organised the vetting for Soham Village College). 
The CRB as a central access point 
3.88 	 The 1997 Act has since been amended to enable the CRB to act as a 
central access point not only for criminal records information but also for: 
•  the Department for Education and Skills’ (DfES’) List 99; and 
• 	 the Protection of Children Act List (see the Protection of Children Act 
1999 and the Care Standards Act 2000). 
3.89 	 From later this summer, the DfES will also maintain a similar list, the Protection 
of Vulnerable Adults List, for the Department of Health. As will be apparent 
from the existence of these lists, there are overlapping systems of control 
and they are dealt with in more detail below. 
3.90  The CRB has published a range of guidance: 
•  on how the vetting system works (jointly with ACPO); 
• 	 advice to employers on the appropriate level of disclosure for 
particular positions; 
•  advice to applicants on how to fill out the form; 
•  notes for employers and Registered Bodies on dealing with forms; and 
•  a Code of Practice. 
Joint CRB and ACPO vetting guidance 
3.91 	 Joint CRB and ACPO guidance covers various aspects of the operation of 
the regime: 
3.91.1 	 It informs police forces (on a ‘Local’ search request from the 
CRB) about the need to interrogate the appropriate intelligence 
databases and to review their intelligence systems to ensure that 
they are properly set up to respond to such requests. 
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supplied to the CRB remain the responsibility of the police. The 
CRB performs no editing function. It reminds Chief Constables that 
the ‘test of relevance’ remains that of the Chief Constables (or an 
officer to whom the function is properly delegated). 
3.91.3 	 It provides that local information should be ‘based on fact and be 
capable of proof if presented in evidence’. 
3.91.4 	 It sets out the procedure to be followed for ‘additional information’, 
which should be sent to the CRB by way of a separate letter. 
3.91.5 	 It deals with the circumstances in which it might be appropriate 
for the police to decide under the Police Act 1997, section 115(8), 
that the job applicant should not see the information. There were 
evidently problems with this aspect because the guidance was 
supplemented in September 2002 to ensure that such decisions 
were taken only when it was really necessary. 
3.92 	 After the CRB was launched in March 2002, it quickly became apparent 
that the demand for its services outstripped its capacity to respond as 
quickly and efficiently as was desirable. (The full background to the 
difficulties encountered in the early months of the CRB is set out in the 
National Audit Office’s report Criminal Records Bureau: Delivering Safer 
Recruitment, published on 12 February 2004.) 
3.93 	 In September 2002, the Home Secretary appointed an Independent Review 
Team (IRT) to examine the CRB, its processes and performance and to 
make recommendations for change. They reported in December 2002. 
3.94 	 Some recommendations led to a consultation process with a view 
to legislative change. In February 2003, the Home Office published a 
consultation paper on Reform of the Disclosure Process, seeking views on 
a number of the IRT’s recommendations, including: 
• 	 possible changes to the role of Registered Bodies in the 
disclosure process; 
•  the introduction of an electronic application channel; and 
•  the criteria for Standard and Enhanced Disclosures. 
A summary of the responses was published in May 2003. 
3.95 	 In September 2003, in response to one recommendation, the CRB was set 
up as an independent executive agency (previously it had been one of the 
operational arms within the Passport and Records Agency). 
3.96 	 In October 2003, in the light of concerns about the effectiveness of identity 
checks, the Home Office issued a consultation paper about the possibility of 
requiring applicants to submit their fingerprints. 
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(with responses due by 23 February 2004) focusing on two aspects of the 
vetting regime: 
• 	 the role of Registered Bodies and whether they should be made 
unambiguously responsible for validating the identity of applicants, and 
for ensuring that the forms are fully and accurately completed; and 
• 	 the criteria to be applied in determining whether a person is eligible for 
the Enhanced Disclosure process. 
HMIC inspection 
3.98 	 Force vetting processes have not routinely featured as part of the HMIC 
inspection regime. In their evidence, HMIC says that this is because these 
processes have not previously raised any cause for concern. 
Vetting processes in other countries 
3.99 	 Information collated by the Home Office in April 2004 for the Inquiry on 
vetting practices in other countries is summarised in Appendix 4. 
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structure – the findings 
4.1 € The final section of the report sets out the Inquiry’s findings nationally 
concerning: 
•  the legislation; 
•  the policing structure; 
•  information systems; 
•  information management; and 
•  recruitment and vetting. 
The legislation 
Data protection 
4.2 € In the media coverage following the trial, and during the course of 
the Inquiry, a great deal of attention was given to the role of the data 
protection legislation. This was not least because the Humberside Police 
press release of 17 December 2003 suggested that the legislation was a 
principal reason for the information now known about Huntley’s contacts 
not being available to them in December 2001. As set out in Section 2, Chief 
Constable Westwood later accepted that this was not the case. 
No radical revision necessary 
4.3 € It was suggested that since intelligence could not be retained solely for the 
purposes of employment vetting, the records about Huntley had necessarily 
been destroyed. The loss of this intelligence cannot be blamed on the data 
protection legislation. The loss of this intelligence was caused by the failings 
of Humberside Police’s record-keeping systems. The legislation may be, as 
a member of the judiciary said recently, ‘inelegant and cumbersome’, but 
it was not the problem here, and I do not believe that radical revisions are 
necessary on the strength of this case. 
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clearer so that front-line police officers and other professionals know when they 
can confidently retain and use intelligence for the protection of young people 
and other vulnerable members of society. I deal with this in more detail below. 
The relationship between ACPO and the Information 
Commissioner 
4.5 € The relationship between the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
and the Information Commissioner is an especially important one if data 
protection legislation is to be properly understood in the Police Service. 
Each has a different role but the relationship needs to be close and 
constructive if confusion and uncertainty are to be avoided. The unhelpful 
disagreement that surfaced in their respective evidence to the Inquiry was 
damaging to both and is likely to have left the public, and serving police 
officers, less confident about how the legislation should be applied. 
4.6 € ACPO’s submission stated that ‘the Information Commissioner has 
influenced individual forces on occasions to the detriment of the Police 
Service in general and vulnerable members of the community in particular’. 
I cannot agree. If complaints are made by members of the public, it is 
the Information Commissioner’s duty to question police forces about their 
justification for retaining or disclosing particular records. It is not fair of ACPO 
to criticise him for doing that. Nor do I accept that the Commissioner was 
somehow prevented from challenging decisions relating to the retention of 
conviction information on the Police National Computer (PNC) because of 
the foreword to the ACPO 2002 Code. In fact, the then Commissioner made 
it clear that she reserved the right to do that, and the Code itself makes it 
clear that the retention periods are not fixed. 
4.7 € Nonetheless, the Information Commissioner should always take care over 
the tone of his interventions. It is one thing to ask searching and necessary 
questions. It is another to do so in an unnecessarily aggressive manner. 
One particular letter from the Commissioner’s office, which was put to 
him in evidence, seemed to fall into that category and contribute to the 
‘climate of fear’ which was referred to on more than one occasion during 
the Inquiry. 
4.8 € The Information Commissioner assured me that this letter was an ‘exception’ 
and I was encouraged by the expressions of co-operation, value and 
respect that I heard from both parties in oral evidence. It is clearly important 
that both play their part in rebuilding the relationship. 
The policing structure 
4.9 € The problems associated with the implementation of the National Strategy 
for Police Information Systems (NSPIS), together with the excessive time 
it has taken to improve police performance in putting data on the PNC, 
have raised questions about the tripartite structure of policing in England 
and Wales. 
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which has a place alongside the counter-balancing responsibilities of both 
the local police authority and the Home Office. Some have suggested, 
however, that the time has come to review these arrangements. 
4.11 € I do not believe that significant changes are justified. It is, I think, important 
to maintain local accountability, and the Police Reform Act has helpfully 
rebalanced the relationships where necessary. We need to be careful, 
however, to distinguish between functions that go to the heart of local 
accountability and those that are less critical to it. If we do not make 
these distinctions, the danger is that local accountability will be used 
to defend ineffective local systems when a national solution would be 
more appropriate. It is difficult, for example, to justify maintaining local 
approaches to the retention and deletion of records when national 
standards would make more sense and avoid the possibility of confusion 
and uncertainty. Equally, it is difficult to understand the need for local 
procurement of information technology (IT) solutions which seek to resolve 
national problems (see paragraphs 4.34–4.35 below). 
Information systems 
4.12  All the relevant national bodies giving evidence accepted that: 
•  intelligence is a vital part of effective policing; and 
• €an IT system capable of allowing police intelligence to be shared 
nationally is a priority. 
4.13 € Recognising the importance of intelligence is nothing new. Indeed, 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s (HMIC’s) thematic inspection 
report of 1997, Policing with Intelligence, began with a passage from Sun 
Tzu’s The Art of War, which prizes intelligence and is dated 490 BC. This 
recognition has not, however, always been matched by effective action. 
The problems, and the failure to address them, have been wide-ranging. 
4.14 € The disparate development of different local IT systems, many of which 
do not communicate with each other, has inevitably led to real difficulty 
in accessing all relevant information, which has in turn resulted in poorly-
informed decision making. Police forces need to address these problems 
urgently where they exist. 
Little progress with a national intelligence IT system 
4.15 € Nationally, the picture is disappointing. Although the need for a national 
intelligence IT capability has been recognised for at least a decade, I find 
that very little progress has been made. 
4.16 € I am aware of the roles and responsibilities of national agencies which 
manage intelligence as their specific function, and with which police 
forces share information and interact – for example, the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS), the National Crime Squad (NCS), the Security 
Services, and Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise. My focus, however, is on 
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prevention and detection of crime. 
4.17 € At the moment, no police force has a straightforward way of knowing what 
intelligence, if any, is held on a particular individual by another force. It also 
has no IT-based method of finding out. 
4.18 € In 1994, the original NSPIS proposals included plans for a national IT solution 
to record intelligence that, among its benefits, would compel the adoption 
of common information systems. However, the national IT solution was 
abandoned in 2000 when it was decided that the National Intelligence 
Model (NIM), which placed intelligence at the heart of policing, would 
be developed as the priority. It was decided that a national IT system to 
support NIM would be developed when there were sufficient funds. Four 
years later, some progress has been made towards agreeing a ‘common 
information architecture’, premised on the retention of the current 
patchwork of IT systems. 
4.19 € More recently, there have been other developments, including pilot 
schemes such as the Cross Regional Information Sharing Proposal (CRISP), 
which, the Home Office acknowledged in its report to the Inquiry, is still 
being ‘looked at’. CRISP currently involves 13 police forces and will be 
in operation within 12 to 18 months, but CRISP was not designed to be 
a national scheme and there are issues around its infrastructure and 
analytical capability. 
PITO 
4.20 € Since 1998, the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) has been 
responsible for the strategic development and delivery of IT systems. PITO 
told the Inquiry that the failure to deliver an effective national intelligence 
capability resulted from individual forces failing to agree on, and commit to, 
what was needed. 
4.21 € It is true that PITO does not have the power to impose solutions, but nor is 
it simply a reactive body. It works with police forces to identify priorities, 
specify requirements, manage the procurement process and act as ‘the 
authority’ for managing contracts with suppliers. Normally, police forces 
are not required to accept the solutions, but it is expected that the majority 
will do so. Arguments that can be brought to bear to achieve this include 
better value for money, the excellence of the product, the ability to 
integrate solutions nationally, and recognition of the larger national interest. 
However, when local police budgets are matters for local accountability, 
it is not easy to reach a common acceptance of IT solutions. PITO will be 
disappointed, nevertheless, not to have had more success in this vital area. 
ACPO and the Home Office 
4.22 € ACPO is the national body that exists, in large part, to develop national 
approaches to national problems. It does not, however, have the power to 
deliver national solutions. All chief police officers are members. In ACPO’s 
view, the failure to deliver a national intelligence IT system resulted from the 
lack of: 
•  agreement among its members; 
130  The Bichard Inquiry – National systems and structure – the findings •  legal powers to insist on a national solution; and 
• central  funding. 
4.23 € Funding and the split between local and national responsibilities 
undoubtedly have been limiting issues. 
4.24 € The Home Office has been understandably sensitive to concerns about 
centralising decisions, because local accountability is so valued. However, 
it is clear that a national intelligence capability is needed. The Home Office, 
as the lead government department, should have ensured that those who 
needed to get to grips with the delivery of a national IT solution did so at an 
earlier stage. 
4.25 € If limitations to the department’s legal powers prevented this (though 
the Police Act 1996 and earlier Acts gave it some powers), the Home 
Office could and should have dealt with that issue earlier. In this respect, 
the additional powers granted under the Police Reform Act 2002 are a 
welcome, if belated, step in the right direction. The challenge for the Home 
Office will be to use those powers in a way which produces a concrete 
result rather than further discussion. 
The Scottish intelligence-gathering model 
4.26 € The inability to deliver an effective national intelligence IT capability in 
England and Wales should be contrasted, unfavourably, with Scotland’s 
performance, notwithstanding the differences in scale. 
4.27 € The Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland (ACPOS) recognised 
that it was not acceptable to have a situation in which one force had no 
idea what intelligence was available to another elsewhere in Scotland. 
Consequently, in 1992 they introduced a database (running alongside the 
Scottish Criminal History System) that flags up the fact that local intelligence 
is held about particular individuals by police forces. In principle, this system 
is indistinguishable from the PLX mentioned below (paragraphs 4.32–4.33). 
4.28 € ACPOS also subsequently decided that the only sensible longer-term 
solution was the development of a common IT system. They agreed 
the core requirements, drew up a specification, sorted out the funding, 
procured a system and produced one simple guide, which explained what 
officers on the ground needed to do. 
4.29 € The Scottish Intelligence Database (SID) will be fully operational by the end 
of this year. It cost in the region of £10–£11 million and will have taken about 
four years to deliver from start to finish. 
4.30 € No one doubts that introducing a similar system in England and Wales will 
be much more complex. The variety of potential solutions and the number 
of involved parties, with sometimes conflicting interests, is much greater. 
The fact remains, however, that this is a national priority which goes to the 
heart of effective and efficient policing. The Home Office should take the 
lead more effectively than it has during the past decade, but, ultimately, 
this should be a priority for the Government as a whole. 
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the national solution, it is to be used, with other initiatives, as a building 
block for Project IMPACT (Intelligence Management Prioritisation Analysis 
Co-ordination and Tasking). It is intended that IMPACT should deliver a 
range of compatible products to support the full implementation of NIM. 
PITO will undertake a feasibility study this year. I understand that IMPACT is 
the subject of a funding bid under the Spending Review 2004 and I strongly 
support this proposal. 
Recommendation 
A national IT system for England and Wales to support police 
intelligence should be introduced as a matter of urgency. The Home 
Office should take the lead and report by December 2004 with clear 
targets for implementation. 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
An interim solution – the PLX 
4.32 € Recently there has been progress in England and Wales towards an 
intelligence-flagging system, known as the PLX system, with a pilot that 
involves three forces. It has been driven by the needs of the Criminal 
Records Bureau (CRB) rather than (as one might have expected) any or all 
of PITO, ACPO or the Home Office. It will be available to all police forces by 
the end of 2005. 
4.33 € It is clear to me that the PLX system is a significant advance in the support 
of effective policing and offers an interim solution, pending the introduction 
of the national IT system. Although the PLX is not a substitute for a national 
intelligence solution, it is considerably cheaper and easier to set up and 
delivers important intelligence benefits in addition to its vetting capabilities. 
The PLX must also be given urgent priority. 
Recommendation 
The PLX system, which flags that intelligence is held about someone 
by particular police forces, should be introduced in England and 
Wales by 2005. 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
Finding the best IT procurement 
4.34 € The evidence the Inquiry received about police IT procurement raised 
concerns as to whether that system is working efficiently. The key issue once 
again is to determine which procurements can be dealt with locally and 
which are national projects, requiring a national IT solution. If the latter is the 
case, then it makes no sense to allow local forces to frustrate or delay its 
achievement. The lessons from NSPIS must be taken on board. 
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to good effect, but police procurement should, in my view, be reviewed 
to assess whether the processes that are currently used adequately 
support the effective delivery of national solutions to national problems. 
The procurement processes should be part of PITO’s current review. 
Recommendation 
The procurement of IT systems by the police should be reviewed to 
ensure that, wherever possible, national solutions are delivered to 
national problems. 
Responsibility: The Home Office, advised by PITO 
The future of the PNC 
4.36 € The PNC makes a major contribution to both operational policing and the 
wider criminal justice system. It is nonetheless an ageing system, and its 
architecture and operating systems inhibit its further development. There 
needs to be investment in the PNC to ensure its medium and long-term 
future. I note that PITO has started to look at the issues. 
4.37 € For many years, the PNC’s problems have been about data quality and 
particularly timeliness. Put simply, police forces have been slow to input 
information onto the PNC about arrests and summonses at the start of a 
case and slow to input court results. These are currently made available to 
the police by the courts. 
4.38 € I note that a number of actions are planned which will help to maximise the 
PNC’s value, namely: 
4.38.1 € the new Code of Practice dealing with data quality and timeliness, 
made under the Police Reform Act 2002. This needs to be 
implemented as soon as possible. Attempts to improve the position 
have begun to have an effect but the Act’s powers, and the 
sanctions provided, now offer the best hope of significant progress; 
4.38.2 € the intention that PNC data quality and timeliness should be 
included in the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) 
and the Baseline Assessments and become part of HMIC’s routine 
inspections; and 
4.38.3 € the transfer of responsibility for inputting court results onto the PNC 
from the police to the Court Service. This needs to be reaffirmed by 
both sides and, if possible, accelerated. The current proposed date 
for this transfer is 2006. If this deadline cannot be brought forward, it 
must at least be met. 
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Investment should be made available by Government to secure 
the PNC’s medium and long-term future, given its importance to 
intelligence-led policing and to the criminal justice system as a whole. 
I note that PITO has begun this work. 
Responsibility: The Home Office, advised by PITO 
The new Code of Practice, made under the Police Reform Act 2002, 
dealing with the quality and timeliness of PNC data input, should be 
implemented as soon as possible. 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
The quality and timeliness of PNC data input should be routinely 
inspected as part of the PPAF and the Baseline Assessments, which 
are being developed by HMIC. 
Responsibility: HMIC 
The transfer of responsibility for inputting court results onto the PNC 
should be reaffirmed by the Court Service and the Home Office and, 
if possible, accelerated ahead of the 2006 target. At the least, that 
deadline must be met. 
Responsibility: The Court Service and the Home Office 
Information management 
4.39 € Data has to be collected, analysed and input correctly. Records then need 
to be properly reviewed, with regard to the data protection legislation, 
so that the potentially useful records are retained, while those that are no 
longer needed for policing purposes are deleted. In this way the creation, 
review, retention or deletion of records will all become part of one system. 
Where information is held, it must be used effectively and shared, where 
appropriate, with other key agencies. Each part of the process must work 
well if the whole system is to be effective. The contacts Humberside Police 
had with Huntley graphically illustrate how important this is. 
National guidance on record creation, retention 
and deletion 
4.40 € There is little national guidance available on how best to use the 
information systems needed for effective record creation. It may be 
that most police forces have ensured that they already have efficient 
arrangements in place. But the nature and scale of the problems in 
Humberside Police, together with the persistent problems with the input of 
data onto the PNC, suggest that the problems are not unique to that force. 
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the review, retention or deletion of records: 
4.41.1 € Police forces can adopt different approaches to review periods 
for, or decisions about, deletion or retention of data. There seems 
little justification for these differences. They do not affect local 
accountability. 
4.41.2 € There has been scope for confusion between the concept of 
‘review’ on the one hand, and ‘delete’ on the other. This has mainly 
been caused by the use of the shorthand ‘weed’ to describe 
both processes. It is an important point because such a scope for 
confusion could lead to the deletion of valuable information. 
4.41.3 € There has been scope for confusion and disagreement, notably 
between ACPO and the Information Commissioner, about the 
retention, in some circumstances, of conviction-related information. 
There is, too, some uncertainty about what to do with allegations 
in a case that is discontinued, or that results in an acquittal. Sexual 
offences can be particularly problematic. 
4.41.4 € There is room for clearer guidance than the current ACPO Code 
about the retention of criminal intelligence. As was shown during 
the Inquiry, the application of intelligence-assessment models 
linked to ‘grades of reliability’ carries serious risks, and may cause 
concerns in cases involving allegations of sexual offences. For 
example, two incidents taking place some time apart, but involving 
the same alleged offender, might be graded at the unreliable end 
of the scale when assessed separately. However, the connection 
between the same alleged offender and each incident might be 
an important intelligence item. 
A new Code of Practice 
4.42 € For these reasons, the Inquiry explored whether there would be an 
advantage for the police and those key agencies with whom they work 
in producing a new Code of Practice to help drive up standards. Witnesses 
from national bodies who gave evidence agreed that this would be 
valuable and that it should be produced under the Police Reform Act 2002. 
4.43 € This new Code of Practice would cover record creation, retention, deletion 
and information sharing. It should be clear, simple and designed to help 
police officers on the ground. It should be tested against those aims and, 
in particular, it needs to avoid language which is either excessively legal 
or which veers towards management-speak. To this end, I suggest that 
professional assistance should be sought in its drafting. The Code should 
supersede all existing guidance on these issues. 
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or interpretation. The Home Office should be responsible for producing it in 
conjunction with others, not least ACPO and the Information Commissioner. 
The Code should cover the following areas: 
4.44.1 € the key principles of good information management (capture, 
review, retention, deletion and effective use) with regard to 
policing purposes, the rights of the individual and the law; and 
4.44.2 € the standards to be met in terms of systems (including IT 
applications), accountability, training, resources and audit in 
meeting those principles. These standards should fit within the 
PPAF and be capable of being monitored within police forces 
and by HMIC. 
The new code and data protection 
4.45 € Data protection concerns are relevant but should not dominate the Code 
or any supporting manual. That said, some important messages for those 
drafting the Code emerged from the Information Commissioner’s evidence. 
He clearly and helpfully said that: 
4.45.1 € The police are the first judge of their operational needs and the 
primary decision makers; the Information Commissioner’s role is a 
reviewing or supervisory one. 
4.45.2 € Police judgements about operational needs will not be lightly 
interfered with by the Information Commissioner. His office ‘cannot 
and should not substitute [their] judgement for that of experienced 
practitioners’. His office will give considerable latitude to the police 
in their decision making. If a reasonable and rational basis exists for 
a decision, ‘that should be the end of the story’. 
4.45.3 € There is, at present, considerable latitude extending both to 
decisions about how long to retain records and about when to 
disclose information (under the Enhanced Disclosure regime, for 
example, in the employment-vetting context). 
4.45.4 € It could be presumed to be reasonable if, after discussions with 
the Information Commissioner, certain categories of information 
were retained for specified periods, while still allowing the right of 
challenge in individual cases. 
4.45.5 € In terms of striking the balance between the various rights and 
interests involved, retaining information represents considerably less 
interference than using (that is, disclosing) that information, and is 
correspondingly easier to justify. 
The new Code and sexual offences 
4.46 € As far as retention or deletion decisions are concerned, the records 
examined most closely by the Inquiry related to allegations of sexual 
offences. There was a clear consensus on the factors that should be taken 
into account in reaching retention or deletion decisions and which should 
therefore be reflected in the Code. These were: 
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4.46.1 € This focuses attention both on the seriousness of the alleged crime 
and the circumstances of the particular incident. For example, an 
allegation of unlawful sexual intercourse is more serious the greater 
the age difference between the victim and the alleged offender. 
If young people are involved, the nature of the allegation also 
focuses attention on the need to be particularly astute in protecting 
the vulnerable. 
The reliability of the allegation 
4.46.2 € The concerns about too heavy a reliance on the grading 
models (now the 5x5x5 system) have already been covered (see 
paragraphs 2.77–2.79). It is likely that those reviewing records will 
be able to make a more useful and consistent judgement about 
reliability if the basic facts are properly recorded and available. 
4.46.3 € Thus, for example, in relation to Contact 1 involving Huntley, it 
would be vital for the reviewer considering retention or deletion 
to know that Huntley had signed a confession under caution; and 
also that the victim had confirmed the offence but was unwilling to 
assist in the prosecution of her boyfriend. If those facts were known, 
it would be surprising if the reviewer took anything other than the 
view that it was justifiable to retain the record for at least the period 
for which a conviction would be kept. 
4.46.4 € For sexual offences, there may be reasons why it is decided 
not to prosecute or when it proves not possible to prosecute. In 
these circumstances, the distinction between the reliability of the 
information on which a conviction is based and the reliability of 
intelligence records, while still important, may be less sharp than in 
other offences. 
The age of the allegation 
4.46.5 € The age of the allegation and how long it has been since the last 
recorded incident are linked factors. For sexual offences, those 
giving evidence to the Inquiry accepted that behaviour patterns 
were particularly important. Thus, the first intelligence record needs 
to be kept for a sufficiently long period for it to be seen whether a 
pattern emerges, even if that first allegation is judged to be (or is 
graded at) the lower end of the reliability scale. 
4.46.6 € The Information Commissioner was reluctant, for understandable 
reasons, to be drawn into offering timeframes that could be used as 
general guidance, but he accepted the importance of identifying 
behaviour patterns. He suggested that the recording of an 
allegation, followed by a retention period of perhaps ten or more 
years during which nothing further occurs, might raise questions 
about reasonableness. However, if there was a second allegation, 
the justification for continued retention of both, for a substantial 
period, would be more compelling. 
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A Code of Practice should be produced covering record creation, 
review, retention, deletion and information sharing. This should be 
made under the Police Reform Act 2002 and needs to be clear, 
concise and practical. It should supersede existing guidance. 
The Code of Practice must clearly set out the key principles of good 
information management (capture, review, retention, deletion 
and sharing), having regard to policing purposes, the rights of the 
individual and the law. 
The Code of Practice must set out the standards to be met in terms 
of systems (including IT), accountability, training, resources and audit. 
These standards should be capable of being monitored both within 
police forces and by HMIC and should fit within the PPAF. 
The Code of Practice should have particular regard to the factors 
to be considered when reviewing the retention or deletion of 
intelligence in cases of sexual offences. 
Responsibility: The Home Office, taking advice from ACPO, the 
Information Commissioner and the other relevant agencies 
Handling allegations of sexual offences against children 
4.47 € There is concern that the issue of underage sex may not be taken 
sufficiently seriously by the police or by social services generally. It is critical 
that there is good communication between the police, social services and 
other relevant agencies and that decisions are taken on the basis of clearly 
understood criteria. 
4.48 € I am aware that there is already Government guidance on information 
sharing. In particular, Working Together to Safeguard Children and What to 
Do if You’re Worried a Child is Being Abused. 
4.49 € The Association of Directors of Social Services (ADSS) drew the Inquiry’s 
attention to the status of Working Together to Safeguard Children. It is issued 
under section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1950, so that it is to 
be complied with unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so. 
4.50 € Among other things, the guidance states that ‘the police should be notified 
as soon as possible where a criminal offence has been committed, or is 
suspected of having been committed, against a child’. In their evidence, 
the ADSS confirmed that there were circumstances in which social services 
might not pass on information to the police. This seems likely to include 
cases where there is a sexual relationship which is considered to be 
consensual and not abusive. They referred the Inquiry to criteria for decision 
making contained in a protocol being developed by Sheffield Social 
Services. 
4.51 € Alleged offenders’ names are not searchable on the Social Services 
Information Database (SSID), and will not be searchable without the 
addition of a new data field to the Integrated Children’s System (ICS), 
which supports the work of the social services in dealing with childcare 
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Services, stated that this would be sensible, but in a subsequent submission 
decided otherwise. I do understand his dilemma. 
4.52 € An alternative way forward would be to require social services, in all 
circumstances, to refer to the police cases when a criminal offence against 
a child has been committed, or is suspected of having been committed. 
I am reluctant, however, to recommend something that takes away all 
local discretion and that could lead to the referral of cases that were, for 
example, consensual, involving two young people either side of the age of 
consent. 
4.53  I am, therefore, recommending the following: 
Recommendations 
The Government should reaffirm the guidance in Working Together to 
Safeguard Children so that the police are notified as soon as possible 
when a criminal offence has been committed, or is suspected 
of having been committed, against a child – unless there are 
exceptional reasons not to do so. 
National guidance should be produced to inform the decision as to 
whether or not to notify the police. This guidance could usefully draw 
upon the criteria included in a local protocol being developed by 
Sheffield Social Services and brought to the attention of the Inquiry. 
The decision would therefore take account of: 
•  age or power imbalances; 
• overt  aggression; 
•  coercion or bribery; 
•  the misuse of substances as a disinhibitor; 
• €whether the child’s own behaviour, because of the misuse of 
substances, places him/her at risk so that he/she is unable to make 
an informed choice about any activity; 
• €whether any attempts to secure secrecy have been made by 
the sexual partner, beyond what would be considered usual in 
a teenage relationship; 
• €whether the sexual partner is known by one of the agencies 
(which presupposes that checks will be made with the police); 
•  whether the child denies, minimises or accepts concerns; and 
•  whether the methods used are consistent with grooming. 
The Integrated Children’s System (ICS) should record those cases 
where a decision is taken not to refer to the police. 
The Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) should, as part of 
any social services inspection, review whether decisions not to inform 
the police have been properly taken. 
Responsibility: The Department for Education and Skills (DfES) 
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that all cases involving abuse and potential abuse would be referred to 
the police and entered on their local Child Protection Databases. These 
are searchable by name and so can be searched by the name of a 
potential abuser. If it were felt that yet further assurance were needed, the 
ICS itself could be made searchable by details of alleged sex offenders. 
This would allow social services to records information which is, after all, 
relevant to their work and helps protect children. It does, however, raise 
some contentious issues about the role of social services and whether the 
ICS would then need to be routinely searched as part of future vetting 
arrangements. These are matters for further consideration by the DfES and 
the ADSS. 
4.55 € Clearly, not all notifications to the police result in criminal investigation 
and prosecution. The police, social services and other agencies exercise 
discretion in the interests of the child. The criteria to which I have referred 
above should also support any decisions taken after the police have 
been notified. 
Recruitment and vetting 
Recruitment and selection 
4.56 € Previous Inquiries, such as the Warner Report Choosing with Care, 
Sir William Utting’s People Like Us and the Waterhouse Report Lost in Care 
(which looked into the abuse of children in care in North Wales) have all 
highlighted the importance of robust selection and recruitment processes. 
4.57 € My concern, however, is that the importance of this issue seems still not to 
have been understood by those managing recruitment in schools. 
4.58 € The Principal of Soham Village College could not recollect having received 
training on how to draw out child protection issues during an interview. 
Equally, the Secondary Heads’ Association (SHA) was unaware of any 
such training, referring instead to the ‘kind of training that comes from 
experience and from what you do as you move up the management 
scale’. 
4.59 € Indeed, there still seems to be a general belief that interviewing, selection 
and recruitment are skills that are acquired from experience. But this is not 
good enough where child protection is concerned. 
4.60 € Interviews should involve some element of screening that goes beyond 
the type of well-intentioned questions asked during Huntley’s interview at 
Soham Village College. I believe that the DfES has already addressed this in 
relation to the recruitment of staff to work in the Government’s Connexions 
service (an initiative for teenagers that gives advice on education, training 
and work). That guidance may prove useful in probing whether or not an 
applicant is suitable for a job in a school. 
4.61 € Local Education Authorities and Governing Bodies have a responsibility 
to ensure that head teachers, and others involved in interviews, have the 
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where they do this already. 
4.62 € The danger is that too much reliance will be placed on CRB checks or on 
the improved systems I recommend later, if these are adopted in the future. 
There is a concern that many abusers do not have convictions and that no 
intelligence is held about them. Therefore, the selection and recruitment 
process, if properly conducted, is an important, indeed essential, safeguard. 
Better audited 
4.63 € I understand that in their inspection of regulated care settings (for example, 
children’s residential care homes), the CSCI includes an evaluation of 
evidence on effective recruitment and vetting procedures. Given the 
importance of this issue, it is perhaps surprising that recruitment and 
selection standards elsewhere do not feature strongly in inspection/audit 
arrangements, including, as far as I can see, in Ofsted’s standards for the 
inspection of schools (or of youth organisations and agencies such as 
Connexions). Even the very recent DfES consultation paper, Improving 
Child Protection in Schools, makes only scant reference to recruitment 
and training. 
Recommendations 
Head teachers and school governors should receive training on how 
to ensure that interviews to appoint staff reflect the importance of 
safeguarding children. 
From a date to be agreed, no interview panel to appoint staff 
working in schools should be convened without at least one member 
being properly trained. 
The relevant inspection bodies should, as part of their inspection, 
review the existence and effectiveness of a school’s selection and 
recruitment arrangements. 
Responsibility: The DfES 
Vetting 
4.64 € The Inquiry discovered that police vetting processes, like police systems 
for record keeping, were not routinely covered in HMIC inspections. It was 
agreed by HMIC that this should change. 
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HMIC should develop, with ACPO and the CRB, the standards to be 
observed by police forces in carrying out vetting checks. These should 
cover the intelligence databases to be searched, the robustness of 
procedures, guidance, training, supervision and audit. 
Responsibility: HMIC 
4.65 € A variety of concerns also emerged from the evidence about the current 
vetting arrangements. I address these, and what can be done to make 
improvements within the current framework, in paragraphs 4.66–4.94 below. 
My strong view, however, as set out later in this section (paragraph 4.113), 
is that an entirely new arrangement should be introduced requiring those 
who wish to work with children, or vulnerable adults, to be registered or to 
obtain a licence in order to prove their basic suitability. I explain how this 
new system should work below. 
The current framework – issues and improvements 
Enhanced or Standard Disclosures 
4.66 € The type of police check carried out depends on the nature of the job or 
position applied for. 
4.67 € For the most basic level of disclosure, section 112 of the Police Act 1997 
provides for a ‘Criminal Conviction Certificate’ which would reveal the 
convictions of the job applicant not yet spent under the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act. However, this section is not yet in force and would not, in any 
event, apply to those applicants seeking jobs with children or vulnerable adults. 
4.68 € There are two levels of vetting for this sort of job: the so-called ‘Standard’ 
Disclosure (under the ‘Criminal Records Certificate’ regime set up under section 
113 of the 1997 Act) and ‘Enhanced’ Disclosure (section 115 of the 1997Act). 
4.69 € The legislative regime governing when it would be appropriate and 
permissible for Standard Disclosure to be sought is complex. In summary, it is 
appropriate if the job involves work: 
4.69.1 € in  a  ‘regulated position’, such as where normal duties involve work 
in an educational institution (this covers all school staff and not just 
teachers), including caring for, training, supervising or being in sole 
charge of children; or 
4.69.2 € in a further education institution where the normal duties involve 
regular contact with people under 18. 
4.70 € Standard Disclosures involving work with children or vulnerable adults 
contain details of: 
4.70.1 € all spent convictions on the PNC, and details of any cautions, 
reprimands or warnings held at national level. The period for which 
a conviction remains on record, for instance on the PNC, will 
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in paragraphs 3.72–3.80; and 
4.70.2 € whether or not the job applicant appears on List 99 or on the 
Protection of Children Act (POCA) List maintained by the DfES. 
(It will also, in due course, include details of whether or not the job 
applicant appears on the Protection of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) 
List to be maintained by the DfES for the Department of Health.) 
4.71 € Enhanced Disclosure is appropriate where the job involves ‘regularly caring 
for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of people aged under 18’. 
4.72 € Enhanced Disclosure provides the same information as Standard Disclosure, 
plus any relevant local police intelligence held by forces whose areas cover 
the addresses provided by an applicant for the previous five years. Thus, 
there is checking of local police force records, in addition to PNC checks. 
A Chief Constable is required to provide any information ‘which in his 
opinion is relevant to the application’. 
Problems with the distinction between Standard and Enhanced 
4.73€ The decision on which type of disclosure to seek depends essentially on 
whether the job applicant is to be ‘regularly’ involved in caring for or 
supervising children, or whether that would only be a part of the job applicant’s 
‘normal duties’. (In practice, and perhaps unsurprisingly, approximately 87 per 
cent of applications received by the CRB are for Enhanced Disclosure.) 
4.74 € There are two main problems with this distinction. First, the differences 
between the two types of disclosure are subtle and unclear. Different 
employers are likely to have different views about where the distinction lies. 
Inconsistency is likely. The potential for confusion is illustrated by the very 
position for which Huntley was vetted – that of school caretaker: 
4.74.1 € The previous regime, under Home Office circular 47/93, effectively 
treated those within the scope of the circular as being within the 
Enhanced Disclosure category. School caretakers were specifically 
named as one of the groups caught by the circular. 
4.74.2 € However, under CRB guidance on Becoming a Registered Body, the 
position of school caretaker is given as an example, under the current 
regime, of a post falling within the Standard Disclosure category. 
4.74.3 € School caretaker is given as an example of a post that should 
require Enhanced Disclosure under Annex C to the Home Office 
consultation paper of December 2003. 
4.75 € The second problem is that the distinction does not seem to me to be 
appropriate in principle. Its broad aim is to target the highest vetting level 
at those who will potentially pose most risk to children and vulnerable 
adults. For children, drawing a distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘regular’ 
contact does not make sense. The true risk analysis should involve looking 
at those whom a child might trust, which does not depend upon any such 
difference. As the NSPCC pointed out in evidence, such trust is likely to be 
engendered by a range of people who fall within the Standard Disclosure 
test but who would not necessarily fall within the Enhanced Disclosure test. 
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All posts, including those in schools, that involve working with children, 
and vulnerable adults, should be subject to the Enhanced Disclosure 
regime. 
Responsibility: The Home Office and the DfES 
The decision to check 
4.76 € The DfES states that designated childcare organisations must carry out a 
POCA check when someone ‘moves job’. The only way to do this is through 
a full CRB check. Currently, subject to the discretion of the head teacher, a 
person can commence employment in a school prior to the completion of 
CRB checks as long as there has been a check of List 99 or an earlier check 
by the Teacher Training Institution. There is a grey unregulated area – such 
as children’s clubs and activities – where checks are only discretionary. The 
principal issue here is whether it is appropriate to leave employers to decide 
whether to start the checking process. Under the current system, some 
could decide, for whatever reason, not to bother with such a check. 
4.77 € There was nothing in the evidence received by the Inquiry to suggest 
that this was happening. On the contrary, an employer is likely to be 
more, rather than less, concerned to ensure that checks are done 
on a prospective employee. Those who work with children and other 
vulnerable groups are likely to be all the more astute in that regard. In the 
circumstances, I do not see the need for a change. 
Responsibility for checking identity 
4.78 € The CRB existing Code of Practice deals with establishing the identity of job 
applicants and the explanatory guide to the Code states that: 
4.78.1 € It is good standard recruitment practice for employers to satisfy 
themselves of the identity of those applying for positions. This is 
especially sensible in relation to sensitive posts, to which Standard 
Disclosures and Enhanced Disclosures apply. 
4.78.2 € Where an applicant claims to have changed his/her name 
by deed poll or any other mechanism (for example, marriage, 
adoption, or statutory declaration), the employer should see 
evidence of such a change. 
4.79 € The issue of identity verification was looked at by the Independent Review 
Team (IRT) because Registered Bodies were often not checking identities 
properly. (The CRB gave evidence that they immediately rejected one 
application in ten for this failing and returned it to the Registered Body.) 
The IRT recommended that there should be greater clarity about the 
Registered Bodies’ responsibilities in the process. 
4.80 € I note from the consultation paper Criminal Records Bureau: Regulations 
under the Police Act 1997, issued by the Home Office in December 
2003, that it is proposed that Registered Bodies should be placed under 
an obligation to exercise all due diligence to ensure that mandatory 
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and is accurate. 
4.81 € Concern was expressed to the Inquiry that the declaration that Registered 
Bodies are currently asked to sign, verifying the information contained in the 
application, placed a level of responsibility on them that was unreasonable 
in terms of what they were in a position to deliver. This concern should be 
addressed when the regulations are introduced under the Police Act 1997. 
The regulations should clearly state what the precise responsibilities of 
Registered Bodies are. 
Recommendation 
The Registered Bodies’ precise responsibilities for checking identities 
need to be clarified urgently. 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
Improving the systems for checking identity 
4.82 € Whoever is primarily responsible for checking identity, there is scope for 
improving the system by checking passports or driving licences presented 
as proof of identity against the Passport Service and DVLA’s databases. 
4.83 € There should also be an expectation that, wherever possible, documents 
produced to confirm identity should include a photograph. However, it 
has to be recognised that even with such documents there is scope for 
falsification; and there will be cases in which the person concerned does 
not have such identity documents. 
4.84 € The national identity card scheme, if introduced, would go a long way to 
solving this problem. The CRB’s view was that a requirement for fingerprint 
provision would be a very useful element in protecting the integrity of the 
vetting process. Although it would not be a complete solution, fingerprint 
provision: 
• €would enable checks to be carried out against police records at least 
to identify those convicted of serious offences; 
• €could also be used as part of any notification scheme (that is, the 
scheme through which the police report the arrest of people in certain 
occupations); and 
• €would go some way to solving the difficult problem of how to check 
effectively whether a person has provided aliases. 
4.85 € I agree that fingerprint provision would be a useful element in the vetting 
process. I am also aware that some will find this recommendation 
controversial. However, it is essential that everything possible is done to 
prevent the abuse of children and vulnerable adults, and if the use of 
fingerprints helps, then I believe that most people will accept it. 
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4.86 € The giving of full and accurate addresses by an applicant ensures that 
requests for any local information are made to the right police forces. If that 
is not done, the system breaks down. 
4.87 € The CRB informed the Inquiry that, to their knowledge, some Registered 
Bodies did conduct checks to verify that addresses had been checked. They 
accepted, unsurprisingly, that it was good practice to do so. That is plainly 
right. It is accordingly surprising that there is no reference to the need for such 
checks in any of the guidance documents issued by the CRB. It may be that 
checks would not be foolproof. However, some checks would be better than 
none. It should be possible for the CRB, consulting as necessary, to work out 
the most effective way in which such checks could be undertaken. When set 
up, the PLX will render the checking of addresses less important. 
4.88 € There are two other important issues that need to be resolved in connection 
with checking applicants’ addresses: 
• €whether the consents currently given by an applicant on the ‘Police 
Check Form’ are sufficiently wide to enable the requisite checks to be 
undertaken; and 
• €whether there would be a benefit, if Registered Bodies are to be 
responsible for such checks, for a re-introduction of the previous 
declaration, confirming that all the information on the form has been 
checked in accordance with CRB guidance. 
Incomplete and withdrawn applications 
4.89 € The Inquiry received some concerns about the CRB’s handling of 
incomplete or inadequate applications, where it appeared that sometimes 
they were returned to the applicant, and not to the Registered Body. 
The danger here, of course, is that an unsuitable person already working, 
say in a school, could prolong and delay the checking procedure. The 
CRB recognises that this is a flaw in their system and intends to change 
procedures so that rejected applications are sent to the Registered Bodies. 
I recommend that they do so urgently. 
Checks on overseas workers 
4.90 € The Inquiry received concerns from some teaching unions, and others, 
that foreign workers’ backgrounds could not be easily checked. We heard 
the suggestion that, in future years, potentially 40 per cent or more of the 
teaching workforce could come from overseas. Systems need to be in 
place to ensure that they are properly vetted. 
4.91 € I have seen Answers to Parliamentary Questions in April 2004 from the DfES 
and the Home Office, advising that when criminal record information is not 
available, extra care should be taken in pursuing references and carrying 
out other checks on a person’s background. Reference was made to the 
CRB Overseas Information Service, which describes the checks in other 
countries, including: 
•  where information can be obtained; 
•  how to go about the checks; and 
•  the cost and time involved. 
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including nine in Europe, and that work is in hand to extend it by a further 
15, including 14 in Europe. 
4.93 € This is clearly an area of potential weakness in the protection of young 
people. I know that the Home Office has recently organised a seminar on 
how EU member states can improve checking procedures, and that the 
Home Office is now considering options. They should come forward with 
these as soon as possible. 
Extension of databases accessed by the CRB 
4.94€ I note that the Government plans, ‘when Parliamentary time allows’, to bring 
forward proposals to enable the CRB to access the Scotland and Northern 
Ireland equivalent of the POCA and POVA Lists. A second proposal would 
enable the CRB, when dealing with Enhanced Disclosure, to access any 
relevant information from, for example, HM Customs and Excise, NCIS, the 
National Crime Squad and the British Transport Police. They should do so as a 
matter of priority. 
Recommendations 
Registered Bodies, or the CRB, should be able to check passports and 
driving licences presented as proof of identity against the Passport 
Service and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) databases. 
There should be an expectation that documents produced to confirm 
identity should, wherever possible, include a photograph. 
Fingerprints should be used as a means of verifying identity. 
Guidance should be issued to Registered Bodies on how to verify that 
applicants have given a full and accurate account of their current 
and past addresses. 
Registered Bodies should be required to confirm that they have 
checked the information on the ‘Police Check Form’ in accordance 
with CRB guidance. 
The consents that applicants currently give on the ‘Police Check 
Form’ should be sufficiently broad to enable the requisite checks to 
be undertaken. 
Incomplete or withdrawn applications should in future be returned to 
the Registered Body, and not to the applicant. 
Proposals should be brought forward as soon as possible to improve 
the checking of people from overseas who want to work with children 
and vulnerable adults. 
As a priority, legislation should be brought forward to enable the CRB to 
access the following additional databases for the purpose of vetting: 
•  HM Customs & Excise; 
• NCIS; 
•  National Crime Squad; 
•  British Transport Police; and 
•  Scottish and Northern Ireland equivalents of POCA and POVA. 
Responsibility: The Home Office 
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4.95 € Although these recommendations will improve the way in which the current 
framework operates, they will not resolve all the problems and I believe that 
more radical changes are necessary for the following reasons. 
Overlaps, duplications and inconsistencies 
4.96 € The current regime (the details of which are set out in Appendix 4) has 
overlaps, duplications and inconsistencies: 
•  the DfES operates the POCA List and List 99; 
• €the Department of Health will operate the POVA List with the DfES 
managing it on their behalf from July 2004; and 
•  these are in addition to the CRB arrangements. 
4.97 € Those on the Lists are forbidden, on pain of criminal sanction, from working 
with the relevant group, whereas the CRB’s Enhanced Disclosure regime 
leaves the final decision to the employer. 
4.98 € The processes for deciding who should be placed on the Lists are similar 
in some respects yet essentially different. Some organisations have a duty 
to refer information about unsuitability, while some do not. Some bodies 
regularly refer, while some do not. 
4.99 € Definitions also vary between the Lists and there is an overlap between the 
three Lists (and the CRB’s Enhanced Disclosure regime). One list (POCA) 
includes a provisional listing (which prevents an individual from working, 
pending a final decision); another (List 99) does not. 
4.100 € Decisions about putting someone on the POCA List are taken by civil 
servants and similar decisions about List 99 are taken by ministers. Appeal or 
review arrangements are also different, as are the responsibilities placed on 
employers and applicants. 
4.101 € It is difficult to justify these differences and they lead to unnecessary 
complexity of regulation. 
The police are not best placed to make intelligence disclosures 
4.102 € The current regime also leaves the police to make some very difficult 
judgements, for which they may not be best placed. 
4.103 € At the moment, all conviction and caution information, retained in 
accordance with the 2002 ACPO Code, is disclosed to the employer as a 
matter of course, which means no discretion or judgement is exercised in 
relation to that information. (I return to this below.) 
4.104 € However, judgements do need to be made about the disclosure of 
intelligence held on local police systems at the time of the vetting. 
4.105 € There was a clear consensus in the evidence, including that from ACPO, 
in favour of taking the decision about what information should, and 
should not, be disclosed out of police hands. That consensus is, in my view, 
supported by a range of compelling arguments: 
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Constables (or those to whom the function is properly delegated). 
Inconsistency is inevitable, even where the system is monitored, as it 
is, by a former Senior Circuit Judge, Sir Rhys Davies. 
4.105.2 Although I recognise that the purpose of vetting is crime prevention 
– a core police task – the judgement about relevance for the 
disclosure of intelligence is a distraction from ‘normal’ policing 
duties that a hard-pressed police service can ill afford. 
4.105.3 € There  is  also a risk that the police will blur the decisions about 
whether information should be retained and whether it should 
be disclosed. These are different issues, not least because the 
relevance of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) is markedly different in the separate contexts. For example, 
it may be justifiable for a police force to interfere with a person’s 
private and family life to the extent of retaining confidential 
information on him/her, but not justifiable to communicate that 
information to his/her employer. 
Disclosures only provide a snapshot 
4.106 € Under the current arrangements the disclosure results are, in effect, 
a ‘snapshot’ taken at a particular point in time. There are no uniform 
arrangements for ‘re-vetting’ or ensuring that relevant subsequent 
convictions or intelligence are consistently made available to inform 
a decision about continued employment. 
Issues of fairness to the job applicant 
4.107 € In addition, at present Enhanced Disclosure results are normally provided at 
the same time to the individual applicant and to the employer or voluntary 
body (Police Act 1997). Any objections by the job applicant to the provision 
of certain information could not, therefore, undo any damage done to his/ 
her prospects with that particular employer. 
4.108 € In exceptional circumstances, where the Chief Constable considers that 
showing information from local police records to the applicant would 
prejudice the detection or prevention of crime, that information may be 
given separately, directly, and only to the Registered Body. 
4.109 € This raises important issues about the fair treatment of individuals. There is a 
risk that careers may be blighted and job prospects lost. The essential 
issues are: 
4.109.1 What should the ingredients for fair treatment be? 
4.109.2 € Can  the system be made to work efficiently, protectively and fairly 
all at the same time, bearing in mind the call on limited resources? 
4.109.3 €Ultimately, how should the balance be struck between the rights of 
the individual and the need to protect the vulnerable? 
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disclosure of police information for vetting purposes. There has been 
a recent successful judicial review challenge to the provision of local police 
information to an employer under the Enhanced Disclosure regime: see X v 
Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2004] EWHC (Admin) 61, Mr Justice 
Wall. His conclusions (which are the subject of an appeal in which the Home 
Office has intervened) were in summary as follows: 
4.110.1 € The  discretion to be exercised by the Chief Constable under section 
115 of the Police Act 1997 as to whether to disclose intelligence 
material has to be exercised in accordance with common law 
principles of fairness. In the present context, those principles were 
set out in ex parte Thorpe [1996] QB 396 and ex parte LM [2000] 1 
FLR 612. 
4.110.2 € The  principles require that the job applicant be given an opportunity 
to make representations before the disclosure is made to the 
prospective employer. That conclusion was largely based on the 
seriousness of the consequences of disclosure for the job applicant 
and on the ‘very small numbers’ of Enhanced Disclosure requests 
producing a result other than ‘no trace’. (The figures cited to the 
court indicated a figure of three in every 1,000 for that police force.) 
4.111 € If that decision is upheld on appeal, it will probably have the effect of 
requiring an extensive review and debate with the job applicant and his/ 
her lawyers in a significant number of Enhanced Disclosure cases before 
any disclosure is made. It is not for the Inquiry to predict the outcome of the 
appeal. I am also particularly conscious that the arguments for and against 
advance disclosure, including the practical impact of such a regime, are 
likely to be explored in a level of detail not available to me. 
4.112 € I would only say that, in terms of fairness, there are attractions in affording 
applicants a prior opportunity to comment on disclosed information, but 
there will be timing and resource implications in routinely offering this 
opportunity to applicants in the current system. 
A new system – licence or registration 
4.113 € There are, I think, sufficient problems with the current arrangements, even 
if these were improved, to justify a different approach to establishing the 
basic suitability of those who want to work with children or vulnerable adults 
(although the latter falls outside this Inquiry’s remit). 
4.114 € I believe that the arrangements I propose in the following paragraphs will 
deliver a system that is more proactive and effective than the 
current regime. 
Central registration 
4.115 € Under my proposal, an individual wishing to work with children or vulnerable 
adults, including in the voluntary sector, would apply to a central body 
for registration. 
4.116 € The central body would have access to all the information currently, or soon 
to be, available to the CRB: that is, PNC records, local intelligence, POCA, 
List 99, POVA, HM Customs and Excise, British Transport Police, NCIS, the 
National Crime Squad and the Scottish and Northern Ireland equivalents of 
the PNC. 
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above and notify the applicant. At that stage, no other employer, individual 
or institution would be informed. The applicant would have an opportunity 
to appeal against any refusal, either to the Care Standards Tribunal or some 
other appropriate independent body. 
4.118 € Under this system, employers would still decide whether or not a job 
required the postholder to be registered with the central body. If they 
decided the postholder did need to be registered, employers would be 
aware that the authorities knew of no reason why an applicant should not 
be employed to work with children or vulnerable adults. Employers would 
also retain the ultimate decision about whether or not to employ someone, 
using references and interviews. 
4.119 € The decision about the relevance of police intelligence, for the purpose of 
determining a person’s suitability for a job, would be taken by the central 
body. The police, as now, would be able to advise on any intelligence that 
for operational reasons should not, under any circumstances, be revealed 
to the job applicant. 
Up-to-date information 
4.120 € This revised scheme would have other advantages. With the introduction 
of the PLX (intelligence-flagging) scheme (see paragraphs 4.32–4.33), it 
should be possible to update the list of those registered, to take account of 
new intelligence held by any police force. I appreciate that a change in 
the law would be required to allow continuous consent for the rechecking 
of records. 
4.121 € In addition, with the use of some security identification, prospective 
employers could check the prospective employee’s status through a 
freephone number or secure website. This would be especially helpful 
to small employers or parents employing, for example, tutors or sports 
coaches (the Inquiry received evidence from sports organisations that 
were concerned about the current arrangements). I stress that the response 
to a check would only be whether or not an individual was registered. 
Licence or card 
4.122 € A scheme such as this could go a stage further than a searchable register 
and issue a licence or a card. 
4.123 € The arguments for including a licence or card are finely balanced. It could 
be politically controversial and the prudent employer to whom such a card 
was produced would still need to check, either by telephone or online, to 
be sure that it was still valid and not a forgery. On the other hand, the card 
could include other information including, for example, qualifications in the 
case of childcare workers. 
4.124 € It is not for me to decide on this issue and I am aware that the DfES, together 
with other departments, is considering the best way forward. Certainly, if 
it was decided to introduce a card or licence, a photographic card with 
biometric details would provide real advantages in checking identification. 
The Home Office will also want to give consideration to how a childcare 
licence might best co-exist with a national identity card, if this is introduced. 
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4.125 € If the question of a card is finely balanced, the transfer of the decision 
about basic suitability to a central body is, I think, more clear cut. 
4.125.1 € The  current system makes inconsistency inevitable, given the 
number of employers involved. Published central guidance and 
evidence of consistent decision taking would increase confidence 
for all the interested parties. 
4.125.2 € The  current system makes it more likely that employers will adopt 
an over-cautious approach to decision making. The chances of 
a fair and appropriate balance regarding suitability being struck 
are increased by placing responsibility with a central body that 
takes such decisions regularly – although the final decision on 
employment still rests with the employer. 
4.125.3 € A  central register will mean that the whole vetting process is not 
repeated every time a person moves post. This should achieve 
considerable savings in terms of time, effort and resources for 
employers, the police and individual applicants. 
Basic suitability: recruitment and selection 
4.126 € I cannot stress too often that the decision taken by the central body would 
only be about basic suitability. It will still require employers to undertake 
rigorous recruitment and selection processes – not least because of the 
concern that many abusers and potential abusers do not have criminal 
convictions or even intelligence retained about them. For many, therefore, 
there would be no known reason to refuse their application for registration. 
4.127 € Nor can I stress too often the dependence on the effective retention of 
intelligence records, which was so clearly lacking in the case of Huntley. 
In answer to the obvious and justified question – would this kind of 
registration scheme prevent a person like Huntley from obtaining the 
position of school caretaker? – the answer is ‘yes’, but only if the police 
maintain proper records and if the PLX intelligence-flagging scheme (or a 
sophisticated intelligence-gathering system) is in place. 
Criteria for decisions about disclosure 
4.128 € If there is a transfer of decision making about an applicant’s basic suitability 
to a central body, the police will not need to take decisions about 
disclosure. They will simply gather the information and send it to the central 
body, doubtless continuing to identify information that should not, in any 
circumstances, be disclosed to anyone. 
4.129 € The Home Office has recently produced another draft circular that contains 
helpful additional guidance as to how Chief Constables should address the 
‘relevance’ issue that lies at the heart of the disclosure decision provided for 
under part V of the Police Act 1997. This is necessary whatever the response 
to this Inquiry’s recommendations. Even if a transfer of decision making is 
implemented, it will take time; and in the meantime, the police will have to 
continue to make decisions. The principal guidance, which I am content to 
endorse, may be summarised as follows: 
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believe that it might be materially relevant – that is, not remotely or 
speculatively relevant, but materially relevant’. 
4.129.2 €The key purpose is not to provide a general ‘character assessment’ 
but is to consider the risk or likelihood of an offence being 
committed against the vulnerable. Accordingly, information must 
be relevant to the purpose for which disclosure is being made. 
4.129.3 € The  information must be ‘credible, clear and capable of being 
substantiated if challenged’. (This is not necessarily the same as the 
test set out in the CRB/ACPO guidance referred to above.) 
4.129.4 €Information must be reasonably current – the older the information, 
the less likely it is to be relevant. 
4.129.5 € A  two-stage relevance test is proposed. Is there a firm basis for 
considering: (a) that the information might be directly relevant to 
an assessment of the person’s suitability to work with children or 
vulnerable adults; and (b) that a reasonable potential employer 
for a particular job might find the information to be material to the 
decision of whether or not to employ, having regard to whether 
that individual would pose a risk to children (or vulnerable adults)? 
4.129.6 € The  decision making about relevance must be procedurally sound: 
it must be made at an appropriate level (ACPO or equivalent rank) 
and the process must be able to withstand legal scrutiny. 
4.129.7 €The information disclosed must be presented so as to make its 
relevance clear. It must also be self-contained (rather than referring 
to another source of information not included in the disclosure). 
4.130 € If a central body takes over the decision-making function about basic 
suitability, it will need to draw up and publish criteria for making these 
decisions. 
Not all conviction information is relevant 
4.131 € I have considered two other issues. The first was whether all conviction 
information retained by the police on the PNC should be disclosed as 
a matter of course. I support the concern expressed by the Information 
Commissioner that not all conviction information will be relevant to 
employment decisions. It is possible to think of examples involving 
conviction information, legitimately retained by the police under the 2002 
ACPO Code, the disclosure of which to an employer would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to justify. It is also clear, as highlighted above, that the 
decisions about retention and disclosure are, and should be, separate. 
That said, I appreciate that the value of a clear general rule is not to be 
underestimated. 
4.132 € For me, at a more pragmatic level, the issue is intertwined with the possible 
transfer of the basic suitability decision to a central body. If that happened, 
I would recommend that all retained conviction information be disclosed to 
the central body. I would do so, in large part, because of the confidence 
such a body would bring to the decision-making process, and because the 
applicant would have access to an appeal process in advance of such 
information being made public (if it ever was). 
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4.133 € The second issue was the extent to which third-party information should 
be disclosed to employers or to the central body. For example, applicants 
for teaching and teaching assistant posts are vetted. If a police force 
asked for relevant intelligence, as part of that vetting process, was able to 
make a link between the applicant and his/her partner and had ‘relevant’ 
information relating to the partner, should they disclose that information 
to a prospective employer? The Inquiry was told that there are already 
occasions when such information is revealed, but that they are currently 
restricted to situations in which the child, or vulnerable person, is to live with 
the third party as well as with the subject of the vetting process. 
4.134 € I consider that the difficulties, both in principle and in practice, with routine 
disclosure of such third-party information render it inappropriate to move to 
such a system. But I do not rule out (and, as I understand it, the law would 
not currently rule out) the possibility of such disclosure being made when 
there is a clear case of risk. 
Recommendation 
New arrangements should be introduced requiring those who wish to 
work with children, or vulnerable adults, to be registered. This register – 
perhaps supported by a card or licence – would confirm that there is no 
known reason why an individual should not work with these client groups. 
The new register would be administered by a central body, which would 
take the decision, subject to published criteria, to approve or refuse 
registration on the basis of all the information made available to them 
by the police and other agencies. The responsibility for judging the 
relevance of police intelligence in deciding a person’s suitability would 
lie with the central body. The police, as now, would be able to identify 
intelligence which on no account should be disclosed to the applicant. 
Employers should still decide, based on good selection procedures, 
whether or not the job required the postholder to be registered and 
should retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not to employ. 
The central body would have the discretion to ignore any conviction 
information judged not to be relevant to the position in question. 
Individuals should have a right to appeal against any refusal to place 
them on the register and that right should be exercised before any 
information is made available to a third party. 
The register should be continuously updated and available to 
prospective employers for checking online or by telephone. 
The register should be introduced in a phased way, over a period of 
years, to avoid the problems associated with the introduction of the CRB. 
The DfES, in consultation with other government departments, should 
decide whether the registration scheme should be evidenced by a 
licence or card. 
Responsibility: The DfES, the Department of Health and the Home Office 
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4.135 € There are clearly a number of practical issues to be addressed, in addition 
to the question of whether or not a registration scheme should be 
accompanied by a licence card. I do not underestimate the scale of the 
challenge. The Government estimates that 2.4 million people are working 
with children. This figure does not take into account those people living 
or working on premises who, if not working directly with children, may still 
have contact with them. There will need to be priorities and possibly some 
difference of approach, for example the use of a designated card for 
the Early Years and Childcare sectors but some simpler registration for the 
education sector. 
4.136 € The Government would need to decide which central body should be 
responsible, for example the CRB, a government department or a new 
body. It would need to be satisfied about costs. There are, of course, costs 
attached to the current overlapping arrangements. I am confident that 
after an initial necessary investment the new arrangements could offer 
savings in a relatively short time. The Government would need to decide 
over what period the new system would be introduced for existing and 
new workers. In the time available, it has not been possible to resolve these 
important, but detailed, issues. 
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4x4 system – a subjective alpha/numerical intelligence grading system used by most 
police forces to determine the reliability of a piece of information (on a scale of A, B, C 
and X) and the reliability of the source of the intelligence (on a scale of 1–4). Therefore, 
‘A1’ means the intelligence source is highly credible and the intelligence is of a high 
standard. 
5x5x5 system – the successor to the 4x4 system of intelligence grading, incorporating 
the two factors above but including a judgement about who can have access to that 
intelligence (on a scale of 1 to 5). 
A
ACPO – Association of Chief Police Officers – the professional body of chief police 
officers. Its core activity is developing policing policy. 
ACPOS – Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland – the professional body of chief 
police officers in Scotland. Its core activity is developing policing policy.
ADSS – Association of Directors of Social Services – the professional body representing 
directors of social services in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Advice officer – job title in social services. An advice officer gives information and 
confidential advice on a wide range of issues.
Airwave – a digital national radio communication service.
APA – Association of Police Authorities.
ASU – Administrative Support Unit at Humberside Police.
B
BCU – Basic Command Unit – a geographically defined area within a police force. 
BVR – Best Value Review – introduced under the Local Government Act 1999. A BVR 
measures improvements in economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
C
Care Standards Act 2000 – the Act reforming the regulatory system for care services in 
England and Wales.
Care Standards Tribunal – a tribunal established under section 9 of the Protection of 
Children Act 1999. 
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Caution (1) –  when a suspect is advised of their rights once the police have reason 
to suspect an offence has been committed. The words used are: ‘You do not have to 
say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned 
something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in 
evidence.’
Caution (2) – a formal warning given by a police officer to a person who has admitted 
committing a criminal offence. 
Centrex – Central Police Training and Development Authority – known as National 
Police Training (NPT) before 1 April 2004. 
Charge – the formal accusation of a crime. 
Chief Constable – the senior police officer in a force.
Child Access Database – a Cambridgeshire Constabulary database containing 
information relating to individuals undergoing vetting checks.
CID – Criminal Intelligence Division – a local police force’s unit providing intelligence by 
gathering and processing information that helps identify crime trends and suspected 
criminals.
CIS 1 – Humberside Police’s Criminal Information System, made up of CIS Crime and 
CIS Nominals. CIS 1 changed to CIS 2 in September 1999.
CIS Crime – a part of Humberside Police’s Criminal Information System, CIS Crime 
contained details of crimes reported, recorded and detected, and their disposal. 
CIS Nominals – a part of Humberside Police’s Criminal Information System, CIS Nominals 
was the force’s core intelligence system, structured around the names of individuals.  
CJS – Criminal Justice System – the collective activity of the police, courts, probation 
and prison services, through which alleged offences and offenders are processed. 
Command and control – gives staff in police control rooms more information to make 
informed decisions about how to respond to incidents.
Conditional bail – a person released on conditional bail has to meet certain conditions, 
for example staying in a bail hostel.
Connexions – an initiative for teenagers that gives advice on education, training 
and work.
Court Service – an executive agency of the Department for Constitutional Affairs, 
responsible for running most courts and tribunals in England and Wales.
CPD – Child Protection Database – used by the Child Protection Units of Humberside 
Police. 
CPS – the Crown Prosecution Service – responsible for prosecuting people in England 
and Wales charged with a criminal offence.
CPU – Child Protection Unit – a local police force unit dealing with a range of child 
protection-related matters. 
CRB – Criminal Records Bureau (1) – a Home Office agency that provides employers 
with relevant information about an individual to assist in child-related and other 
recruitment decisions. 
CRB – Criminal Records Bureau (2) – a term used by some police forces to describe their 
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CRISP – Cross Regional Information Sharing Proposal – an information-sharing system.
CRO number – Criminal Records Office number – a unique number given to an 
individual following arrest and at the point when fingerprints are taken. 
CSCI – Commission for Social Care Inspection. 
D
DCA – Department for Constitutional Affairs.
DfES – Department for Education and Skills.
DIB – Divisional Intelligence Bureau. There were four DIBx in the Humberside Police area, 
whose operators input data onto CIS Nominals and updated CIS Crime.
Disclosure – the document issued by the national CRB detailing the result of the police 
checking process. There are two levels of disclosure: Standard and Enhanced.
Discontinuance, Notice of – issued under section 23(3) of the Prosecution of Offences 
Act 1985, informing an accused person that criminal proceedings are not being 
pursued. 
Disposal – the term used to describe how a recorded crime and/or offender has been 
dealt with. 
DPA – the Data Protection Act 1984 and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
E
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights.
EPM – Education Personnel Management Ltd. A personnel service provider for most 
schools in Cambridgeshire.
F
Force Weeding Rules – Humberside Police force’s guidelines on the review and deletion 
of records.
Form 310 – a Humberside Police form that was filled in to create a PNC record.
Form 547 – a Humberside Police form ‘Suspected Child Abuse – Record of Initial 
Decision’. 
Form 839 – a Humberside Police intelligence form.
G
No entries for this letter.
H
HMCIC – Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary.
HMIC – Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary – responsible for inspecting police 
forces to ensure that they are operating efficiently and effectively.
Holmes 2 – an IT system designed to help the police manage major inquiries.
Home Office Circular – one of the ways in which the Home Office sets out guidance on 
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Human Rights Act 1998 – imposes specific obligations on public bodies and the courts 
to take account of, and apply, rights and freedoms accorded under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
I
ICJS – Integrated Criminal Justice System – installed in Humberside; the ICJS creates 
custody records and generates documents on, for example, cautions, charges 
and bail.
ICS – Integrated Children’s System – supports the work of the Social Services in dealing 
with childcare issues.
IMPACT – Intelligence Management Prioritisation Analysis Co-ordination and Tasking 
– if developed, IMPACT will, among other things, support police forces in the 
implementation of the National Intelligence Model.
Information Commissioner – the Office of the Information Commissioner enforces and 
oversees the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. 
INTREPID – the Integrated Tasking Reporting Evaluation Police Intelligence Database, 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary’s intelligence database. 
IRT – Independent Review Team – appointed by the Home Secretary to review the 
process at the CRB.
IT – information technology.
J/K
No entries for these letters.
L
Lie on file – when a case cannot proceed further without permission of the court or the 
Court of Appeal.
List 99 – a DfES-maintained list, recording people who have been statutorily barred from 
teaching and other employment in the education service. 
LMS – Local Management of Schools – changes introduced in 1990, allowing boards 
of governors and schools’ principals to makes decisions on resources and priorities to 
improve learning in schools.
Local Government Act 1999 – the Act makes provision to impose on local, and certain 
other authorities, requirements relating to economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It also 
makes provision for the regulation of council tax.
M
No entries for this letter.
N
NACRO – National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders.
NAFIS – National Automated Fingerprint Information System.
NAHT – National Association of Head Teachers.
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National Policing Plan – a document produced under the Police Act each financial 
year that sets out the priorities for police forces in England and Wales for a period of 
three years. 
NCIS – National Criminal Intelligence Service, which provides strategic and tactical 
intelligence on serious and organised crime. 
NCS – National Crime Squad.
NDPB – Non-Departmental Public Body – an organisation that is funded, but not directly 
managed, by a government department.
NIM – the ACPO National Intelligence Model – an NCIS–produced model aimed at 
making the intelligence discipline more professional within law enforcement. 
NSPCC – National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.
NSPIS – the National Strategy for Police Information Systems. A range of information 
technology systems that aims to increase police effectiveness. 
O
Ofsted – Office for Standards in Education.
OIC – Officer in the Case – the police officer in charge of a case.
P
PACE – Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. An Act governing police powers and 
the rights of defendants. 
Phoenix – a PNC database, launched in 1995, which includes details of people 
convicted or cautioned for recordable offences (that is, those offences that carry the 
option of imprisonment).
PITO – Police Information Technology Organisation – responsible for the strategic 
development and delivery of IT systems to the police service.
PLX – an intelligence-flagging IT system currently being piloted by three police forces. 
PNC – Police National Computer – accessed by all police forces in England and Wales. 
POCA – Protection of Children Act List – a DfES-maintained list of those considered to be 
unsuitable to work with children. 
Police Act 1996 – the principal Act dealing with the organisation, administration and 
management of the police.
Police Reform Act 2002 – an Act designed to improve the efficiency of the Police 
Service.
POVA – Protection of Vulnerable Adults List – a DfES-maintained list, detailing individuals 
deemed unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults in the health and social care sectors. 
PPAF – Policing Performance Assessment Framework – performance measures that 
span the remit of police work.
Prosecution – pursuance of a lawsuit or criminal trial. 
Protection of Children Act 1999 – an Act that set up systems to identify people 
considered unsuitable to work with children.
Q
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R
Registered Body – an organisation listed in a register maintained by the national CRB.
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 – the Act enabling some criminal convictions to 
become ‘spent’ after a given period of time.
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order England and Wales 1975 
– makes provisions that all convictions (spent or unspent) are to be disclosed by an 
applicant when applying for a specified position, which includes a post working with 
children or vulnerable adults.
S
Spent conviction – under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, a conviction may 
become ‘spent’, that is an offender does not have to reveal or admit its existence, after 
a given period of time. 
SSID – Social Services Information Database – a national IT database used by many 
social services authorities.
Summons – an order requiring a person to attend court.
T
No entries for this letter. 
U
Unspent conviction – a conviction that has not become ‘spent’ under the Rehabilitation 
of Offenders Act 1974.
URN – Unique Reference Number – a unique number ascribed to the individual 
concerned when a record was made on CIS Nominals in Humberside Police.
USI – unlawful sexual intercourse. Under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 it is an offence, 
subject to certain exceptions, for a man to have unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
girl under the age of 16 years. It is also an offence for a man to have unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a girl under the age of 13, without exceptions.
V
VISOR – Violent and Sex Offenders’ Register.
W/X 
No entries for these letters.
Y
Y2K – Year 2000 Compliance. Refers to the millennium bug that many feared would 
affect IT systems everywhere at the start of 2000.
Z
No entry for this letter.A.   The Huntley case
In order to ascertain what occurred in the Huntley case, I will need all 
information and documentation concerning any contact between Huntley 
and the police and other agencies. From those organisations that had such 
contact, I invite
  1.  A detailed chronological description of the nature of each such contact, 
with explanation as appropriate about actions taken or not taken as a 
result. If possible, this should be supported by statements from those directly 
involved at the time. If that is not possible, the sources of the description 
should be indicated.
  2.  Copies of all documentation generated in such contacts.
B.   The local and national picture from 1995 to the 
present
In order to build up a picture of the factual position from 1995 and as it now 
exists, I will need to examine in particular the following (both locally and 
nationally):
  1.  What were/are the systems, policy and practice for recording information 
in relation to those against whom allegations of criminal or unlawful 
conduct are made and those who are convicted of offences or whose 
cases are disposed of in some other way (eg caution)? Included within this 
category are timing of record creation (including updating) and the use of 
pseudonyms by those the subject of information recorded.
  2.   What were/are the systems, policy and practice for retaining such 
information? Of particular interest in this area are systems, policy and 
practice relating to weeding or deleting information: eg how often this was/
is done in relation to what categories of information; what tests were/are 
applied; what were/are the perceived legal (including specifically Data 
Protection Act) constraints – and how were/are they applied in practice; 
who made/makes the decisions. 
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  3.  What were/are the systems, policy and practice in relation to the use of 
such information in vetting. Of particular interest in this area are: (a) the 
nature of the vetting requests; (b) the nature of the searches then carried 
out; (c) the nature of liaison with other agencies at this (or any earlier) 
stage; (d) steps taken to deal with identification issues/problems (including 
pseudonyms); (e) tests applied in determining the level of vetting; (f) tests 
applied in determining what information should be disclosed, in particular in 
relation to enhanced vetting.
  4.  What changes relevant to the systems, policy and practice of recording, 
retaining and using such information in vetting are in train or proposed?
C.   The future
In relation to the future, I invite comments and views on any of the above 
areas or any other areas or issues those responding consider relevant. 
I would particularly welcome comment and views on changes that could 
usefully be made and any practical or legal difficulties or considerations to 
be borne in mind in considering such changes.Appendix 2
Evidence received by the Inquiry
List of witnesses 
This is a list of those who gave oral evidence and/or written statements to the Inquiry. 
Those organisations and government departments whose representatives gave oral 
evidence also provided written submissions.
Organisation Name  Oral  (O)
   Written  (W)
ACPO Fox,  C  O
 Readhead,  I  O
 Grange,  T  W
ACPOS Gorman,  B  O     
 Hamilton,  A  O
 McCandlish,  I  O
 McSporran,  J  O
 Ovens,  R  O
ADSS Cozens,  A  O
 Held,  J  O
 Thompson,  P  O
Audit Commission  Ainsworth, R  O
 Davies,  G  O
Cambridgeshire Constabulary  Haddow, W  O/W
 Lightley,  C  O/W
 Lloyd,  T  O/W
 Ashford,  C  W
 Barnes,  S  W
 Barton,  C  W
 Baxter,  T  W
 Brookes,  A  W
 Causer,  R  W
 Christie,  D  W
 Cooke,  W  W
 Cooper,  D  W
 Cranwell,  R  W
 Cummins,  J  W
 Davidson,  T  W
 Deane,  A  W
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 Dew,  S  W
 Dolamore,  R  W
 Dougal,  J  W
 Driscoll,  P  W
 Eales,  J  W
 Fairbank,  D  W
 Feavyour,  J  W
 Ford,  C  W
 Giddings,  J  W
 Harding,  S  W
 Ingrey,  G  W
 Kelly,  R  W
 Lane,  M  W
 Leader,  R  W
 Lidstone,  N  W
 Mann,  P  W
 Moores,  P  W
 Mulligan,  A  W
 Newman,  M  W
 Nicholson,  P  W
 Phillipson,  P  W
 Pinner,  C  W
 Plant,  J  W
 Potter,  J  W
 Ross,  M  W
 Rushmer,  J  W
 Simpson,  K  W
 Stevenson,  C  W
 Swain,  G  W
 Toland,  R  W
 Vajzovic,  D  W
 Wate,  R  W
 Watts,  P  W
 Webster,  A  W
 Winser,  R  W
 Wood,  J  W
CRB Gaskell,  V  O
 O’Brien,  J  O
DfES Efunshile,  A  O
 Hevey,  D  O
 Lefﬂ   er,  M  O
 MacKenzie,  H  O
Department of Health  Monks, V  O
 Nash,  A  O
 Sheehan,  A  O
EPM Cooper,  M  O     
 Curtis,  B  W     
 Walker,  R  W
Organisation Name  Oral  (O)
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HMIC  Povey, Sir K  O
 Todd,  P  O
Home Office  Goldie, C  O
 Rimmer,  S  O
Humberside Police  Appleton, K  O/W
 Baggs,  G  O/W
 Billam,  P  O/W
 Carroll,  C  O/W
 Chatha,  D  O/W
 Harding,  M  O/W
 Heatley,  R  O/W
 Hibbitt,  S  O/W
 Hunter,  D  O/W
 Tait,  N  O/W
 Westwood,  D  O/W
 Adcock,  M  W
 Biggs,  R  W
 Casswell,  P  W
 Clark,  R  W
 Crosse,  J  W
 Dent,  W  W
 Garrod,  H  W
 Gell,  L  W
 Higgins,  R  W
 Hill,  M  W
 Hodges,  E  W
 Hodgson,  S  W
 Hopper,  M  W
 Hume,  C  W
 Hunter,  D  W
 Johnson,  K  W
 Keightley,  I  W
 Larkin,  A  W
 Love,  S  W
 MacDougal,  G  W
 Miller,  N  W
 Ramskill,  G  W
 Snowden,  P  W
 Spicksley,  P  W
 Stokes,  S  W
 Stone,  K  W
 Teasdale,  M  W
 Thompson,  M  W
 Ward,  J  W
 Ware,  M  W
 Worrall,  P  W
Humberside Police Authority  Inglis, C  O/W
Information Commissioner  Smith, D  O
 Thomas,  R  O
Organisation Name  Oral  (O)
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Liberty Chakrabati,  S  O
 Crossman,  G  O
Lincolnshire Police  Knowles, C  O
NAHT James,  K  O
NASUWT Howard,  M  O
 Keates,  C  O
National Audit Office  Barker, G  O
 Murphie,  A  O
North East Lincolnshire Social Services  Eaden, M  O/W
 Watters,  P  O/W
NSPCC Atkinson,  C  O
 Cleary,  K  O
 Noyes,  P  O
National Union of Teachers  Brown, A  O
Professional Association of Teachers  Brierley, D  O
PITO McArthur,  T  O
 Webb,  P  O
Secondary Heads Association  Bird, R  O
Soham Village College  Gilbert, H  O/W
Scottish Secondary Teachers’ Association  Eaglesham, D  O
Turnbull, L  Former Humberside Police Officer  W 
Wood, R  Former Humberside Police Ofﬁ  cer  W
Organisation Name  Oral  (O)
   Written  (W)The Bichard Inquiry – Appendix 2 169
Organisations that provided written submissions but were not asked 
to give oral evidence
Association of Police Authorities 
Association of Teachers and Lecturers
Cambridgeshire County Council
Centrex
Churches’ Child Protection Advisory Service
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
Department for Constitutional Affairs
Disclosure Scotland
General Council of the Bar
General Teaching Council for England
General Teaching Council for Scotland
HMIC for Scotland
Law Society
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders 
National Probation Service (Humberside)
Ofsted
Oxfordshire County Council
Police Federation of England and Wales
R E Austin Ltd
Scottish Executive
Scottish Police Federation
Scottish Superintendents’ Association
Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales
United Kingdom Passport Service
Victim Support
Women Against Rape
In addition, the Inquiry was also provided with information by many organisations and 
members of the public.Humberside Police records
This information was provided to the Inquiry by Humberside Police.
There were four information systems in use over the relevant period:
•  the Police National Computer (PNC);
•  the local Criminal Intelligence System (CIS), made up of the CIS 
Nominals and CIS Crime applications;
•  the Child Protection Database (CPD); and
•  the Integrated Criminal Justice System (ICJS).
The PNC
  1  Introduced in 1974, the PNC is directly accessible to all police forces in 
England and Wales. Before 1995, paper records of arrested people were 
forwarded by local police forces to the National Identification Service (NIS). 
•  In May 1995, the Phoenix ‘nominal’ database was launched nationally 
to improve the existing Criminal Names Index. 
•  This ‘nominal’ or ‘descriptive’ database can hold a record about name, 
age, sex and height, along with other details, such as aliases, addresses 
and modus operandi (common features and patterns of illegal 
behaviour). 
•  From this time, local police forces were responsible for putting 
information onto the PNC. 
Form 310
  2  At this time, Humberside Police introduced Form 310 (Phoenix descriptive), 
which officers had to complete by hand. Form 310 was designed to give 
all the information that was needed for the PNC and was meant to be filed 
when, or shortly after, a person was charged or summonsed or an offence 
was disposed of by way of a formal caution. 
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  3  The job of inputting information from Form 310 onto the PNC was the 
responsibility of the civilian staff in the Conviction Service Bureau, a part 
of each of the three Administration Support Units that serviced the four 
divisions of Humberside Police. 
  4  Form 310 was also sent to the relevant Divisional Intelligence Bureaux (DIBx) 
– in each of the divisions of Humberside Police. The DIBx were staffed by a 
combination of police officers and civilian staff and were understood, at 
least by operational officers, to be responsible for inputting information and 
intelligence onto the local police intelligence system, CIS Nominals.
  5  When the ICJS was introduced, between 1995 and 1997, a copy of a 
charge prepared on it would automatically print out in the local Conviction 
Service Bureau. This would then be used immediately to create a skeleton 
PNC record. Later, the full arrest/summons report would be completed after 
receipt of Form 310, as explained above.
  6  Before November 1995, in common with other police forces, Humberside 
Police did not put any cautions for reportable offences onto the PNC, 
because the PNC program was not designed to allow this. Instead, they 
were recorded locally on CIS Nominals. 
  7  After November 1995, such cautions could be put onto the PNC, but any 
issued before that date were not immediately put onto the system. In 1999 
Humberside Police implemented a back-record conversion programme 
for a limited number of offences, following liaison with the Home Office. 
(Police forces wishing to convert existing cautions were required first to 
liaise with the Home Office, due to a concern that a large-scale conversion 
exercise would cause a backlog at the National Fingerprint Office, as 
fingerprint records were required to confirm the identity of the subject of 
the electronic record.)
  8  It was the responsibility of the local police force that had created the 
records to review and delete them when appropriate, under data 
protection legislation. 
  9  Humberside Police would conduct the review at the relevant time, in 
accordance with the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) Code of 
Practice on Data Protection 1995 (called the 1995 ACPO Code). 
  10  In May 1996, Humberside Police introduced a process by which certain 
cases (including those involving a court case where there had been an 
acquittal for unlawful sexual intercourse or other sex offences) would be 
reported to a supervisor so that a decision whether or not to keep a record 
on the PNC, in accordance with the 1995 ACPO Code, could be taken at 
superintendent level.
The CIS
  11  The CIS was a local database, with two applications, operated by 
Humberside Police. In 1995, the system had been with the force for about 
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tool ... to store and supply comprehensive information and intelligence on 
crime and criminals to assist police in both administrative and operational 
roles’. 
  12  The CIS was updated at the end of 1999 for Y2K compliance. From that 
time, the old system was known as ‘CIS 1’ and the new one as ‘CIS 2’. 
CIS Nominals – the core intelligence tool 
 13  CIS Nominals (one of the two CIS applications) held information about 
people who came to the attention of the police in connection with criminal 
activity, or alleged criminal activity. It was Humberside Police’s core 
intelligence tool.
  14  Inputting data onto the CIS system was the responsibility of the four DIBx. 
So, to find its way onto CIS Nominals, that information had to be supplied, 
by police officers, to one of the four DIBx via a range of documents routinely 
submitted. Thus, record creation would only work effectively if:
•  the police officers handling cases routinely and promptly supplied 
information to the DIBx; and
•  that information was input in an efficient, timely way by the DIBx. 
  15  The manual records routinely sent to the DIBx to create CIS Nominals records 
were: 
•  custody and bail records; 
•  Form 310; and
•  Form 839, the dedicated intelligence report form.
Unique Reference Number
  16  When a new record was made on CIS Nominals, a Unique Reference 
Number (URN) was assigned to the individual concerned. The CIS Nominals 
record was ‘owned’ by the Humberside Police division where the subject of 
the record lived.
  17  When a record was made, a review date would be set. If no review date 
was set, there was an automatic default date of one year from the date 
the record was created. 
Datasets or categories
  18  Information on CIS Nominals could be recorded in 13 different datasets or 
categories. So, for example: 
•  the ‘summary’ screen (dataset 1) had details of the name, age, sex and 
the CIS URN; 
•  the ‘modus operandi’ (m.o.) screen had details of the method used in 
criminal activity or alleged criminal activity; and174 The Bichard Inquiry – Appendix 3
•  the ‘general information’ screen (dataset 11), which was the most 
relevant during the period of Humberside Police’s contacts with Huntley. 
This was used for recording intelligence about the individual concerned. 
Each piece of information input into dataset 11 was meant to have a 
review date. If there was no review date, the system inserted its default 
date one year from that particular record’s creation.
  19  CIS Nominals could be searched against the name of an individual.
Automatic review of records
  20  Each month the system automatically presented the records for review by 
generating and printing two reports: one listed whole records that were 
due for review; and the other listed records in which there were individual 
items of intelligence, recorded in dataset 11, that were due for review. 
Both reports had lists of the relevant URNs. 
20.1   Twenty-eight days before the review date entered on the record, 
the reports would be posted, via internal mail, to whichever police 
division ‘owned’ the record in question. For example, if a record 
had a review date of 1 August 2001, the list would be generated for 
review in early July 2001. 
20.2  Until May 2000, the reviews were conducted at the DIBx by police 
officers and after that date by civilian staff. 
20.3  Until February 2001 (when the review process was halted as it was 
realised it was not working as it should), in order for a record not to 
be deleted on, or shortly after, the review date, the person reviewing 
that record had to set a new review date. If this was not done, the 
record would be automatically deleted. 
20.4  When the system was first set up in 1985, the term ‘deleted’ meant 
‘archived’. In 1986, the system was changed and deleted meant 
permanently lost.
Guidance on deleting records
 21  There  were:
•  the 1995 ACPO Code principles, dealt with in more detail below; and
•  two Humberside Police-produced documents: 
–  the ‘Force Standing Order of 1990’ (also called the ‘1990 Standing 
Order’), which appears to have been based on the 1987 ACPO 
Code of Practice; and 
–  Humberside Police’s 1996 ‘Weeding Policy and Criteria’, usually 
called the ‘1996 Force Weeding Rules’, which followed the 1995 
ACPO Code. 
Intelligence grading
  22  There is a common intelligence grading system within police forces. 
•  It used to be called the ‘4x4 system’. It is now called the ‘5x5x5 system’.The Bichard Inquiry – Appendix 3 175
22.1  In essence, the system grades information held by the police 
according to two scales: 
•  first, the reliability of the source (graded by letters, with ‘A’ being 
the best); and second, the reliability of the information (graded by 
numbers, with ‘1’ being the best). The extra element in the 5x5x5 
system introduced a code for the handling and dissemination of 
the information.
  23  The 1990 Standing Order stated that:
23.1  Information about people with formal cautions, but no convictions, 
had a ‘weed date’ of three years from the date of the last caution.
23.2  Information about people with no convictions or cautions had a 
‘weed date’ of one year from the last entry. 
23.3  If the evaluation code was A (1–4), B (1–4), C(1) and X(1) [that is, 
‘high grade’ intelligence], general information (in dataset 11) on CIS 
Nominals was to be reviewed one year from entry, unless an earlier 
review date had been put in.
23.4  But if information evaluation codes were (C (2–4) and X (2–4) [that 
is, ‘low grade’ intelligence] the information ‘should only be retained 
for three months’. 
The 1995 ACPO Code
  24  The need for flexibility in deciding whether or not to keep intelligence was 
emphasised at the outset: ‘The need to retain or remove [information in 
criminal intelligence records] can only be judged from the nature of the 
information, the person to whom it relates and the circumstances prevailing 
at the time in question.’
  25  Accordingly, it was ‘not possible to lay down strict criteria for the removal of 
data from criminal intelligence records’. 
  26  The 1995 ACPO Code suggested that intelligence records should be 
graded when they were created and that review dates should be specified 
6, 12 or 24 months on from that date. It also stressed that, in some cases, 
information might have to be retained for long periods if the police were 
effectively to discharge their duties, for example in cases involving persistent 
offenders or those convicted of sexual offences.
The 1996 Force Weeding Rules 
  27  These remained in place until September 2003. They began by stressing 
that it was not compulsory for the data to be removed within the 
timescales prescribed in the Rules, but that a review should be carried 
out, the information assessed and a decision made as to whether to 
retain it. However, in relation to dataset 11(that is, the set likely to contain 
intelligence information), the Rules stated: ‘Information held should be 
reviewed and weeded accordingly after 12 months. No weed date should 
exceed this period.’ [Inquiry’s bold] 176 The Bichard Inquiry – Appendix 3
CIS Crime
  28  The second CIS application was the crime recording system, CIS Crime, 
which contained details of all crimes reported, recorded, detected and 
disposed of. 
  29  There were a number of datasets, or screens, including a ‘Summary’ screen 
and an ‘Offenders/Wanted Persons’ screen. The ‘Disposal’ screen had a 
number of options, including:
•  ‘undetected’ (no offenders interviewed, charged or reported for this 
offence); 
•  ‘no crime’ (meaning that a decision had been made that the incident 
should not be classified as a crime); and
•  ‘detected’ (offence detected, offender charged/summonsed). 
Creating records on CIS Crime
  30  The Crime Report Form was the one ‘paper’ document that created a 
record on CIS Crime. This was then updated by a series of other Crime 
Report Forms as the case progressed. However, information for the initial 
record on CIS Crime was often just telephoned in to those responsible for 
creating the record, before a Crime Report Form was submitted. 
  31  Creating records on the CIS Crime system was mainly done by the Central 
Crime Input Bureau, a central unit for Humberside Police. However, crime 
administration staff in the four DIBx also had some CIS Crime inputting 
functions and were responsible for updating the system with a case’s 
‘finalisation code’, recording its result (for example, ‘detected’, or the more 
detailed disposal codes that existed). 
CIS Crime’s search function
  32  The only way to search for an individual’s past contacts with the police was 
through the ‘Offenders’ screen (dataset 3), not by a specific name, but only 
via the URN or the Criminal Records Office (CRO) number, a unique number 
given to an individual following arrest. 
Using CIS Crime to search CIS Nominals
  33  However, from December 1999 and the launch of CIS 2, it was possible:
•  to do a full search by name; and
•  to search both CIS Crime and CIS Nominals in one search through CIS 
Crime. 
Once it became possible to search by name, CIS Crime was opened up as 
an intelligence tool.
Removing records from CIS Crime
  34  The normal retention period for records on the ‘live’ CIS Crime system was 
three years. After that, the record was archived on other back-up media 
(magnetic tapes and, later, CDs) where it was held indefinitely. But a The Bichard Inquiry – Appendix 3 177
retention marker (‘retain’) could be added to preserve the record on the 
‘live’ system, where it would stay until the marker was removed. 
The CPD
  35  Humberside Police’s CPD was set up in 1991. It was a single database and 
was used by the four divisional Child Protection Units. 
35.1  Records were created on it when a member of one of the Child 
Protection Units sent a copy of Form 547, the ‘Record of Initial 
Decision’ in a case, to a co-ordinator based at Humberside Police 
headquarters, where it was then passed to a clerk for inputting. 
35.2  In 1995, the CPD had a number of screens (or datasets) that allowed 
a range of information to be recorded. One screen mirrored the 
content of Form 547 (the screen was called a ‘Record of Initial 
Decision’). There was also a screen for inputting details about the 
alleged offender or abuser, and another for the decision taken in 
the case. 
35.3  The CPD could be searched against a name to determine whether 
either the victim or the alleged offender/abuser was on the system. 
35.4  Access to the information on the CPD was via the co-ordinator’s 
office. 
Reviewing the CPD’s records
  36  There was no review of any of the CPD’s records until 2001 and 2002, when 
records were reviewed and deleted according to a policy that was set out 
in detail by Humberside Police in their evidence to the Inquiry. 
The ICJS
  37  The ICJS was introduced across Humberside Police between 1995 and 1997 
and is installed in all custody suites. It dealt (and, pending the introduction 
of National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS), still deals) with 
initial processing of prisoners brought into custody. 
  38  It creates a custody record and generates documents for a range of 
matters such as formal cautions, charges and bail. 
  39  All people arrested and taken to a police station are recorded on this 
system. 
  40  ICJS operates via a series of screens that follow on one from the other as 
details are recorded. Once the personal details of the subject are filled in, 
the system automatically sends a message to the PNC bureau asking them 
to check the PNC and CIS Nominals.
  41  ICJS did not, and does not, automatically generate records for review. 
Since its inception, no records have been deleted from it. 178 The Bichard Inquiry – Appendix 3
Social Services records
  42  Social Services recorded their referrals onto a Client Enquiry Form. The 
information was then recorded onto the Social Services Information 
Database (SSID) (a nationally recognised system used by many social 
services authorities) as a ‘Referral and Information Record’. 
  43  Social Services used Form 547 whenever they decided to make an onward 
reference to the police about an incident referred to them. 
  44  Form 547 would be completed by both Social Services and the police 
(usually over the telephone) to ensure that both services had an agreed 
record of the referral.
  45  Other paper records were also kept by social workers, including:
• diary  sheets; 
•  records of telephone and other conversations;
• letters;  and 
•  notes of meetings.
  46  Paper records were filed under the name of the child. There was no system 
of indexing to the name of the alleged abuser. 
  47  The SSID contained, in skeleton form, the information that had been 
recorded in the Client Enquiry Form, but it had a limited function. It could 
search and retrieve data by reference to the child’s name and it had 
the capacity to record free text (that is, a form of ad hoc note keeping). 
However, it had no facility to search under the name of the alleged abuser 
or do a word search in the free text section. 
  48  Records were not kept in a way that could help inform Social Services 
about previous contacts between themselves and an alleged abuser.   1  This appendix covers the system that was operating when Huntley was 
vetted for the job of school caretaker. It also looks at the List schemes run 
by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and the Department of 
Health, and it contrasts these with the Enhanced Disclosure scheme. Finally 
it looks at vetting systems in other countries.
The system in operation when Huntley was vetted
  2  At the time of Huntley’s vetting check, in December 2001, guidance and 
vetting arrangements were set out in Home Office Circular 47/93. The 
circular covered checks on people who were applying to local authorities 
or schools for work that would give them ‘substantial unsupervised access, 
on a sustained or regular basis … to children under the age of sixteen’. 
The police check process
  3  Guidance was given on the meaning of ‘substantial access’ and therefore 
on whether a post qualified for a police check. 
  4  A list of the main groups of people, for whom checks should be considered, 
included ‘other staff in schools or education departments who have 
substantial opportunity for access to children (e.g. … school caretakers)’. 
This definition clearly covered Huntley’s application for Residential Site 
Officer or caretaker. 
  5  The police check was made against national and local police records for 
all the posts covered by the Home Office Circular.
  6  Home Office Circular 47/93 also made it clear that police checks:
‘… must not take the place of normal personnel procedures and 
safeguards. References should be required and taken up, and birth 
certificates and educational/professional qualifications verified, in 
the case of all new appointments; unexplained gaps in employment 
history should be satisfactorily accounted for. Further information 
about the recruitment, selection and appointment of staff can 
be found in Chapters 3 to 5 of Choosing with Care (the Report of 
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the Committee of Inquiry into the Selection, Development and 
Management of Staff in Children’s Homes – HMSO, December 1992).’
  7  A police check should not have been requested until a conditional offer of 
appointment had been made. Requests for a police check would be sent 
to the chief officer of the police force of the area in which the applicant 
had applied to work, who would liaise as necessary with the applicant’s 
‘home’ force. 
  8  Authorities were advised to consider making a statement available to 
people who may be subject to a criminal records check to reassure them 
that ex-offenders would not be rejected automatically. A model statement 
was offered for the purpose.
  9  Home Office Circular 47/93 also stated:
‘Authorities should make every effort to confirm the identity of 
the applicant before the police are asked to process a check. 
Verification of identity, date of birth and of any change of 
name should be obtained. Incomplete or incorrect information 
may invalidate the police check and lead to failure to discover 
relevant convictions.’
  10  The police checks procedure outlined in Circular 47/93 was as follows:
10.1  Requests had to be made on a specific form. Part A was completed 
by the applicant, who was required to disclose any convictions, 
bind-overs or cautions. The applicant also had to provide relevant 
details, including any previous surnames and addresses in the past 
five years. The applicant declared that the information given was 
true, and gave consent to a police record check being made. 
10.2  The form was then countersigned by the Senior Nominated Officer 
(the person responsible for the carrying out of the procedure) to 
confirm that the particulars provided on the form had been verified 
and that he or she was satisfied they were accurate.
10.3  The form was sent to the police force in the area where the 
applicant had applied to work.
10.4  That force was to liaise, as necessary, with the applicant’s ‘home’ 
force(s) as identified by the address on the form.
10.5  Once the checks had been carried out, the form was returned 
to the employer detailing convictions and any other relevant 
information. 
10.6  The form had two boxes for use by the ‘home’ force after it had 
received all the relevant information from other forces. The first 
stated: ‘No trace on details supplied.’ The second stated: ‘The 
subject appears identical with the person whose criminal record 
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National and local checks
  11  Checks would include looking at the relevant national police records on 
the Police National Computer (PNC), which included information about 
convictions, cautions, reprimands and final warnings for recordable 
offences (that is, offences that carry a custodial sentence). It also had 
details of pending prosecutions and other disposals, such as charges 
directed to ‘lie on file’. All PNC records were subject to review and deletion.
  12  Spent and unspent convictions would be revealed, so long as they were 
retained on the PNC. This was because the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 
1974 did not apply to offences that were the subject of a police check 
(see the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) (England and 
Wales) Order 1975, as amended by the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
(Exceptions) (Amendment) Order 1986). 
 13  Local police records were not dealt with in detail in Circular 47/93, but:
‘… might contain details of:
convictions for certain minor offences 
cautions
bind-overs
other relevant factual information which the police would be 
prepared, if necessary, to present as evidence before a court or 
tribunal. This may include information about acquittals or decisions 
not to prosecute where the circumstances of the case give cause 
for concern.
Information from local records, other than details of convictions, 
non-conviction bind-overs and cautions, should be disclosed 
only on the authority of a police officer of the rank of Assistant 
Chief Constable or above or, where appropriate, the Head of the 
National Identification Bureau.’
  14  Therefore, Huntley’s vetting check also involved a search of local police 
records. After any non-conviction or formal caution information had been 
found, the next stage was for a senior police officer to make a judgement 
about whether or not particular information should be disclosed to 
the employer.
  15  If the information provided by the police differed from that provided by the 
applicant, and was of significance, the employer was required to discuss 
the discrepancy with the applicant before reaching a decision. It is clear 
that the general rule was that information provided to employers as a result 
of police checks could be discussed with the prospective employee. 
  16  The Home Office Circular dealt with how the employer might use the 
information supplied by the police, stressing that a person’s suitability for a 
post needed to be judged by the employer in the light of all the information 
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sexual, violent or drug offences would be ‘particularly strong contra-
indications for work with children’. In a similar vein, it was stated that ‘the 
chance for rehabilitation must be weighed against the need to protect 
children’, and that a series of offences over time was more likely to give 
cause for concern than an isolated minor conviction. 
The List schemes compared with Enhanced Disclosure
  17  There are currently overlapping, but different, control schemes, or Lists:
• the  Protection of Children Act (POCA) List and List 99 from the DfES;
• the  Protection of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) List run by the DfES on behalf 
of the Department of Health from July 2004 (the proposed operation of 
this list is summarised in the supplementary report to the Inquiry by the 
Department of Health, dated 29 March 2004); and 
• the  Enhanced Disclosure regime run by the Criminal Records Bureau 
(CRB), the police and employers. Anyone who comes under the remit 
of the three lists is likely to fall within the Enhanced Disclosure regime.
There are differences:
•  within the List schemes; and
•  between the List schemes and Enhanced Disclosure.
  18  The purpose of each List scheme is to prevent or minimise the risk of 
unsuitable people occupying positions of trust that give them access to 
vulnerable groups. However, there is a considerable overlap between them. 
The purpose of Enhanced Disclosure is the same.
18.1  The List schemes are ‘exclusionary with sanctions’, which means that 
a person put onto any List is forbidden, on pain of criminal sanction, 
from working with the group of vulnerable people covered by that 
List’s particular regime. Under the current Enhanced Disclosure 
regime there are no criminal sanctions. The final decision about a 
person’s suitability for a job is made by the employer. 
18.2  Under the List schemes, decisions about an applicant’s employability 
are taken by central/national bodies (that is, the DfES and the 
Department of Health). Under the Enhanced Disclosure regime, 
the decision is taken by a local employer. 
  19  Under the List schemes, the decision-making processes about who should 
be placed on the Lists are broadly similar, although there are significant 
differences between them individually, and also between them as a whole 
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Stage 1 – referrals 
 20  The POCA List and List 99 refer information about the applicant to the 
decision-making body. Some organisations have a duty to refer. For 
example, under the POCA List scheme ‘child care organisations’, defined 
in the legislation as being concerned with providing accommodation (such 
as a children’s home), social services, healthcare services or the supervision 
of children, are under such a duty. Under the List 99 scheme, ‘relevant 
employers’ and agencies – essentially those employing or placing teachers 
and ancillary workers in the education service – are under a duty to refer. 
  21  The Enhanced Disclosure regime has no obligation to refer information to 
a central decision-making body; there is merely provision for the possibility 
of reporting matters of concern. The evidence suggests that there is a lack 
of clarity about how this voluntary reporting system is meant to work and 
an inconsistency in its operation, with some bodies regularly reporting and 
others not. 
  22  Under the POCA List, information is referred which might render a person 
unsuitable to work in a ‘regulated position’: that is, a position that the DfES 
describes as ‘involving regular contact with children’. 
  23  Similarly, List 99 calls for ‘prescribed information’ that might make a person 
unsuitable to work with children. 
  24  The coverage of the POCA List corresponds almost exactly with the 
Enhanced Disclosure regime, which makes it difficult to understand the 
important differences between the schemes – how, and by whom, the 
decisions on employability are made, for example. 
Stages 2 and 3 – decision taking
 25  Stage 2 in the POCA List scheme involves a decision as to whether the 
subject of the referral should be provisionally included on the list. This 
will have the effect of preventing the person from working with children 
pending a final decision. There is no equivalent under List 99. 
  26  In contrast, under the Enhanced Disclosure regime, employers can choose 
to employ a person, even in the face of concerns that might trigger 
provisional inclusion on the POCA List. Employers can also employ people 
and allow them to start working with children or vulnerable adults before 
police checks are completed.
 27  Stage 3 involves a decision about whether or not a person should be 
included on the lists. Under POCA, this decision is taken by a senior civil 
servant. In the case of the List 99 scheme, it is taken by a minister. 
Representations and appeal
  28  There are other differences. The List schemes give an opportunity for 
the subject of the decision to make representations before the decision 
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  29  Under the Enhanced Disclosure regime, that opportunity is only available in 
the sense that the applicant can comment on the information given to the 
employer. However, an element of damage is likely to have been done by 
that stage because the employer will have already formed a view about 
the applicant.
 30  Stage 4 is the appeal. Under the POCA List scheme, there is a right of 
appeal to the Care Standards Tribunal (under a judge’s chairmanship). 
This is in the nature of a rehearing. 
  31  Under the List 99 scheme, there is also a right of appeal to the Care 
Standards Tribunal, but the review is restricted to consideration of the 
material that was before the minister. 
  32  Under the Enhanced Disclosure regime, there is no appeal against an 
employer’s decision. The applicant has to challenge the police decision 
to release the information, through a judicial review. 
Obligations on employers and applicants
  33  Under the POCA List scheme, ‘child care organisations’ are obliged to 
check the List before offering employment and may not employ a person 
on the List. A similar regime operates under the List 99 scheme. 
  34  However, other employers that offer positions creating similar risks, and for 
that reason covered by the Enhanced Disclosure regime, are under no 
similar obligations. 
  35  Under pain of criminal sanction, a person included on the Lists may not 
knowingly apply for a job in any of the sectors covered by the Lists. There 
is no similar criminal sanction for those subject to the Enhanced Disclosure 
regime who have been refused a job as a result of a police check.
  36  The POVA List scheme will mirror aspects of the other Lists. 
The vetting process in other countries 
  37  Information collated by the Home Office in April 2004 about the 
vetting processes in other countries is on the Inquiry website at 
www.bichardinquiry.org.uk 
  38  It is based on published material mainly from official sites, newspaper 
articles and online reports. In addition, information has been obtained from 
the NSPCC 2000 publication of the findings of the EU-funded CUPICSO 
project, an overview of The Collection and Use of Personal Information on 
Child Sex Offenders in EU countries.
The countries covered are: 
  39  non-EU: Australia (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and 
Victoria), Canada (British Columbia and Ontario), New Zealand and the 
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  40  EU: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. 
In summary, this information shows:
Legislation for vetting
  41  The majority of countries either already have in place, or are in the process 
of introducing, legislation covering the vetting of people in child-related 
employment, with the exceptions of Germany and Spain, where no recent 
information on legislative arrangements has been obtained after 2001. In 
Spain, it is thought that the mandatory vetting of prospective employees 
may be considered discriminatory.
Data protection and privacy 
  42  All countries take privacy and data protection considerations into account 
when dealing with the vetting of prospective employees. The handling 
of such personal information is covered by relevant privacy and data 
protection legislation. 
  43  In the majority of countries, the applicant’s consent is required before any 
vetting process is started. 
  44  In Australia, criminal records information is considered confidential, and 
employers and vetting agencies are required to ensure the confidentiality 
of any information obtained. In Queensland specifically, the employer is 
notified only on the suitability of the applicant, without any criminal records 
details being disclosed.
  45  In the USA, the court in each state has to decide on the publicising of a sex 
offender’s identity. In some states, even though the court has allowed it, law 
enforcement agencies have decided not to proceed on this basis.
  46  For the EU’s (at that time) 15 member countries, data protection principles 
protect the confidentiality of criminal records and permission by the 
individual concerned is required for any checks. 
Type of records held
  47  All countries hold criminal records of convictions, and often of any pending 
charges for criminal offences, including sexual offences. In New South 
Wales, Australia, additional background checks are carried out to search 
for records of child abuse allegations and disciplinary proceedings involving 
violent and sexual acts, while working with children.
  48  In some countries (such as France, the USA and Australia) there are 
separate sex offenders’ registers in place. 
  49  Many countries are establishing, or have established, national DNA 
databases for criminal offenders, but only a few have a separate sex 
offenders’ DNA database. Australia is developing a unified DNA database. 
In the USA, the FBI’s National Sex Offenders Database holds convicted sex 
offenders’ fingerprints and ID details.186 The Bichard Inquiry – Appendix 4
Vetting procedures 
  50  In some countries there is a single agency co-ordinating and carrying out 
child-related employment vetting (for example, Ireland). In other countries 
‘approved agencies’ are responsible for vetting checks (for example, parts 
of Australia). 
  51  In some cases, the checks are carried out by the police (for example, 
New Zealand) but co-ordinated by a central body. In other cases, the 
co-ordinating central body also carries out the checks.
  52  The majority of countries use individuals’ names to confirm identity. In the 
USA, criminal history checks are based on fingerprinting.
Who is subject to vetting?
  53  People subject to vetting are mainly employees in child-related jobs. Some 
countries limit vetting to teachers and non-teaching staff in schools, while 
others cover only health-related professions. Contractors and short-term 
workers are also usually included, but for volunteers the position varies. 
  54  In many countries, the legislation relates to new employees entering the 
system from the date the relevant legislation became active. Retrospective 
checks are also carried out to cover existing employees in a few countries.
Repeat vetting
  55  The checks usually take from ten days to a few weeks, depending on the 
country’s system. In most countries, vetting is repeated every two to three 
years and at shorter intervals for short-term employees.
  56  In the USA, the National Sex Offenders Registry Assistance Program and the 
National Criminal History Improvement Program were established to ensure 
that accurate and up-to-date information is available and shared between 
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